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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996). Section 78-2a-3 states in part that "[t]he Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction . . . over . . . appeals from the district court 
involving domestic relations cases." 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Cross-Appeal: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Bert 
Thomas's income to be $69,567 for purposes of support, when the marshaled 
evidence does not support this finding? 
Standard of Review: A trial court is granted significant latitude in making 
findings of fact. The Court of Appeals will only review the trial court's findings to 
determine if the trial court abused its discretion, or to determine if the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 263-64 (Utah 
App. 1993)(citations omitted); Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877,879 (Utah App. 
1995). 
2. Reply to Appellant's Brief: Should the trial court's findings 
regarding child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of Bert Thomas 
Construction Inc.(BTCI) be reversed given the fact Ann Thomas failed to marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then show that the findings 
were unsupported by the evidence, and given the fact the evidence was sufficient to 
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support the trial court's findings? 
Standard of Review: In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact on 
appeal, the challenger "must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in 
question." Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996). 
In determining custody of a child, trial judges are accorded broad discretion. 
"Only where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of 
discretion, will [an appellate court] interpose its own judgment." Shioji v. ShiojL 
712 P.2d 197, 210 (Utah 1985). 
To fix alimony, at least three factors must be considered: (1) financial need 
of the receiving spouse; (2) the receiving spouse's ability to produce income; and 
(3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 
193, 198 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). "If these three factors have been 
considered, [an appellate court] will not disturb [alimony] unless such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Rappleve v. 
Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993)(citations omitted). 
For marital property, "the trial court is empowered to make such distributions 
as are just and equitable." Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980). 
A trial court's determination of marital property will not be disturbed absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah App. 1995). 
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The Court of Appeals will only review the trial court's findings to determine 
if the trial court abused its discretion, or to determine if the trial court's findings 
were clearly erroneous. Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah App. 1992); 
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989); Richie v. Richie. 784 
P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This cross-appeal arises from the divorce proceeding between Ann Thomas, 
Appellant/Plaintiff, and Bert Thomas, Appellee/Defendant. Bert Thomas cross-
appeals from the Findings of fact and Conclusion of Law, and Decree of Divorce 
signed and dated July 9, 1997. Bert Thomas was an employee of Bert Thomas 
Construction Inc. (BTCI). The trial court determined Bert Thomas's gross income 
for child support and alimony purposes by adding to his personal income all the net 
income of BTCI. Bert Thomas argued that the trial court erred in determining his 
income to be so high. The trial court stated that Bert Thomas's contention may be 
correct, but "it is best left for the appellate courts to revisit the complex financial 
arrangements of the parties." (Finding of Fact U 115, Record at 1116.) This appeal 
followed. 
Ann Thomas argued that the trial court abused its discretion in determining 
child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of Bert's business. Bert 
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Thomas supports the trial court's decision regarding these issues. 
Course of Proceedings 
Trial was held in December 1995 and was continued to February 1996. Oral 
arguments were heard on April 1, 1996. The trial court's Ruling was entered 
August 19, 1996. In the trial court's ruling, the issue of alimony was reserved to 
reflect the award of custody and allow financial statements to be resubmitted. 
Subsequent motions were heard. The trial court issued its final Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce on July 9, 1997. This appeal followed. 
Disposition Below 
The trial court found Bert Thomas's income to be $69,567 per year. Based 
on this finding, the trial court set alimony and child support. The trial court 
awarded custody of the two children to Bert Thomas, subject to a liberal visitation 
schedule. The trial court distributed the parties personal property so that the values 
of the assets of both parties were nearly equal. No attempt was made to place a 
value on BTCI other than the value of the hard assets. The hard assets (tools, 
equipment, materials) of BTCI were included in the equitable distribution of 
personal property. Bert Thomas was awarded a $150,000 value in the real estate as 
premarital property. After the marriage, the property appreciated. Ann Thomas 
received one half of the appreciated value of the real estate to compensate her for 
her maintenance and modest contributions to the home. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Bert Thomas raises two argument on appeal. First, the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding his income to be $69,567 per year. All of the evidence 
marshaled in support of the trial court does not support this finding. Second, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Bert Thomas custody of the 
children, limited alimony to three years, awarded Bert Thomas a $150,000 
premarital value in the home, and valued Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI). 
Both arguments will be summarized below. 
1. Bert Thomas's income was not $69,567 
per year. 
The trial court relied on the testimony and exhibits of Dirk Rasmussen, Ann 
Thomas's expert, to find that Bert Thomas's income was $69,567 per year. 
However, Dirk Rasmussen imputed income to Bert Thomas which he did not have. 
Income which was earned by BTCI and maintained for expenses and bonding was 
added to Bert Thomas's personal income. It was an abuse of discretion to impute 
the cash reserves of BTCI as income to Bert Thomas because Bert Thomas did not 
receive the cash reserves and the court did not find and could not find that Bert 
Thomas received a personal benefit from them. 
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2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining child custody, alimony, real estate 
division, and the value of BTCI. 
A. Marshaling the Evidence. 
The Appellant is required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings, and then show that the evidence is still insufficient to support that 
finding. Ann Thomas has failed to marshal the evidence. She has only reargued the 
evidence which supports her position. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should not 
disturb the trial court's findings. 
B. Child Custody. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody of the 
children to Bert Thomas because the evidence showed that Bert Thomas was a 
competent parent who could provide for the needs of the children without deficit. 
The evidence showed that the influence of Mr. Sauer, Ann's lover, illuminated the 
deficiencies in Ann's judgment, parenting ability, and character. Specifically, Ann 
Thomas put her desires ahead of the needs of her children and had exposed her 
children to the negative influence of her lover. 
C. Alimony. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the duration of alimony 
to three years. Ann Thomas argued that the trial court did not articulate a change in 
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financial conditions that would justify limiting the duration of alimony to three 
years. However, this is not accurate. The trial court found that Bert Thomas's 
expenses would increase because he had custody of the children. The trial court 
also found that Ann Thomas's expenses were overstated and that she had access to 
income from gifted stocks and bonds. Ann Thomas even testified that some of her 
expenses were only temporary expenses because she was in the process of 
furnishing her home. Ann Thomas was employed as a school teacher by Alpine 
School District. The evidence showed that Ann Thomas could maintain her 
standard of living. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting 
alimony to three years. 
D. Real Estate Division 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Bert Thomas a 
premarital value of $150,000 in the home. Before the marriage, Bert Thomas 
owned the Sundance real estate, cleared timber from the lot, excavated a 400 foot 
long access road with a 12% grade, erected extensive retaining walls, connected 
power, sewer, and utilities, completed 35% of the home, and purchased enough 
materials to build on the home for a year after being married. In essence, 70% of 
the construction was complete before Ann and Bert were married. The premarital 
value was determined to be $150,000. The value of the home had appreciated to 
$355,000. To compensate Ann Thomas for her modest contributions to the home, 
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she was awarded one half of the $205,000 appreciation value, less certain expenses. 
This was an equitable division. 
The evidence also showed that awarding Ann Thomas one half of the 
premarital value could force Bert Thomas to sell his home. This could severely 
disadvantage the children, and would place Bert Thomas's livelihood at risk. Bert 
Thomas worked exclusively in Sundance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding Bert Thomas a premarital value of $150,000. 
E. BTCI Value 
Ann Thomas argued that the trial court failed to divide the assets of Bert 
Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI). This is not accurate. The trial court divided the 
hard assets of Bert Thomas's construction company when it divided the personal 
property of the parties. The trial court found that the personal property awarded to 
Bert Thomas, including the hard assets of BTCI, was nearly equal in value to the 
personal property awarded to Ann Thomas. Ann Thomas did not attempt to value 
BTCI beyond its hard assets. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Ann Thomas also argued that Bert Thomas had dissipated BTCI's savings 
account which she claimed was subject to equitable division. However, the 
evidence does not support this argument. Ann Thomas's own expert testified that 




I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING 
BERT THOMAS'S INCOME TO BE $69,567 PER YEAR 
BECAUSE THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THIS FINDING. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding Bert Thomas's income to be 
$69,567 per year because the marshaled evidence does not support this finding. The 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings regarding Bert Thomas's income 
included: (1) Bert's tax returns; and (2) the testimony and exhibits of Dirk 
Rasmussen, Ann's expert witness. After marshaling the evidence, it is clear that the 
evidence does not support the trial court's finding. 
At trial, Bert Thomas submitted tax forms and financial statements showing 
his W-2 income to be approximately $36,000 per year.1 In addition, Bert Thomas 
had "passive" income from his leasing company of approximately $17,000 per 
year.2 Bert Thomas argued that some of Dirk Rasmussen's calculations were 
incorrect because they did not account for taxes, or they imputed Ann Thomas's 
income to Bert Thomas. However, in order to challenge the trial court's findings, 
the evidence must be marshaled in favor of the trial court's finding and the evidence 
1
 Bert Thomas's tax documents are not included in the Addendum because they are 
accurately reflected by Dirk Rasmussen's Exhibit #14. 
2
 On Exhibit #14 this is identified as "Lease Expense" listed under the heading 
"Adjustments to Net Income." 
9 
must still be insufficient to support the trial court's finding. Marshall. 915 P.2d at 
516. Therefore, the focus of this argument must be on the testimony and exhibits 
provided by Dirk Rasmussen. 
Dirk Rasmussen testified that Bert Thomas did not inappropriately take 
money or skim from BTCI. (Trial Transcript volume II, 126, Record at 1583.) The 
income that Bert Thomas took from BTCI was clearly identified and legitimate, and 
it was declared on his personal tax return. (Trial Transcript volume II, 133, Record 
at 1583.) 
Exhibit #14, prepared by Dirk Rasmussen, is a summary of BTCI's financial 
activity from 1988 to 1994. Exhibit #14 outlines the method Dirk Rasmussen 
employed to calculate Bert Thomas's income. To simplify Dirk Rasmussen's 
methodology, the analysis will be broken down into two steps. 
Step one: for each year (1988-1994) Dirk Rasmussen calculated the wages 
and passive income which Bert Thomas received. At the bottom of Exhibit #14, 
Bert's wages and passive income were broken down into four categories listed 
under the heading "Adjustments to Net Income." The four categories were labeled 
"Officer's Compensation," "Personal Cost of Goods Sold," "Lease Expense," and 
"Personal Payroll Expense." To determine Bert Thomas's personal income, Dirk 
Rasmussen added the four categories together. 
Bert Thomas has no argument with step one of the methodology. The four 
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categories represent the personal income of Bert Thomas. 
Step two: for each year (1988-1994) Dirk Rasmussen calculated the net 
income of BTCI, a Utah corporation, and then added the total BTCI income to Bert 
Thomas's personal income, even though Bert Thomas did not receive any benefit 
from that money. Dirk Rasmussen knew that the net income of BTCI was kept in 
the corporation and that Bert Thomas did not receive the money. In fact, during 
cross-examination Dirk Rasmussen was asked if the net income of BTCI was kept 
in the corporation in 1988. (Trial Transcript volume II, 131-32, Record at 1583.) 
Dirk Rasmussen answered "yes." (Trial Transcript volume II, 131-32, Record at 
1583.) It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to include the net income of 
BTCI as part of Bert Thomas's personal income when the evidence showed that 
Bert Thomas did not receive this money and did not receive a personal benefit from 
this money. 
One might wonder why net income would be left in a corporation. Dirk 
Rasmussen stated that "there are good reasons for a construction company to 
maintain a good cash balance." (Trial Transcript volume II, 132, Record at 1583.) 
Some of the reasons a construction company may need to maintain a good cash 
balance is to pay bills and the corporation may need capital for bonding. (Trial 
Transcript volume II, 132, Record at 1583.) The only way Bert Thomas could reach 
the income level found by the trial court ($69,567 per year) was if he personally 
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used the entire cash reserves of BTCI each year. However, this would make 
operating BTCI impracticable. Besides, it would be inequitable to require Bert 
Thomas to use up the cash reserves of BTCI every year. Because the net income of 
BTCI was not received by Bert Thomas or used to personally benefit Bert Thomas, 
it was an abuse of discretion to impute the total net income of BTCI as part of Bert 
Thomas's personal income for child support and alimony purposes. 
If the trial court is to impute corporate income to a shareholder or officer, it 
should be required to make specific findings of the specific economic benefit to the 
officer or shareholder.3 In this case, that was not done. 
Although Dirk Rasmussen could not determine why Bert Thomas's income 
declined in 1993-1994, there are good reasons why Bert Thomas's income declined. 
Foremost among these reasons is the fact that Bert Thomas has been almost a full-
time father. (Trial Transcript Volume IV 55, Record at 1585.) Another reason was 
that Ann Thomas, who formerly performed secretarial functions, was helpful with 
customers on the telephone, no longer helped in the business. (Affidavit of Ann 
Thomas, Record at 718.) Bert Thomas assumed all of her duties when she left, in 
addition to the child rearing obligations. It is not consistent to assume, as the trial 
3
 Title 78-45-7.5(4)(a). Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business 
shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the 
parent to satisfy a child support award.... 
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court has done, that Bert Thomas has been almost a full-time father, award him 
custody and then accept Dirk Rasmussen's testimony that Bert Thomas' income 
should reflect the income of a full-time contractor. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING CHILD CUSTODY, ALIMONY, REAL 
ESTATE DIVISION, AND BERT THOMAS CONSTRUCTION 
INC. (BTCI) VALUE. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining child custody, 
alimony, real estate division, and Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI) value. In 
order to challenge a trial court's findings, the Appellant must marshal the evidence 
in favor of the trial court's findings and then show the evidence is insufficient to 
support the trial court's findings. Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence. 
Therefore, Ann Thomas should be prevented from challenging the trial court's 
findings. Even if the Court of Appeals does not follow the above argument, there 
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings regarding child custody, 
alimony, real estate division, and BTCI value. 
A. Marshaling the Evidence. 
Ann Thomas's has failed to marshal the evidence as required by this Court in 
order to challenge findings of fact. Thus, Ann Thomas should be prevented from 
challenging those findings. This Court stated: 
In order to challenge a trial court's finding of fact of Appeal, 
the challenger must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings 
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and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings in question. We will uphold the trial court's finding of fact if 
a party fails to appropriately marshal all of the evidence. Marshall v. 
Marshall. 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996)(citations omitted). 
In viewing this marshaled evidence, the evidence must be viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the findings" and the evidence must still be "insufficient to support the 
findings." Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1,7 (Utah App. 1992). When a party 
challenging findings of fact fails to marshal all of the evidence, the Court of 
'Appeals upholds the trial court's findings of fact. Marshall. 915 P.2d at 516. 
As shown in each section below, Ann Thomas has failed to marshal the 
evidence regarding the findings of child custody, alimony, division of real estate, 
and BTCI value. She did not demonstrate why the evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the findings, would be insufficient. Instead, Ann Thomas 
has simply restated the evidence she believes supports her position and reargued the 
original case to the Court of Appeals. In Marshall, this Court was faced with a 
similar situation. This Court concluded: 
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence but 
has merely recited the findings on point and then 
highlighted the evidence which he deems contrary to the 
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial 
court's findings and affirm the awards on appeal. 
Marshal, 915 P.2d at 516. 
Likewise, in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. this Court refused to disturb the trial 
court's findings because the appellant had "not marshaled the evidence, but had 
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merely reargued the evidence supporting his position." 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Because Ann Thomas had failed to marshal the evidence and has only 
reargued the evidence supporting her position, this Court should not disturb the trial 
court's findings of fact but should affirm the trial court's decision. 
B. Child Custody 
In determining permanent custody of a child, trial judges are accorded broad 
discretion. "Only where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an 
abuse of discretion, will [an appellate court] interpose its own judgment." Shioji v. 
ShiojL 712 P.2d 197, 210 (Utah 1985). 
Ann Thomas argued that the trial court found that it was clearly in the best 
interests of the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas, but then awarded custody to 
Bert Thomas. (Appellant's Brief 23.) However, this is a misunderstanding of the 
trial court's finding. The meaning of the trial court's statement must be understood 
in context. 
The trial court stated that "this is a complicated case with no easy, clear-cut 
answers." (Findings of Fact j^ 61, Record at 1131.) Based on the evaluations of Dr. 
Jensen and Dr. Stewart, the trial court found that both parents are competent and 
love their children. (Finding of Fact ^ 59, 61, Record at 1131.) Although Ann 
Thomas was the primary care taker prior to separation, Bert Thomas has also 
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contributed and been involved with the children's activities, including "schooling, 
health care, religious training, and day to day activities." (Finding of Fact ^ 65, 66, 
Record at 1131.) Bert Thomas was "involved with the children on a daily basis 
until the separation." (Finding of Fact Tf 68, Record at 1130.) Since separation, the 
"children have . . . had an opportunity to rely upon their father for meeting their 
needs to a greater extent than existed prior to separation." (Finding of Fact <[j 68, 
Record at 1130.) In fact, the "children have flourished in the relationship they have 
with Mr. Thomas." (Finding of Fact ^ 68, Record at 1130.) Dr. Jay Jensen reported 
that there were "no apparent deficits in the ability of either parent to provide for the 
children's physical, emotional, and spiritual needs." (Exhibit 1, Dr. Jensen's 
Custody Evaluation 7.) Although Ann Thomas was the primary care giver before 
separation, Bert Thomas was an exceptional parent, able to provide for the 
children's needs without deficit. Without considering the negative influence of Mr. 
Sauer, this was a close call that would have been tipped in favor of Ann Thomas 
because she was the primary care giver. 
However, Mr. Sauer was part of the environment to which the children would 
be exposed if Ann Thomas had been awarded custody. The appearance of Mr. 
Sauer into Ann Thomas's life had two significant effects which concerned the trial 
court. First, Ann Thomas permitted the children to be exposed to Mr. Sauer's 
negative influence. (Findings of Fact If 79, Record at 1125.) Second, Mr. Sauer's 
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influence upon Ann Thomas illuminated the deficiencies in her judgment, parenting 
ability, and character. It showed her inability to subordinate her own pleasures to 
the needs of her children. This is why the trial court found Mr. Sauer to be "a very 
complicating factor." (Finding of Fact If 71, Record at 1129.) 
Because of the presence of Mr. Sauer in Ann Thomas's life, the trial court 
had to weigh which arrangement would be best for the children: (1) they could 
reside with Ann Thomas who was under the negative influence of Mr. Sauer and 
had exposed the children to his negative influence; or (2) they could reside with Bert 
Thomas who had no deficiencies in judgment, parenting ability, or character. The 
trial court did not punish Ann Thomas for her past moral conduct. The trial court 
did not award custody based upon sexual misconduct. The trial court simply 
weighed which arrangement was best for the children. 
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the parties for several days in 
trial, hear their testimony, observe Mr. Sauer, hear his testimony, hear the testimony 
of two experts, visit with the children, and judge the personal and individual 
circumstances of this case. (Finding of Fact ^ 55, Record at 1133.) Regarding Mr. 
Thomas, the trial court found that: 
a. Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the children's 
lives (Finding of Fact % 81, Record at 1125.) 
b. Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's integration into their 
present environment by a change of residence. Mr. Thomas has indicated 
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that he plans to remain in the area where his business is established. It is the 
area where the children were born. He plans to continue to rear the children 
in these familiar surroundings. At earlier stages of the separation, Mrs. 
Thomas wished to move then from the area regardless of the separation of 
the children from their father. (Finding of Fact Tf 81, Record at 1125.) 
c. Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas' role in the 
children's lives. (Finding of Fact ^ 81, Record at 1125.) 
d. Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and has set a better 
example in that regard. (Finding of Fact f^ 81, Record at 1125.) 
e. There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would subject the children to 
the deleterious effects of a relationship as Mrs. Thomas has done. (Finding 
of Fact f 81, Record at 1125.) 
f. Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation to his family and is 
more interested in the children having a meaningful relationship with both 
parents. (Finding of Fact Tf 81, Record at 1125.) 
Because Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence concerning Bert Thomas's 
ability to care for the children and then show the above findings were clearly wrong, 
the Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings. Clearly, Bert Thomas was a 
capable parent, able to be the primary care giver for the children. In fact, until the 
court ruled, the children had spent half their time with Bert Thomas. (Dr. Jensen's 
Custody Evaluation 4.) 
Regarding Mr. Sauer, the trial court found: 
a. Mr. Sauer is married and has several small children. (Finding of Fact 
H 73, Record at 1129.) 
b. During the pendency of this action, Pedro Sauer fathered a child 
during a time of reconciliation with his wife while still maintaining an 
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intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas. (Finding of Fact f^ 73, Record at 
1129.) 
c. After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas, Pedro was 
charged with domestic violence with his wife. (Finding of Fact Tj 73, Record 
at 1129.) 
d. Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was charged with possession 
of a firearm/revolver at Lake Powell in the company of Mrs. Thomas. This 
may have also violated his work permit status in the United States. (Finding 
of Fact 1f 73, Record at 1129.) 
e. Pedro, in his young marriage and with several young children, has 
participated in other adulterous affairs. (Finding of Fact f^ 73, Record at 
1129.) 
f. Based on the evidence, the court finds a link that Mr. Sauer has or will 
negatively impact the children. The affair has impacted the family 
financially. The testimony is that Mr. Sauer has not contributed financially 
to the family despite the frequency of his overnight stays. In addition, scarce 
resources have been expended on Pedro for gifts and travel. 
The affair did result in a confrontation at the children's home 
with Mrs. Sauer. That exposure, albeit brief, was not positive for the 
children. 
Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is of concern to 
this court. His spousal abuse charge during this time is of concern to 
this Court as is his illegal possession of a weapon. Such activity 
always places the children's mother at risk and such illegal choices 
can potentially, negatively affect the family. (Finding of Fact % 77-78, 
Record at 1127.) 
g. Mr. Sauer had a dramatic effect on the ultimate breakup of the 
Thomas family. That breakup has affected these children 
significantly. (Finding of Fact f^ 78, Record at 1127.) 
h. Pedro has less than desirable characteristics: immorality, social 
irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his criminal activity and his 
spousal abuse. This court cannot conceive how Pedro is a positive role 
model for little Joseph. Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the 
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children. (Finding of Fact % 80-81, Record at 1125.) 
Ann Thomas did not marshal the evidence from the record to show these 
findings about Mr. Sauer were clearly wrong. Although Mr. Sauer testified that the 
spousal abuse charge was not prosecuted, and a plea in abeyance was entered 
regarding the gun charge, these and other facts were sufficient to find that Mr. Sauer 
provided a negative influence on Ann and the children. There was also testimony 
from Dr. Jay Jensen that since the arrival of Mr. Sauer, Ann Thomas had put her 
own needs ahead of the children. (Exhibit 1, Dr. Jensen's Custody Evaluation 10.) 
It is also interesting to note the threat Mr. Sauer made to Dr. Jensen. Mr. Sauer 
conveyed a message through Dr. Sanderson that he planned to mess up Dr. Jensen. 
(Trial Transcript volume 1,46, Record at 1582.) 
Because Bert Thomas has the ability to provide for the children's physical, 
emotional and spiritual needs, because Ann Thomas has put her own needs ahead of 
the children, and because Mr. Sauer had exposed the children to his negative 
influence, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award custody of the 
children to Bert Thomas. 
C. Alimony. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the duration of alimony 
to three years. To determine alimony, at least three factors must be considered: (1) 
financial need of the receiving spouse; (2) the receiving spouse's ability to produce 
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income; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). "If these three 
factors have been considered, [the appellate courts] will not disturb [alimony] unless 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993)(citations omitted). 
The trial court considered the financial needs of Ann Thomas, Ann Thomas's 
earning capacity, Bert Thomas's ability to pay, the length of the marriage, the fault 
of the parties, and the standard of living of the parties. (Findings of Fact f^ 115-127, 
Record at 1116.) Ann Thomas even stated in her Appellate Brief that the trial court 
properly considered the factors to determine alimony. (Appellant's Brief 28.) 
Ann Thomas went on to argue that the trial court "inexplicably limited the 
duration of alimony to three years." (Appellant's Brief 28.) Ann Thomas argued 
that because the trial court did not make a finding "showing some anticipated 
change in circumstances" and because "there [was] nothing to suggest that 
circumstances will change in any financial sense," the trial court abused its 
discretion in limiting alimony to three years. (Appellant's Brief 28-29.) Ann 
Thomas cited to Thronson v. Thronson. 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), as 
authority to support her argument. (Appellant's Brief 29.) 
There are two problems with Ann Thomas's argument. First, contrary to 
Ann Thomas's assertion, the trial court did make findings regarding anticipated 
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change in financial circumstances. Second, Thronson does not require a trial court 
to "articulate" a change in financial circumstances before limiting the duration of 
alimony. 
The Trial court made several findings regarding anticipated financial 
changes. The trial court found that Bert Thomas's expenses would increase because 
he was awarded custody of the children. (Findings of Fact % 124, Record at 1113.) 
The trial court found that Ann Thomas's expenses were exaggerated, and that her 
financial needs were less than what she had reported. (Findings of Fact <[  124, 
Record at 1113.) The trial court also found that Ann Thomas had access to money 
from gifted stocks and bonds. (Findings of Fact f 124, Record at 1113.) Ann 
Thomas even testified that some of her expenses were only temporary because she 
was setting up a new home and purchased furniture, kitchen items, and household 
supplies. (Trial Transcript volume III, 129, Record at 1584.) Apparently, the trial 
court felt that Ann Thomas needed alimony for three years to set up her new life. 
Given these specific findings, and given the fact that Ann Thomas did not go to the 
Record and marshal the evidence in support of these findings and then show the 
findings to be clearly wrong, the Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings. 
The purpose of alimony is to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of 
living enjoyed during marriage. Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). The 
evidence showed that Ann Thomas could maintain her standard of living. Ann 
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Thomas had a Bachelor of Science degree and a teaching certificate in special 
education from the University of Utah. (Trial Transcript volume II, 144, Record at 
1583.) Ann Thomas made $25,824 per year teaching in the Alpine School District. 
(Finding of Fact ^ 109, Record at 1117.) Ann Thomas had additional income from 
inherited stocks and bonds. (Finding of Fact If 124, Record at 1113.) Bert Thomas, 
on the other hand, had less than a high school education. (Trial Transcript volume 
IV, 44, Record at 1585.) Bert Thomas worked in the construction business which 
was unpredictable from year to year. Bert Thomas was also awarded custody of the 
children, increasing his financial needs. (Finding of Fact Tf 124, Record at 1113.) 
Although Ann Thomas experienced some temporary expenses to set up her new life, 
these were temporary expenses which would not continue longer than three years. 
Because no specific challenge has been made by citing to facts in the Record why 
these findings are wrong, Ann Thomas has failed to marshal and the findings should 
stand. 
Thronson does not require a trial court to articulate anticipated change in 
financial circumstances before limiting the duration of alimony. Thronson held that 
it was an abuse of discretion to limit alimony to one year when the receiving spouse 
could not produce enough income to meet her financial needs, but the payor spouse, 
after meeting his financial needs, had a surplus of income. Id at 435. It has not 
been shown that Ann Thomas cannot meet her financial needs, especially in light of 
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her exaggerated expenses and extra money from stocks and bonds. It has not been 
shown that Bert Thomas, after providing for his children and meeting his financial 
needs, has a surplus of income. It has not been shown that limiting alimony to three 
years was inequitable or an abuse of discretion. 
D. Real Estate Division 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Bert Thomas a 
premarital value of $150,000 in the home. When dividing property, "the trial court 
is empowered to make such distributions as are just and equitable." Jackson v. 
Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980). In fashioning an equitable property 
division, the trial court should generally award a party their separate property that 
they brought into the marriage or inherited during the marriage. Mortensen v. 
Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
Prior to marriage, Bert Thomas solely and exclusively owned real estate in 
Sundance, Utah. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 78, Record at 1585.) Bert Thomas 
made improvements upon the real estate prior to marriage. He planned the building 
site, cleared timber, excavated and graded a 400 foot access road up the mountain, 
built massive retaining walls to retain the mountain from the house and road, and 
connected power, sewer and utilities. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 78-93, Record at 
1585.) Bert Thomas also had commenced construction of a home, which was 35% 
complete by marriage, and stockpiled enough materials to build on the home for a 
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year after marriage. (Finding of Fact ^33, Record at 1141.) Total construction of 
the project was 70% complete when Ann and Bert were married. (Trial Transcript 
volume III, 45-46, Record at 1584.) The value of this premarital asset was 
$150,000. (Trial Transcript volume III, 19-20, Record at 1584.) 
Because the value of Bert Thomas's premarital asset could be determined, 
and because Ann Thomas made little contribution to this premarital value, it was 
clearly within the trial court's discretion to award Bert Thomas his premarital 
interest of $150,000 in the home. The trial court's decision was in accordance with 
Mortensen that a trial court should award a party their premarital property. 
During the marriage, Ann Thomas made some modest contributions to the 
construction of the home including her own manual labor, the acquisition of 
materials, the building of retaining walls, and generally assisting Bert Thomas who 
acted as the general contractor for the building of the home. (Finding of Fact f^ 36, 
Record at 1139.) 
The only debt on the real estate was a mortgage of $27,000 borrowed after 
marriage. (Trial Transcript volume IV, 84, Record at 1585.) The mortgage had 
been reduced to approximately $17,500 at the time of trial. (Trial Transcript 
volume IV, 84, Record at 1585.) Although title was transferred to facilitate the 
security of the note payable to Mrs. Thomas's grandfather, the evidence was clear 
that Bert Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Ann Thomas. (Finding of Fact 
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1f 34, Record at 1141.) 
At the time of divorce, the real estate was worth $355,000. (Finding of Fact 
Tf 44, Record at 1137.) During the marriage, the real estate had appreciated 
$205,000. Ann Thomas was awarded one half of this appreciated value, less certain 
expenses, to compensate her for the maintenance and contributions she made during 
the marriage. (Finding of Fact Tf 41, 50-53, Record at 1138, 1135.) The trial court 
was fair and equitable because Mr. Thomas retained his premarital interest, and 
Mrs. Thomas was rewarded an equitable interest based on her efforts. 
Ann Thomas argued that the home should have been considered a 
commingled marital asset because Ann Thomas enhanced, maintained, and 
protected the home. The authority for Ann Thomas's argument is Mortensen v. 
Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). After analyzing Mortensen. it is clear that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Mortensen states that premarital property which has been enhanced, 
maintained, or protected during marriage by the other spouse should generally be 
divided equitably between the parties. Id at 308. However, this is just a general 
guideline. Mortensen clearly states that equity does not require mathematical 
equality. Id at 308 (citations omitted). In fact, Mortensen allows significant 
disparity if the disparity is based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact 
that one spouse was awarded separate gifts or inheritance. Id at 308. For example, 
26 
Mortensen states that disparity may be appropriate if the home is "utilized to 
provide housing for minor children or utilized in other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands." Id at 308. 
Ann Thomas argued that the rationale of the trial court in awarding Mr. 
Thomas $150,000 as premarital property was solely because she had received gifted 
stocks and bonds. (Appellants Brief 32.) Although this was referred to in the trial 
court's decision, it does not accurately reflect the trial court's rationale. The reason 
the trial court awarded Bert Thomas his premarital interest in the home was because 
of the extraordinary circumstances of this case. The trial court found that if it did 
not award Bert Thomas his premarital value, it "may force Mr. Thomas to sell his 
home, which would be much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would 
ignore the simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had worked for 
many years before the marriage and acquired before the marriage." (Finding of Fact 
T| 35, Record at 1140.) Selling the home would also adversely impact Bert 
Thomas's livelihood, and effect his social and political opportunities for the 
following reasons: 
a. Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years before the marriage 
although not continuously until the home was habitable. (Finding of Fact Tf 
35, Record at 1140.) 
b. Since the fall of 1983, he has lived there continuously and is very much 
involved in the social and political activities there. For example, he is the 
Fire Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District, and Vice 
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Chairman for three years. He is a past president of the Homeowners' 
Association, Chairman of the Architectural Committee, and he drafted the 
Architectural Covenants of the SCAPO subdivision. (Finding of Fact f^ 35, 
Record at 1140.) 
c. Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established his business at 
Sundance, and has earned his livelihood almost exclusively in that 
community since 1977. (Finding of Fact ]f 35, Record at 1140.) 
d. Given his income, it is not probable that he could acquire other 
accommodations in that community. (Finding of Fact f^ 35, Record at 1140.) 
e. It would prove far more difficult for him to maintain his maintenance 
contracts if he were to leave the area. (Finding of Fact f^ 35, Record at 1140.) 
In accordance with Mortensen. the trial court considered the extraordinary 
circumstances of this case, and found that equity did not justify awarding Ann 
Thomas an interest in the premarital value of the real estate. Because Ann Thomas 
failed to marshal to assault the findings which established the extraordinary 
circumstances of this case, and then show that the decision was clearly wrong, the 
Court of Appeals should not disturb these findings on appeal. 
Ann Thomas also argued that the evidence did not support a finding that the 
premarital value of the home was $150,000. (Appellant's Brief 32-33.) Judd 
Harward, an appraiser who had performed appraisals in Sundance for over twenty 
years, (Trial Transcripts volume III, 7, Record at 1584), testified that the total value 
of the real estate prior to marriage was $150,000. (Exhibit 31, 6-7.) This figure 
included a lot value of $70,000, site improvement (driveway, retaining walls, septic 
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tank, water line, and electrical service) value of $10,000, and a 35% completed 
home value of $70,000. (Trial Exhibit 31, 6-7.) The trial court accepted Judd 
Harward's value of the premarital home. (Findings of Fact Tf 48, Record at 1135.)4 
Ann Thomas argued that Judd Harward's testimony could not be used. She 
claimed that Judd Harward testimony violated Utah Rules of Evidence 705 because 
the data he used to make his calculations were not available at trial. (Appellant's 
Brief 32-33.) Utah Rule of Evidence 705 states that: 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference 
and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, unless, the court requires 
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to 
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination. 
Rule 705 is not a reason for the Appellate Court to remand the case for five 
reasons. First, Ann Thomas did not make this argument to the trial court. Ann 
Thomas had an opportunity to object and argue before the trial court that Rule 705 
was not satisfied, but she did not. Because she did not raise it, she waived it. 
Second, neither counsel nor the trial court requested or required Judd Harward to 
disclose the underlying facts or data used. Third, Rule 705 implies that an expert is 
not under an obligation to disclose his underlying facts or data until requested to do 
4
 The trial court rejected Ann Thomas's expert because the photos of the comparables 
were wrong, the comparables were not visited, the quality of materials and workmanship of the 
comparables were considerably different, and did not consider the unique aspect of the Sundance 
community. (Finding of Fact 13-14, Record at 1146.) 
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so. During cross-examination, Ann Thomas never required Judd Harward to make 
his data available. (See testimony of Judd Harward, Trial Transcript volume III, 6-
76, Record at 1584.) Fourth, "disclosure" only means that the expert must identify 
data he employed to calculate his opinion, it does not require the expert to bring the 
data to the courtroom. Fifth, during cross-examination, Judd Harward did disclose 
the underlying facts and data he used. Specifically, Judd Harward testified that his 
data was based on his appraisals, appraisals of other experts in the area, multiple 
listing information, price information from Realtors in the area, and extensive 
experience in the Sundance area. (Trial Transcript volume III, 51-52, Record at 
1584.) There was nothing magical about his data; it contained the same information 
which was available to any appraiser. (Trial Transcript volume III, 52, Record at 
1584.) For these five reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the 
testimony of Mr. Harward to find that the premarital value of the home was 
$150,000. 
E. BTCI Value. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing and distributing the 
assets of Bert Thomas Construction Inc. (BTCI). Ann Thomas argued that the trial 
court refused to place a value on BTCI. (Appellant's Brief 33.) This is not 
accurate. The trial court did value and divided the assets of BTCI. Ann Thomas did 
not offer sufficient evidence to make a business valuation of BTCI. (Finding of 
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Fact If 31, Record at 1142.) 
The value of the hard assets of BTCI totaled $7,634. (Exhibit #63.) Ann 
Thomas's argued that the trial court should have equitably divided these assets. 
This argument is surprising because the trial court did equitably divide these assets. 
The trial court awarded Bert Thomas the hard assets of BTCI and determined the 
value to be "nearly equal, fair and equitable" to the personal property awarded to 
Ann Thomas. (Finding of Fact f^ 24-27, Record at 1144.) The trial court did not 
"refuse to place a value on Bert Thomas Construction Company [BTCI]." 
(Appellant's Brief 33.) The trial court valued the hard assets of BTCI and equitably 
divided them. 
Ann Thomas also argued that the liquid assets of BTCI were subject to 
equitable division, but were dissipated by Bert Thomas. The only evidence Ann 
Thomas introduced on this issue was that BTCFs savings account averaged $37,000 
for the four years prior to trial, but only $7,364 at trial. (Appellant's Brief 34.) 
BTCI's savings account does not represent the assets or value of BTCI. BTCI 
receivables were generally deposited into a BTCI savings account where they 
earned interest. When these funds were needed to pay various business expenses, 
they were transferred to BTCI's checking account. (Exhibit 36, 37.) The account 
balance fluctuated significantly from month to month. (Exhibit 7.) Clearly, the 
savings account on any given day did not represent the assets of BTCI. The trial 
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court was correct in finding that "the amount in a corporate savings account on a 
given date is not controlling. To determine the value of the marital asset, one must 
determine the value of the company." (Finding of Fact 1} 31, Record at 1142.) 
However, Ann Thomas offered no evidence to value BTCI beyond its hard assets. 
Because Ann Thomas offered no other evidence to value BTCI, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that there was insufficient evidence to award Ann 
Thomas one half of an average monthly balance in BTCI's savings account. 
Ann Thomas also argued that Bert Thomas dissipated this marital asset. 
However, Ann Thomas failed to marshal the evidence on this issue. Her own expert 
testified that the money earned by Bert's corporation was appropriately accounted 
for. (Trial Transcript volume II, 126, Record at 1583.) There was no skimming or 
inappropriate takings from Bert Thomas's corporation. (Trial Transcript volume II, 
126, Record at 1583.) Bert Thomas's wages and personal draws after separation 
were the same even two years before separation. (Trial Transcript volume II, 135; 
Exhibit 14, Record at 1583.) Clearly, Bert Thomas was not taking money from 
BTCI for any improper or personal purpose, which was not declared on his personal 
return. There is no evidence to show otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's findings regarding the 
issues of child custody, alimony, real estate division, and the value of BTCI. 
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Because Ann Thomas failed to attempt to marshal the evidence and because Mr. 
Thomas had to reply the issue of attorney's fees should be remanded to the trial court 
for an award of Bert Thomas's reasonable attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals 
should reverse the trial court's finding that Bert Thomas's income was $69,567 per 
year and remand for recalculation of child support. 
Dated this /S> day of September, 1998. 
BRENT D. Y< 
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FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Civil No. 934402503 
BERT CHARLES THOMAS, 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant. Conwu Howard Maetani 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing December 5, 1995, and following an adjournment 
convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable Judge Lynn 
Davis presided. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were present in 
person and represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green 
appearing for the Plaintiff and Brent Young appearing for the 
Defendant. Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the 
Court entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses. 
Counsel argued the following contested issues: 1) division of 
personal property; 2) division of real property and value of real 
property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody 
and visitation; 4) child support; 5) alimony; 6) pension, 
retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous issues. 
Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996, and a 
MW»fUT-WrMM»ll. MO 
final hearing was held on November 8, 1996 to resolve remaining 
issues. The Court, having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and 
the arguments of counsel based thereon and good cause otherwise 
appearing, the Court now maJces and enters its, 
FINDINGS OF PACTS 
1. The parties were married on July 17, 1983. 
2. Each of the parties resided in Utah County for more 
than three (3) months prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
3. The parties have two (2) minor children of the 
marriage: Joseph, born July 12, 1986, age ten (10); and 
Katherine, "Katie", born July 8, 1989, age seven (7). 
4. The parties separated and began to live separate and 
apart on March 21, 1993. 
5. The Plaintiff is thirty-eight (38) years old and has 
earned a Bachelor of Science degree, prior to her marriage to the 
Defendant, from the University of Utah. 
6. The Plaintiff presently teaches special education for 
the Alpine School District. 
7. The parties1 children also go to school in the Alpine 
School District at the same school in which the Plaintiff 
teaches. 
8. The Defendant is a self-employed contractor and builder 
licensed as such in the Stare of Utah. He is a high school 
graduate with some plans to continue his education. 
9. During the marriage, the parties have acquired personal 
property and improved real property. 
PERSOMAL PROPERTY 
10. The general purpose of property division is to allocate 
property "in a manner which best serves the needs of the parties 
and best permits them to pursue their separate lives.11 The 
overriding consideration in property division is "that the 
ultimate division be equitable — that property be fairly divided 
between the parties given their contributions during the marriage 
and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Burt v. 
Burt/ 799 P.2d 1166, 1171. 
11. For the purposes of asset consideration this Court 
accepts the following definition: 
Marital property is all property acquired 
during marriage except property acquired by 
gift or inheritance and it "encompasses all 
of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived." Dunn v. Dunnr 802 
P.2d 1314, 1317 - 1318. 
12. It is clear that statutory law confers broad discretion 
upon the trial Court in the division of property, real and 
personal, regardless of its source or time of acquisition. 
13. During the course of the marriage, and prior thereto, 
the Plaintiff received annual gifts, principally from her 
grandfather. 
14. These gifts were always in cash or in kind and, when in 
the form cf stock, were conveyed to the Plaintiff individually 
and not the Defendant as well. 
15. The practice continued through the marriage and existed 
among Mrs. Thomas1 siblings likewise. 
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16. Since the separation of the parties, gifts have been 
made in trust for the benefit of the parties' minor children. 
17. All of these gifts have always been maintained in 
separate accounts or in separate stock accounts or certificates, 
and have not been augmented, supplemented, added to, protected or 
enhanced by the Defendant or from earnings from either party 
during the marriage. 
18. As such, they are classic cases of separate property 
which have maintained their separate identity and should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff, except for those funds, which have been 
designated in trust for the children which should be maintained 
by the Plaintiff, in trust for the children and made available to 
them consistent with the intent of the donor. 
19. Subsequent to separation, the Defendant prepared a 
document entitled "Personal Property Settlement Between Ann 
Thomas and Bert Thomas," dated February 5, 1994. 
20. The Court finds the parties discussed the final 
resolution of the division of personal property and tools. Mr. 
Thomas drafted an agreement. Mrs. Thomas made changes to that 
agreement and signed it. Property was delivered and accepted 
pursuant to the agreement. No discussion was had about that 
agreement for a period of approximately one year. Based upon the 
authority of the agreement:, Mrs. Thomas even sold a vehicle. 
21. Upon review, and based upon the testimony of the 
parties, the Court finds that the "Settlement" is ambiguous 
because it does not state whether it is a settlement of all 
property rights or only temporary property rights. 
22. Furthermore, the agreement was executed without the 
benefit of counsel, and its enforcement would result in a 
potentially significant and substantial inequity between the 
parties. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the 
agreement and its consideration are heavily disputed. 
23. Rather the Court relied upon Exhibit 24 of the 
Plaintiff which lists, in detail, the personal property in each 
party's possession, what property would constitute gifts to 
either party and the relative values of the property. 
24. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the parties to be 
awarded the personal property presently in their possession and, 
in addition and not withstanding that, that the Plaintiff be 
awarded the following items of personal property: 
(a) Kachina doll; 
(b) Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the 
Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces) , at the 
election of the Defendant; 
(c) One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies, or 
the financial equivalent; 
(d) The oriental rug; 
(e) The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by 
her father; 
(f) The wooden bowl; 
(g) One (1) copy of the home videos. 
25. Plaintiff requests that the Court place a monetary 
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value on Defendant's tools and then factor that value into the 
equitable division of the personal property. This Court 
carefully considered the agreement/stipulation of the parties, 
rejected it in part, and fashioned an equitable division of the 
personalty under the circumstances. Weighing all factors, the 
Court believes it to be equitable and fair. 
26. In this regard, the Court makes a few observations. 
First, this Court finds that Plaintiff has minimized the value of 
some of her items and exaggerated the value of some of 
Defendant's items. Some tools were purchased prior to the 
marriage and some after. Those acquired during the marriage are 
generally worn out or in disrepair. This Court awarded Mr. 
Thomas those tools, calculating the values of the assets of both 
parties to be nearly equal, fair and equitable. 
27. Absolute mathematical precision is impossible. For 
example, some items given to the Plaintiff, such as the Oriental 
rug, maintain value over time much better than tools which become 
worn out by day to day use in the construction industry. 
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS 
28. Plaintiff claims that at the time of the separation, 
Defendant had approximately $40,000 on account in the Bert 
Thomas, Inc.'s Savings Account and that she is entitled to one-
half as a marital asset. Plaintiff further argues that the 
account was depleted to approximately $7,000 at the time of the 
trial, and that the Defendant was the sole beneficiary (i.e. he 
used the funds to live on and meet his obligations under the 
7 
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temporary order). 
29. Defendant argues that the subject account was an 
operating fund for the company and the amount in the account 
fluctuated significantly from month-to-month; the amount of money 
in an operating business account at any particular time has no 
particular significance, 
30. These parties set up a complex financial system to 
operate the Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. business. The best 
this Court can glean, the flow of money in and out of the company 
is represented in the flow chart attached (Exhibit No. 37). 
31. Defendant is accurate that the amount in a 
corporate savings account on a given date is not controlling. To 
determine the value of the marital asset, once must determine the 
value of the company. There was insufficient evidence presented 
at trial to arrive at the value of Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. 
and therefore there was an insufficient basis to award Plaintiff 
assets to assess financial obligations. This Court did not make 
a finding of value of Bert Thomas Construction Inc. and cannot 
make such a determination by looking solely at a savings account 
as of a given date. 
RSftL PROPERTY 
a. Marital Versus Separate Property 
32. Utah's appellate courts have long held that once a 
trial court has determined marital property, the court may 
distribute it equitably, regardless of which party's name appears 
on the title. Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986). "The 
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trial court is empowered to make such distributions as are just 
and equitable, and may compel such conveyance as are necessary to 
that end." Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340 - 41 (Utah 
1980) . 
33. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas, solely and 
exclusively, owned real estate in Sundance, Utah before the 
parties were married. He owned the real estate free from any 
type of encumbrance. (The subject property is described in 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23.) The Court finds that Mr. Thomas 
commenced construction of a home on the property, and that it was 
framed up and many of the materials had been purchased before the 
parties were married. In addition, it is important to note that 
a lengthy access road had been constructed and power and sewer 
utilities had been placed on the premises. The Court finds Mr. 
Thomas continued to work on the home after the marriage, using 
materials previously obtained. This property ultimately became 
the parties1 marital residence. Approximately one to one and 
one-half years after they were married, the parties obtained 
$27,000 from Mrs. Thomas' grandfather. This note was secured by 
a mortgage which had been reduced to approximately $17,000 at the 
time of trial (Exhibit 23). 
34. The note was signed by both parties, as was the 
ncrtrrace. Title w^s transferred tc facilitate the securitv of 
the note payable to Mrs. Thomas' grandfather. The evidence is 
clear that Mr. Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Mrs. 
Thomas. 
35. Mr. Thomas had a significant asset before the marriage 
and was able to use assets previously acquired to help complete 
the home for at least a year. Therefore, it would be inequitable 
for the Court to divide the equity in the home equally, and 
permit Mrs. Thomas to have all of her stocks and bonds. It would 
not be equitable or consistent for the Court to award Mrs. Thomas 
all of her premarital property and her gifts and inheritance and 
award her one-half of Mr. Thomas1 premarital property. That 
approach may force Mr. Thomas to sell his home, which would be 
much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would ignore the 
simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had 
worked for many years before the marriage and acquired before the 
marriage. It would also have a significant adverse effect upon 
his employment opportunities at Sundance for the following 
reasons: 
a. Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years 
before the marriage, although not continuously until the 
home was habitable; 
b. Since the fall of 1983, he has lived there 
continuously and is very much involved in the social and 
political activities there. For example, he is the Fire 
Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District, 
and Vice-chairman for three years. He is a past president 
of the Homeowners1 Association, Chairman of the 
Architectural Committee, and he drafted the Architectural 
Covenants of the SCAPO subdivision. 
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c. Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established 
his business at Sundance, and has earned his livelihood 
almost exclusively in that community since 1977. 
d. Given his income, it is not probable that he could 
acquire other accommodations in that community. 
e. It would prove far more difficult for him to 
maintain his maintenance contracts if he were to leave the 
area. 
36. Commencing sometime during the period of cohabitation 
and thereafter, the Plaintiff made some modest contribution to 
the construction of the home including her own manual labor, the 
acquisition of building materials, the building of retaining 
walls, and generally assisting the Defendant who acted as the 
general contractor for the building of the home. 
37. As stated above, generally, parties should retain their 
separate property that they brought into the marriage or that 
they might inherit during the marriage. 
38. The ownership of the premises and the state of 
improvement of the lot prior to marriage is not significantly 
disputed. The value of the asset prior to marriage can be 
established. It would be inequitable to grant Plaintiff an 
interest for which she never worked for, nor contributed to. 
39. The building lot had been conveyed to Mr. Thomas and 
significant improvements had been made prior to any contribution 
by Mrs. Thomas. This Court may always adjust property 
distribution to achieve an equitable result. 
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40. The Court values Mr. Thomas1 premarital asset at 
$150,000. The Court specifically rejects Mr. Free's claim that 
the 1982 value could not be ascertained because of the 
credibility problems listed below. That consists of the building 
lot and its improvements including the foundation for the home, 
the partially framed house, the lengthy access road which was 
constructed and other improvements such as sewer, power, partial 
retaining walls, and the stockpiled supplies. 
41. Beyond that interest, Mrs. Thomas is then entitled to 
an equitable share because of her maintenance and contributions. 
This appears to be a fair, just and equitable result because Mr. 
Thomas retains his clearly premarital interest, and Mrs. Thomas 
retains an equitable interest based on her efforts. This 
equitable determination rejects both the position of Plaintiff 
(commingling) and the position of Defendant (exclusive ownership 
together with all appreciation). 
b. Valuation of the Real Property 
42. Trial courts are provided considerable discretion in 
establishing the value of real property. Such valuations are 
presumed valid and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As stated in Morgan at 691, the trial court "is entitled to give 
conflicting opinions whatever weight it deems appropriate." 
There are conflicting opinions on this case. The Court 
establishes the value of the Sundance property as of the date of 
the trial. 
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43. The Plaintiff introduced evidence based upon the real 
property appraisal conducted by Gary Free and Associates which is 
based upon the "comparable sales approach" and concludes that the 
home has a current fair market value of $500,000. 
44. The Defendant introduced evidence based upon an 
appraisal conducted by Jud Harward who concluded that the home 
had a current fair market value of $355,000. 
45. The Court is disinclined to accept the appraisal of the 
home at Sundance by Mr. Free, Plaintiff • s expert, for the 
following reasons: 
a. Plaintiff's expert was uncertain of the 
comparables and some of the pictures of the "comparables" 
did not even correspond to the comparables which were relied 
upon. While this does not constitute a dispositive defect, 
it does reflect upon the accuracy of the appraisal and the 
credibility and integrity of the report. 
On this issue, the Court agrees with Mr. Thomas. The 
Court is not impressed with the idea that the photos of the 
comparables are not required and therefore of little 
importance. In the Court's view, an appraisal is a 
comparison of properties. The photograph is a "snapshot" of 
the real property. If it is wrong, the appraisal could be 
misleading. 
b. The comparables were not visited. 
c. The quality of the materials and quality of 
workmanship in the comparables were considerably different 
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the area. He testified concerning the significant differences in 
the quality of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin. 
47. Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Jud Harward. 
It is clear that Mr. Harward had considerable experience of 
appraising in Utah County area and in appraising property in 
Sundance. 
48. The Court accepts Mr. Harward's appraisal based upon 
such experience and observations in appraising real estate in 
Sundance. Accordingly, the Court accepts the value of the cabin 
at $355,000. 
49. The Court must consider costs associated with sale. It 
is undisputed that there are problems with the cabin before it 
could be marketable, including boundary line problems. There 
also are costs of repair. A real estate commissioner would be 
approximately six percent (6%), plus closing costs (.06 x 
$355,000 = $21,300). Mr. Thomas testified that the sales cost 
would be approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately 
$17,000 would have to be paid. 
$355,000 Sale Price 
$ 17,000 Mortgage 
S 31,900 Commission and Realtor Fees 
$306,100 
50. The value of Mr. Thomas1 interest at the time of 
marriage was $150,000. The Court has already addressed the issue 
of natural growth/appreciation. A fair division of the equity 
forces the Court to reject the appreciation factor given the 
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than those used by Mr. Thomas. It is undisputed, 
specifically, that the materials to construct the Thomas 
cabin had been previously us££l. The materials in the 
comparables were new. For example, the kitchen cabinets in 
the Thomas cabin are made of plywood. 
d. Comparison of the garages were not accurate, as 
well as other items such as number of fireplaces, concern 
for avalanche danger, and degree of exposure to sun. 
e. The Thomas home is not complete. It requires 
maintenance and repairs to make it marketable. The "Free" 
appraisal did not give sufficient weight to the true 
condition of the Thomas cabin. 
f. Mr. Free and his associates had considerable 
difficulty in even locating the correct properties. 
g. Of significant concern to this Court was Mr. 
Free's failure to address the extant property line and 
easement problems associated with the property. Such 
problems can significantly delay the sale of a property and 
the Court is aware that title problems not only affect the 
marketability of a property, but also affect its value. 
h. The "Free" appraisal also failed to address the 
difficulty of accessibility to the subject property and the 
significance of view. 
46. Mr. Thomas testified of his personal knowledge of 
Plaintiff's comparables because he was acquainted with each, and 
had performed work in many of the comparables and other cabins in 
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contributions of the parties during their marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of the divorce. Nevmeyer v. Newmeyer, 
745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, Mrs. Thomas1 
equity is calculated as follows ($306,100 - $150,000 /2). 
51. Therefore, the Court awards Mrs. Thomas an interest in 
the home at the value of $78,050. 
52. The Court grants the Defendant the option to either 
purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the cabin or sell the cabin 
and divide the proceeds consistent with the above findings of 
fact. 
53. The election to purchase the cabin should be exercised 
within 120 days from date hereon. Upon expiration, the cabin 
should be placed on the market for sale, with the parties 
cooperating in its listing, showing, selling and closing. 
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the area. He testified concerning the significant differences in 
the quality of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin. 
47. Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Jud Harvard. 
It is clear that Mr. Harward had considerable experience of 
appraising in Utah County area and in appraising property in 
Sundance. 
48. The Court accepts Mr. Harvard's appraisal based upon 
such experience and observations in appraising real estate in 
Sundance. Accordingly, the Court accepts the value of the cabin 
at $355,000. 
49. The Court must consider costs associated with sale. It 
is undisputed that there are problems with the cabin before it 
could be marketable, including boundary line problems. There 
also are costs of repair. A real estate commissioner would be 
approximately six percent (6%), plus closing costs (.06 x 
$355,000 = $21,300). Mr. Thomas testified that the sales cost 
would be approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately 
$17,000 would have to be paid. 
$355,000 Sale Price 
$ 17,000 Mortgage 
S 31.900 Commission and Realtor Fees 
$306,100 
50. The value of Mr. Thomas1 interest at the time of 
marriage was $150,000. The Court has already addressed the issue 
of natural growth/appreciation. A fair division of the equity 




CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
54. As indicted above, the parties have two minor children: 
Joseph and Katie. This Court is charged with the duty respecting 
the future care and custody of Joseph and Katie as it deems 
appropriate. 
55. This trial court is given broad discretion in making 
child custody awards. Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) . This Court has had the opportunity to witness 
the parties, to hear all of the evidence, to visit with the minor 
children and to judge the personal and individual circumstances 
of this case. 
56. As provided by statute, "in awarding custody, the Court 
shall consider, among other factors the Court finds relevant, 
which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
[children], including allowing the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the noncustodial parent as the Court finds 
appropriate." §30-3-10(2) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). In 
determining custody, the Court is to consider the best interests 
of the child and the past conducts and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. §30-3-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). 
57. This Court shall consider the "best interests of the 
child" as an important factor, but will also consider past 
conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent will 
act in the child's best interest and other relevant factors such 
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as keeping the siblings together, and each child fs bond with each 
parent. 
58. It is apparent that Joseph and Katie get along well, 
participate in activities together, and are a mutual support of 
each other. As noted in Dr. Stewart's report, there is a firm 
sibling bond. Accordingly, it is in their best interests not to 
be separated. This Court did not inquire as to the preference of 
Joseph or Katie because neither child is sufficiently mature of 
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent 
preference regarding legal custody. 
59. Both parents truly have a sincere desire for custody. 
This Court has carefully examined a custody evaluation report of 
Dr. Jay P. Jensen, a clinical psychologist, dated March 21, 1995. 
He, by stipulation, was appointed friend of the Court. In 
addition, the Court carefully examined the custody evaluation 
report of Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart, also a clinical psychologist, 
dated December 1, 1995. Both of these fine professionals 
testified at trial. Dr. Stewart had the benefit of Dr. Jensen's 
report when making her report and adopted/supported some of his 
findings and conclusions and criticized others. This Court would 
have favored an analysis which did not rely upon or disparage 
that of the parties' stipulated friend of the Court. The Court 
has relied in part on both evaluations for guidance, but the 
Court does not accept either in total. 
60. The two custody evaluations performed in this case 
appear to agree on a number of important points and disagree on 
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some critical issues. Dr. Jensen recommended that custody be 
given to the father or, in the alternative, a modified joint 
custody arrangement be worked out. Dr. Stewart recommends that 
custody be awarded to Mrs. Thomas. 
61. This is a complicated case with no easy, clear-cut 
answers. Both of these parents seek custody, are competent and 
definitely love their children. Both have personal, professional 
lives which somewhat complicate custodial arrangements. The 
children have been isolated in their Orem neighborhood because 
they attend a non-neighborhood school, Orchard Elementary, where 
their mother teaches. In addition, they have been somewhat 
isolated in their Sundance neighborhood because of the paucity of 
playmates and distance between cabins, etc. 
62. Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children 
prior to the parties1 separation. 
63. Prior to the parties1 separation and since, Ann Thomas 
has performed well as the mother of the children. 
64. The Defendant has also acknowledged that Ann Thomas is 
a competent, caring mother who has indeed been the primary care 
giver for the children throughout their lives. 
65. As the primary care giver of the children, Mr. Thomas 
has seen to their day to day needs, typically been the parent who 
has been home when they return from school, assisted the children 
with their school work, made sure the children received 
appropriate medical and dental care, typically transported the 
children when such was necessary, entertained the children, 
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disciplined the children, and so forth. Mr. Thomas has also 
contributed and been involved in these activities. The Court 
finds Mr. Thomas has been involved with the children's schooling, 
health care, religious training, and day to day activities. He 
has attended parent/teacher conferences, he has taken the 
children to doctors, dentists and other activities. 
66. The children interact with Ann Thomas as their primary 
care provider and have established confidence in her as their 
primary care provider. 
67. The parties have, since their separation in March of 
1993, entered into an arrangement of shared custody. The Court 
finds the arrangement which has been heretofore set forth in 
prior Court orders has provided that the time the children spent 
with each parent has been approximately equal. The Court finds 
that for approximately half of the life of the youngest and one-
third of the life of the oldest child, that they both have 
enjoyed a relationship with both of their parents wherein they 
have shared approximately equal time. The arrangement has worked 
somewhat well as these arrangements go, but the children have 
suffered from some instability and moving back and forth. 
68. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas had been involved with 
the children on a daily basis until the separation. Mr. Thomas 
conducts business out of his home which has permitted him to be 
involved in the children's daily activities since they were born. 
Since the parties1 separation, the children have also had an 
opportunity to rely upon their father for meeting their needs to 
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a greater extent than existed prior to separation. The children 
have flourished in the relationship they have with Mr. Thomas. 
69. The children's social needs are being principally met 
thought their associations at school. 
70. The Defendant's residence in Sundance, Utah County, 
does not afford a substantial amount of peer interaction for the 
children, but they have close friends there. In addition, the 
children have not established close friendships in their mother's 
neighborhood. 
71. The appearance of Senor Pedro Sauer in an emotional and 
sexual relationship with Ann Thomas during this marriage is a 
very complicating factor. 
72. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas separated in March of 1993. Mrs. 
Thomas, unbeknownst to Mr. Thomas, had commenced a relationship 
with Pedro in October or November of 1992. Mr. Pedro Sauer was 
then, and was at the time of trial, a married man. 
73. From all the trial testimony and reports of the 
evaluators, what facts to do we glean about Pedro? 
a. He is not a citizen of the United States of 
America. 
b. He is Brazilian and has entered the United States 
by virtue of a work permit. 
c. He is a marrial arts instructor in Ju Jitsu at a 
health club. 
d. He is married, and his wife and small children 
live in Orem, Utah. He has several small children. 
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e. It is somewhat unclear when Pedro entered into a 
sexually intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas, but the 
romantic relationship commenced in 1992. Mrs. Thomas 
reported to Dr. Jensen that she met Pedro in October and had 
a relationship by November of 1992. Mr. Thomas believed the 
relationship had started as early as June of 1992. 
f. During the pendency of this action, Pedro fathered 
a child during a time of reconciliation with his wife, while 
still maintaining an intimate relationship with Mrs. Thomas. 
g. After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas, 
Pedro was charged with domestic violence with this wife. 
h. Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was 
charged with possession of a firearm/revolver at Lake Powell 
in the company of Mrs. Thomas. This may have also violated 
his work permit status in the United States. 
i. Pedro, in his young marriage and with several 
young children, has participated in other adulterous 
affairs. 
j. He now has a divorce pending in the Fourth 
District Court which is set for September of 1996. 
k. His wife enjoyed entry into the United States 
because of the work status of Pedro. A divorce will result 
in her deportation from the United States and her re-entry 
is in question. The future custodial status of their 
children is unknown. This could significantly affect the 
Pedro/Mrs. Thomas dynamics if some or all of the children 
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remain here, particularly any child born in the United 
States and who would automatically enjoy citizenship. 
1. Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that her 
relationship with Pedro "had a dramatic effect" on the 
ultimate breakup of the Thomas family. 
m. Mrs. Thomas perceives Pedro as "a very positive 
male role model. . ." (Report of Dr. Jensen, p. 10.) 
74. The Pedro/Ann Thomas relationship has continued for 
several years and while no one can predict the future, it appears 
to this Court that it is their intention to marry when they are 
legally able. As mentioned above, his divorce trial is scheduled 
for September of 1996. 
75. This Court had hoped Mr. Sauer's divorce would have 
been completed earlier in order to evaluate his true motives, and 
then to have evaluators thoroughly and fully consider his 
relationship to these minor children, his commitment to Mrs. 
Thomas, his relationships with any other women, and his 
obligations to his children and his ex-wife. 
76. The Court has entertained the testimony of Pedro Sauer 
and his wife. He represented himself as a responsible 
individual, but is not. He has undertaken activity which would 
be considered detrimental to the Thomas children. 
77. Based upon the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Sauer and 
others, the Court does find a "link" or connection that would 
suggest that the relationship between the Plaintiff and Mr. Sauer 
has negatively impacted the children, or will negatively impact 
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the children in the future. 
78. The evaluators can make no "objective" link between the 
"affair" and its impact upon the children. The fact of the 
matter is that they are young and my not appreciate the 
consequences of a fairly discreet sexual affair, but the 
relationship has affected the family: 
a. The affair has impacted the family financially. 
The testimony is that Mr. Sauer has not contributed 
financially to the family despite the frequency of his 
overnight stays. In addition, scarce resources have been 
expended on Pedro for gifts and travel. 
b. The affair eventually resulted in a confrontation 
at the children's home with Mrs. Sauer. That exposure, 
albeit brief, is not positive for the children. 
c. Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is 
of concern to this Court. His spousal abuse charge during 
this time is of concern to this Court as is his illegal 
possession of a weapon. The weapon was possessed in the 
company of Mrs. Thomas on a trip to Lake Powell and was 
attempted to be retrieved at a time of confrontation. Such 
activity always places the children's mother at risk and 
such illegal choices can potentially, negatively affect the 
family. 
d. Mr. Sauer "had a dramatic effect" on the ultimate 
breakup of the Thomas family. That breakup has affected 
these children significantly, dramatically and in a myriad 
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of ways, 
79. The reason this case is so troubling is because of 
Pedro Sauer and his negative influence on the family. Absent his 
entry, and his influence, it is clearly in the best interests of 
the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the 
picture, which he is and intends to be, it is not in the best 
interests of the children to be in the home and subjected to the 
negative influence and example of Pedro. 
80. This Court is profoundly concerned with Mrs. Thomas1 
observation that Pedro is "a very positive role model." She has 
been duped by his suave, debonair and romantic influences and has 
overlooked his less than desirable characteristics: immorality, 
social irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his 
criminal activity and his spousal abuse. This Court cannot 
conceive how Pedro is a positive role model for little Joseph. 
To that extent Ann Thomas does not have the best interests of the 
children at heart. 
81. Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the 
children. On the issue of stability, the Court concurs with Dr. 
Jensen that: 
a. Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the 
childrenfs lives (Exhibit 1 page 14, Conclusions and 
Recommendations) . 
b. Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's 
integration into their present environment by a change in 
residence. Mr. Thomas has indicated that he plans to remain 
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in the area where his business is established. It is the 
area where the children were born. He plans to continue to 
rear the children in these familiar surroundings. At 
earlier stages of the separation, Mrs. Thomas wished to move 
from the area regardless of the separation of the children 
from their father. 
c. Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas1 
role in the children's lives. 
d. Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and 
has set a better example in that regard. 
e. There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would 
subject the children to the deleterious effects of a 
relationship as Mrs. Thomas has done. 
f. Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation 
to his family and is more interested in the children having 
a meaningful relationship with both parents. 
82. Based upon the above, the Court believes it is in the 
long term best interests of the children to award their custody 
to Mr. Thomas subject to generous, liberal and frequent 
visitation by Mrs. Thomas. This award will allow the children 
the stability of the home, which they have known from birth, will 
allow them to continue in the same school and will allow them to 
have daily contact with their morher there. This arrangement 
will provide Mrs. Thomas with sufficient recreational time, as 
well as work time/discipline time with the children. 
83. This Court adopts the "minimum schedule for visitation" 
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found at Utah CQde, Annotated ("U.C.A") §30-3-35(2), modified as 
follows: Plaintiff shall enjoy visitation on alternating weeks 
commencing Thursday evening following the release of the children 
from school and concluding the following Monday morning when the 
Plaintiff returns the children to school, which shall constitute 
her alternating weekend visitation. Additionally, the parties 
have agreed that the Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with 
the children on Thursday evenings following the children's 
dismissal from school until the following Friday morning when the 
Plaintiff delivers the children to school. 
84. The parties shall divide the children's "vacation time" 
between them. Vacation time shall include "off-track" school 
time when the children are in year-round schools. This will 
include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each 
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is 
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow 
for family vacation time. 
85. This modification is made according to the "advisory 
guidelines" of U.C.A. §30-3-33, particularly paragraph (2) ("the 
visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life"). Pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-
34(l),1 the Court finds that this modification serves three 
important interests of the children. 
First, it economized on the amount of required travel* This 
1
 "If the part ies are unable to agree on a v i s i t a t i o n schedule, the court 
may establ ish a v i s i t a t i o n schedule consistent with the best in teres t s of the 
c h i l d . " U.C.A. §30-3-34(1). 
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should promote the safety of the children, increase the amount of 
time available for meaningful activities with each parent, and 
reduce the amount of money diverted to transportation costs. 
Second, it avoids late-evening exchanges on week nights, 
which could have ill effects upon the health of the children as 
well as their performance in school. 
Third, it reduces the number of times the children are 
forced to make a change of dwelling, with all of the 
inconvenience that may entail (in terms of packing and cleaning, 
for example). 
86. For these reasons, the Court finds that this visitation 
schedule will tend to "maximize the continuity and stability of 
the child[ren]fs [lives]," U.C.A. §30-3-33(2), and therefore is 
"consistent with the best interest of the child[ren]" U.C.A. 
§30-3-34(1). Moreover, this arrangement is compatible with this 
Court's prior order of "generous, liberal and frequent visitation 
by [Plaintiff]," Ruling at 18, subject to the restriction to be 
discussed presently. 
87. Moreover, in its ruling from the bench, this Court 
places an important restriction upon Plaintiff with regard to her 
periods of visitation. This Court stated that during the 
visitation periods set forth, "there should be no romantic 
interaction between the Plaintiff and Pedro Sauer." Minute Entry 
- Order to Show Cause Hearing ("Minute Entry") at n.p. Plaintiff 
must use caution and sound judgment in her relations with Mr. 
Sauer in the presence of the children. 
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88. Furthermore, there shall be no romantic interaction 
whatsoever between Plaintiff and Mr. Pedro Sauer during the 
children's martial arts instruction. 
89. However, despite the concerns expressed by the 
Defendant, this Court declines to restrict the children's 
participation in martial arts while visitation. As the Court has 
previously stated on the record: 
The participation of the children in martial 
arts is a separate issue and should be 
addressed through mediation. If the children 
are being injured, bruised or engaging in 
activities which are foreign to the personal 
philosoph[y] of [either] parent, then the 
issue can be revisited. 
Minute Entry at n.p. 
90. In addition, as to any extra-curricular activities, 
including Ju Jitsu/martial arts, the parties shall consult with 
one another with the intent to reach a resolution. If they are 
unable to do so, they shall mediate their differences. The 
parties shall cooperate with each other in providing medical, 
school and other records relating to the children. 
91. Each party is to assume its own costs and attorney's 




92. Mr. Thomas is entitled to child support for the care 
and custody of Katie and Joseph. Practically speaking, it is 
difficult to assess the income of Mr. Thomas because of his self-
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employment status and the legal measures set up for financing his 
business. In addition, income generated from a construction 
business is volatile from year to year and is sensitive to the 
economy. Likewise, it is also difficult to assess Mrs. Thomasfs 
income because she historically enjoyed the benefit of an 
inheritance of stocks and bonds exclusive to her. There is 
testimony that that source has been exhausted, but nonetheless 
she had substantial income from the sale or stocks and bonds 
during the tax year prior to trial. 
93. The Court finds Bert Thomas was self-employed, and had 
numerous tools and two trucks at the time he married Mrs. Thomas. 
He earns a living using his tools. 
94. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas owns a business known 
as Bert Thomas Construction, Inc. (BTCI) . Mr. Thomas performs 
the following tasks with respect to the business: he performs all 
of the bidding, purchases all of the materials, answers the 
telephone or otherwise handles all inquiries, pays all bills, 
deals with all employees, and has so been involved for 
approximately 20 years at Sundance. He has periodically worked 
with Dwight Hooker as an employee. 
95. Mr. Thomas has set up, pursuant to the advice of his 
accountant, an investment company called Thomas Investments. 
This accounting arrangement allows him to earn passive income 
through the investment company without Social Security 
contribution. 
96. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has confined virtually all 
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of his work to the Sundance area. He remodels and maintains 
homes in this area. He has also built a few homes in the 
Sundance area. 
97. The Court finds Mr. Thomas's income is derived from two 
sources: (1) Bert Thomas Construction Company, a corporation; and 
(2) Thomas Investments. There is not anything irregular or 
inappropriate with respect to his income from either the 
construction company and investment company as verified by both 
Ann's and Bert's accountants. 
98. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has income which comes from 
the investment company. The Court finds the arrangement has been 
set up so that Mr. and Mrs. Thomas could receive passive income, 
thus reducing their withholding to Social Security. According to 
Mrs. Thomas' expert there does not appear to be any inappropriate 
expenditures, or any unaccounted for funds, or inappropriate 
accounting conducted by Mr. Thomas. Moreover, there does not 
appear to be any significant benefits to Mr. Thomas from either 
the construction company or the investment company. While 
employees of the construction company did minor work on the home, 
part of the home is listed as an asset of the investment company 
and is used as an office, shop, bathroom and storage area. 
99. Mr. Thomas has been a reasonably successful contractor 
earning, typically during the years, just prior to separation, 
approximately $70,000 per year. 
100. The Court relies upon the exhibits introduced in 
connection with the testimony of Derk Rasmussen, CPA, consisting 
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of Exhibits 7 through 19. 
101. Mr. Rasmussen conducted an in depth review of the 
parties' savings account and checking account activity in order 
to determine the availability of cash to the family, the 
expenditures of cash, the income of the Defendant and the 
projected income of the Defendant. 
102. The Defendant has testified that his income and 
business activity has been about normal during the pendency of 
the case. 
103. The trend in Utah County residential construction has 
been an increasing trend, and the Bert Thomas Construction 
revenue trend has approximately kept pace with that increase, see 
Exhibit 12. 
104. Inexplicably and contrary to the Defendant's own 
testimony, the actual Bert Thomas Construction Company revenue 
has declined sharply since separation regardless of the trend of 
residential construction in Utah County and the previous Bert 
Thomas Construction trend, see Exhibit 13. 
105. It would be appropriate to average the income of Mr. 
Thomas to determine what his actual income earning capacity is. 
However, it would be inappropriate to give the same weight to 
post-separation years as to pre-separation years. 
106. Therefore, the Court adopts the average set forth in 
Exhibit 16 for Mr. Thomas's income at $69,567 per year, gross and 
before taxes, which is an average of the income from the years 
1988 to 1992. 
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107. The Plaintiff's income from her sole employment is 
$25,824 gross per year. 
108. Child support should be based upon the Child Support 
Guidelines for the State of Utah attributing $5,797 per month as 
gross income to the Defendant and $2,152 per month to the 
Plaintiff. 
109. To arrive at the amount of child support required of 
parents collectively, this Court must first determine the 
"adjusted gross income" of each parent. U.C.A. §78-45-7.4. 
"Adjusted gross income" in this case simply means gross income. 
See U.C.A. §78-45-7.6. This Court previously found Defendant's 
annual income to be $69,567 and Plaintiff's to be $25,824. These 
figures are hereby found to represent the "gross income" and 
hence the "adjusted gross income" of each party for purposes of 
determining their respective child support obligations. 
110. According to U.C.A. §78-45-7.4 (2) (a) , the next step is 
for this Court to lf[c]ombine the adjusted gross incomes of the 
parents." This yields a sum of $95,391 annually. Next, the 
Court must "recalculate []. . . to determine the average 
[adjusted] gross monthly income" of each of the parties 
separately and of both together." U.C.A. §78-45-7.5 (5)(a) , 
emphasis added. The result is a finding that the Defendant 
receives $5,797.25 per month, while Plaintiff receives $2,152 per 
month. Together, their monthly income amounts to $7,949.25. 
111. With this last figure in hand, the Court is in a 
position to "determine the base combined child support obligation 
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using the base combined child support obligation table" found at 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.14. U.C.A. §78-45-7.7(2)(a). According to that 
table, where the monthly combined adjusted gross income ("monthly 
combined income") is between $7,901 and $8,000, and there are two 
children of the marriage, the base combined child support 
obligation is $1,23 6 per month. 
112. This amount ($1,236) must be apportioned between the 
parties according to their respective contributions to the 
monthly combined income. As it happens, Defendant contributes 
72.9% of the income while Plaintiff contributes 27.1% of it. 
Therefore, Defendant is liable for $901.39 ($1,236 x 72.9%) per 
month in child support, while Plaintiff is liable for $334*61 
($1,236 x 27.1%) per month. 
113. Because Defendant is the custodial parent, he is 
entitled to receive $334.61 per month from Plaintiff for the 
purpose of child support. 
114. Based upon the foregoing, child support should enter 
consistent with the guidelines in the amount of $334.61 per 
month. Total child care paid by Mr. Thomas from February 1994, 
through March, 1996 was $2,080. His actual responsibility for 
payment of child care was $438. He is therefore entitled to a 
credit of $1,642.00 
V. 
ALIMONY 
115. Alimony is largely a function of the income of the 
parties. U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(a)(i)(iii). Defendant contends that 
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this Court erred in determining his income. His contention may 
or may not be correct. In any event, it is best left for the 
appellate courts to revisit the complex financial arrangements of 
the parties. Accordingly, this Court declines the invitation to 
disturb its prior determination of the Defendant's income. 
B. 
116. There are a considerable number of factors in 
determining the necessity, amount and duration of alimony 
obligations. At a minimum, the Court must consider the factors 
listed at id. These include: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and , 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
Id. In addition, "[t]he court may consider the fault of the 
parties. . ." U.C.A. §30-3-5(7) (b) . 
117. The aim of alimony generally is to maintain, as much 
as possible, a certain standard of living for each of the parties 
to a divorce. Thus, 
[a]s a general rule, the court should look to 
the standard of living, existing at the time 
of separation, in determining alimony . . . 
However, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time 
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of trial. . . U.C.A §30-3-5(&)(c). 
Additionally, "[t]he court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective 
standards of living-" U.C.A. §30-3-5(7)(d). 
118. These are the statutory statements which guide the 
analysis which follows. 
C. 
119. Defendant in this case seeks a retroactive award of 
temporary support. He was ordered to make payments of $700 per 
month at a preliminary order at the earliest stages of these 
proceedings. Defendant argues that amount was established based 
upon a faulty and inflated determination of his income. He 
argues further that an initial faulty determination has been 
perpetrated through this entire case to the harsh detriment of 
the Defendant. 
120. Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's personal 
expenses have been highly exaggerated, that she has sufficient 
income to meet her needs and that she will receive a significant 
amount of the proceeds (approximately $78,000) from the equity in 
the home. Further, he argues that during the pendency of this 
action, she has had access to large amounts of money derived from 
the sale of stocks and bonds and from personal savings (sometimes 
in excess of $120,000). Next, he argues that yearly gifts of 
stocks and bonds, in light of the divorce, have now simply been 
conveyed to their minor children as a subterfuge until after the 
divorce. 
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121. Next, he argues that the accounts of the children can 
be utilized to purchase a home, etc. and reduce any need for 
alimony. The Court finds this argument to be interesting, but 
unconvincing. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's 
affidavit of personal expenses is exaggerated, and that she has 
sufficient income to meet her personal needs. 
122. Counsel for Plaintiff argues that Defendant should pay 
alimony pursuant to the Temporary Order and that Plaintiff should 
not pay child support simply because she cannot afford it even 
accounting for the alimony she will receive. Plaintiff argues 
that her present personal expenses exceed her income. 
123. The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. Noble v. Noblef 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1988). 
The 1995 amendment to §30-3-5(7)(a) codified 
Jones which had established a three factor 
approach in setting alimony. In setting an 
award of alimony, a trial court must consider 
the following three factors: (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the 
receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income 
for him or herself, and (3) the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support. 
However, "alimony may not be automatically 
awarded whenever there is disparity between 
the parties' incomes"??? 
124. Additionally, the Court has weighed the following 
three factors. 
1. Earnings and Expenses 
This Court has previously determined the income of each 
e: \ ••«A»A\ fMov t- I«T- n\ raoxma. no 37 
party. The Court finds that Plaintiff's expenses are exaggerated 
and that the expenses of Defendant will necessarily increase 
somewhat because of this Court's award of custody to Defendant. 
In addition, it is apparent that during this litigation that 
Plaintiff has had access to sums of money derived principally 
from the sale of gifted stock and bonds. 
2. Education, Health, Etc. 
Both parties are employed and are healthy. Plaintiff is a 
college graduate and has pursued an advanced degree. She is 
employed as a teacher and has steady, stable employment. 
Defendant is a high school graduate with no college degree and no 
substantive advanced training. He runs a one-man-managed 
construction company, employing others as the seasons allow. He 
has expressed some desire to change careers and seek a more 
stable, long-term employment with benefits and retirement. 
3. Ability to Pay 
Defendant argues that he cannot afford alimony because he is 
now saddled with a refinance of the home in order to pay out the 
equity to Defendant. Further, he again argues that the Court's 
determination of income is in error and that Plaintiff's take 
home income exceeds his. 
125. This Court previously held that the character of 
Defendant's source of income requires that he remain in the 
Sundance home. His construction business relies exclusively upon 
word-of-mouth referrals in the Sundance area. 
126. Clearly, there are limited funds to meet the demands 
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of two households. It is impossible to absolutely equalize 
standards of Living. This Court must order alimony in an attempt 
to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries 
essential to maintain customary or proper status or 
circumstances. 
127. Defendant has some ability to pay alimony. 
Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff three years (36 months) 
of alimony at the rate of $700.00 per month. Defendant may have 
credit for amounts paid pursuant to the Temporary Order of the 
Court. This award shall automatically terminate upon Plaintiff's 
remarriage or cohabitation with another person. 
VI. 
PENSION, RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MISCELLANEOUS, ETC. 
128. Health care insurance and health care costs. The 
children should be maintained on Mrs. Thomas1 health care plan. 
Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed routine health 
care costs. Any non-routine medical, dental or orthodontic care 
costs must be agreed upon by the parties before any such cost is 
incurred. The Court finds Mrs. Thomas terminated Mr. Thomas from 
her health insurance. Although the insurance coverage was 
reinstated, as a result, Mr. Thomas incurred and paid health care 
costs in the amount of $1,944, which should have been paid by her 
insurance. Mr, Thomas is entitled to a credit in that amount 
against her interest in the home (See Exhibit 53) . If Mrs. 
Thomas is able to obtain a result from the insurance company, she 
may have it. 
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129. It is clear that Plaintiff improperly canceled health 
care benefits, and it was necessary for the Court to order 
reinstatement. Defendant argues that he is entitled to medical 
expenses he incurred because of the improper cancellation. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not comply with insurance 
company policies. It appears that these problems arose because 
of Plaintiff's improper cancellation of coverage. She is 
chargeable, but is also entitled to the insurance reimbursement 
payments once the bill has been presented and her payment to 
Defendant has been verified. 
13 0. Cost of custody evaluation. These parties stipulated 
to Dr. Jensen as a friend of the Court. When Plaintiff found his 
recommendations to be unfavorable, adverse or objectionable, she 
moved to have another evaluator appointed. Regardless of the 
language of this Court's decision, it was the intent of the Court 
that the parties should share the costs of Dr. Jensen equally. 
Plaintiff should bear all costs associated with the report and 
appearance of Dr. Stewart. 
131. Tax Deductions. Each party is entitled to claim one 
of the children as a dependent for tax purposes. 
132. Debts. Mr. Thomas shall be responsible for his debts 
and obligations including those of the corporation. Mrs. Thomas 
shall be responsible for her own debts and obligations. 
133. Costs of litigation. Each party shall be responsible 
of his or her own costs of litigation, which include attorney's 
fees, costs, costs of appraisals and expert witnesses. 
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134. Retirement, Mr. Thomas is entitled to a qualified 
domestic relations order. The date of the marriage is July 17, 
1992. The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996. Mr. Thomas is 
entitled to be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to 
the terms and conditions of the plan. The ratio which he is 
entitled to receive is as follows: 
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrs. Thomas 
was teaching 
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at 
retirement. 
Mr. Thomas is entitled to be designated as a fifty percent (50%) 
survivor. 
135. The Court finds Mr. Thomas is also entitled to one-
half of the school bus credit to which he was entitled by virtue 
of paying taxes on the home in Sundance. Mrs. Thomas collected 
this credit in the amount of $400. 
13 6. The parties are ordered to cooperate in the 
effectuation of these terms and conditions. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this 
matter. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, the 
same to become final upon signing and entry. 
3. That the Plaintiff should be awarded the annual gifts 
of cash and stock Plaintiff has received during the marriage, 
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except for those funds which have been designated in trust for 
the children which should be maintained by the Plaintiff in trust 
for the children and made available to them consistent with the 
intent of the donor. 
4. Each party should be awarded the personal property 
presently in their possession and, in addition and not 
withstanding that, that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 
following items of personal property: 
(a) Kachina doll; 
(b) Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the 
Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces), at the 
election of the Defendant; 
(c) One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies, or 
financial equivalent; 
(d) The oriental rug; 
(e) The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by 
her father; 
(f) The wooden bowl; 
(g) One (1) copy of the home videos. 
5. The Defendant should be awarded the home and real 
property located in Sundance, Utah and the Plaintiff should be 
awarded an interest in the home in the amount of $78,050. The 
Defendant should either purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the 
cabin or sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with 
the Decree. The Defendant's election to purchase the cabin 
should be exercised within 120 days from date hereon. Upon 
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expiration, the cabin should be placed on the market for sale, 
and the parties should cooperate in its listing, showing, selling 
and closing. 
6. The Defendant should be awarded the sole care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties subject to 
generous, liberal and frequent visitation rights in the 
Plaintiff. 
7• The Plaintiff is awarded reasonable and liberal 
visitation rights which consist of those set forth in §3 0-3-35 
Utah Code Ann.. amended as follows: Plaintiff shall enjoy 
visitation on alternating weeks commencing Thursday evening 
following the release of the children from school and concluding 
the following Monday morning when the Plaintiff returns the 
children to school, which shall constitute her alternating 
weekend visitation. Additionally, the parties agree that the 
Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with the children on 
Thursday evenings following the children's dismissal from school 
until the following Friday morning when the Plaintiff delivers 
the children to school. 
8. The parties shall divide the children's "vacation time" 
between them. Vacation time shall include "off-track" school 
time when the children are in year-round schools. This will 
include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each 
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is 
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow 
for family vacation time. 
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9. The Court adopts the advisory guidelines contained in 
§30-3-33 Utah Code Ann-
10. The Defendant should be awarded child support from the 
Plaintiff in the amount of $334.96 per month consistent with the 
Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
11. The Defendant should be awarded a credit in the amount 
of $1,642.00 for overpayment of child care. 
12. The Plaintiff is awarded alimony from the Defendant in 
the amount of $700.00 per month for a period of three (3) years 
commencing with the entry of the Temporary Order herein. Alimony 
shall automatically terminate upon the Plaintiff's remarriage or 
cohabitation with another person. 
13. The children should be maintained on Plaintiff's health 
care plan. Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed 
routine health care costs. Any non-routine medical, dental or 
orthodontic care costs must be agreed upon by the parties before 
any such cost is incurred. 
14. Defendant should be entitled to a credit in the amount 
of $1,944 against Plaintiff's interest in the home for medical 
expenses incurred by the Defendant which would have been covered 
on Plaintiff's medical insurance had Plaintiff not canceled 
Defendant's coverage. If Plaintiff is able to obtain a result 
from the insurance company, she should have that. 
15. The parties should share equally in the costs of the 
Dr. Jay Jensen child custody evaluation. 
16. Each party should be entitled to claim one of the 
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children as a dependent for tax purposes. 
17. The Defendant should pay and assume his own debts and 
obligations, including those of the corporation, and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless thereon. Plaintiff should pay and assume her 
debt and obligations and hold the Defendant harmless thereon. 
18. Each party should pay their own costs of litigation, 
which include attorneyfs fees, costs, costs of appraisals and 
expert witnesses. 
19. The Defendant should be entitled to a qualified 
domestic relations order. The date of the marriage is July 17, 
1992. The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996. Defendant 
should be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the plan. The ratio which Defendant 
should be entitled to receive is as follows: 
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrst Thomas 
was teaching 
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at 
retirement. 
Defendant should be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor. 
20. The Defendant is awarded one-half (%) of the school bus 
credit in the amount of $400.00 which Plaintiff previously 
collected. 
21. The parties should cooperate in the effectuation of 
these terms and conditions. 
DATED THIS 7 day of Mayf 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
45 
C : \ U M t M f M t > l l T - * 1 \ r t N I M t - n « 
Approved as to Form: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BERT CHARLES THOMAS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
Civil MO. 934402503 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Comm. Howard Maetani 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
commencing December 5, 1995, and following an adjournment 
convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable Judge Lynn 
Davis presided. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were present in 
person and represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green 
appearing for the Plaintiff and Brent Young appearing for the 
Defendant. Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the 
Court entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses. 
Counsel argued the following contested issues: 1) division of 
personal property; 2) division of real property and value of real 
property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody 
and visitation; 4) child support; 5) alimony; 6) pension, 
retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous issues. 
Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996 and a 
MiNkv-in-tnuooi. a 
final hearing was held on November 8, 1996 to resolve remaining 
issues. The Court, having reviewed the file, the exhibits, and 
the arguments of counsel based thereon the Court having made and 
entered herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
good cause otherwise appearing, it is, hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant, the same to become final upon the signing and 
entry hereof. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the annual gifts of cash 
and stock Plaintiff has received during the marriage, except for 
those funds which have been designated in trust for the children 
which shall be maintained by the Plaintiff in trust for the 
children and made available to them consistent with the intent of 
the donor. 
3. That each party is awarded the personal property 
presently in their possession and, in addition and not 
withstanding that, that the Plaintiff is awarded the following 
items of personal property: 
(a) Kachina doll; 
(b) Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the 
Adirondack outdoor furniture (four (4) pieces), at the 
election of the Defendant; 
(c) One (1) of the Bearnaise Mountain Dog puppies or 
the financial equivalent; 
(d) The oriental rug; 
(e) The antique toy trucks given to the Plaintiff by 
her father; 
(f) The wooden bowl; 
(g) One (1) copy of the home videos. 
4. That the Defendant is awarded the home and real 
property located in Sundance, Utah and the Plaintiff is awarded 
an interest in the home in the amount of $78,050. The Defendant 
shall either purchase the Plaintiff's interest in the cabin or 
sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with this 
Decree. The Defendant's election to purchase the cabin shall be 
exercised within 120 days from date hereon. Upon expiration, the 
cabin shall be placed on the market for sale, and the parties 
shall cooperate in its listing, showing, selling and closing. 
5. That the Defendant is awarded the sole care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties subject to 
generous, liberal and frequent visitation rights in the 
Plaintiff. 
6. That the Plaintiff is awarded reasonable and liberal 
visitation rights which consist of those set forth in §30-3-35 
Utah Code Ann.
 r amended as follows: Plaintiff shall enjoy 
visitation on alternating weeks commencing Thursday evening 
following the release of the children from school and concluding 
the following Monday morning when the Plaintiff returns the 
children to school, which shall constitute her alternating 
weekend visitation. Additionally, the parties agree that the 
Plaintiff shall enjoy midweek visits with the children on 
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Thursday evenings following the childrenfs dismissal from school 
until the following Friday morning when the Plaintiff delivers 
the children to school. 
7. That the parties shall divide the children's "vacation 
time11 between them. Vacation time shall include "off-track" 
school time when the children are in year-round schools. This 
will include summer off-track or vacation time provided that each 
party will enjoy a two (2) week period of time that is 
undisturbed by visitation with the other parent, which will allow 
for family vacation time. 
8. That the Court adopts the advisory guidelines contained 
in §30-3-33, Utah Code Ann, 
9. That the Defendant is awarded child support from the 
Plaintiff in the amount of $334.96 per month consistent with the 
Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
10. That the Defendant is awarded a credit in the amount of 
$1,642.00 for overpayment of child care. 
11. That the Plaintiff is awarded alimony from the 
Defendant in the amount of $700.00 per month for a period of 
three (3) years commencing with the entry of the Temporary Order 
herein. Alimony shall automatically terminate upon the 
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with another person. 
12. That the children shall be maintained on Plaintiff's 
health care plan. Each party shall pay one-half (%) of any 
unreimbursed routine health care costs. Any non-routine medical, 
dental or orthodontic care costs must be agreed upon by the 
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parties before any such cost is incurred* 
13. That Defendant shall receive a credit in the amount of 
$1,944 against Plaintiff's interest in the home for medical 
expenses incurred by the Defendant which would have been covered 
on Plaintiff's medical insurance had Plaintiff not canceled 
Defendant's coverage. If Plaintiff is able to obtain a result 
from the insurance company, she shall have that. 
14. That the parties shall share equally in the costs of 
the Dr. Jay Jensen child custody evaluation. 
15. That each party is entitled to claim one of the 
children as a dependent for tax purposes. 
16. That the Defendant shall pay and assume his own debts 
and obligations, including those of the corporation, and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless thereon. Plaintiff shall pay and assume her 
debt and obligations and hold the Defendant harmless thereon. 
17. That each party shall pay their own costs of 
litigation, which include attorney's fees, costs, costs of 
appraisals and expert witnesses. 
18. That the Defendant is entitled to a qualified domestic 
relations order. The date of the marriage is July 17, 1992. The 
date of the divorce is August 13, 1996. Defendant shall be paid 
his interest in the retirement pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the plan. The ratio which Defendant .shall be 
entitled to receive is as follows: 
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrsf Thomas 
was teaching 
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total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at 
retirement. 
Defendant shall be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor. 
19. That the Defendant is awarded one-half (%) of the 
school bus credit in the amount of $400.00 which Plaintiff 
previously collected. 
20. That the parties shall cooperate in the effectuation of 
these terms and conditions. 
DATED THIS 3 day of Jfey^ 1997. ,x. ^ . 
BY THE SOTfastjS^ 
l &' fa 
5ON3RA^LE$" 
DISTRICT -0 
Approved as t o Form: 
£Yl??-
A t t o r n e y 
Approved a s 
IICK N. GREEN 
[ t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
cx\»m**A\wma*-i»i-9i\* 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANN ELIZABETH THOMAS, 
vs. 
BERT CHARLES THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON ALL OUTSTANDING 
MOTIONS AND ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
CASE NO. 934402503 
DATE: JANUARY 14, 1997 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
On August 19, 1996, following trial on a number of contested issues, this Court 
entered a ruling ("Ruling"). The Ruling disposed of many, but not all, of the issues then 
pending in this case. Some issues were reserved by the Court 
Thus Plaintiff Ann Elizabeth Thomas ("Plaintiff*) subsequently filed a Motion for 
Ruling on "issues which have not been addressed in the Court's Ruling and are pivotal to 
issues which have been reserved by the Court." Motion for Ruling at 1. The Motion was 
dated August 29, 1996 but was filed in this Court on September 3, 1996. 
Plaintiff next filed a Notice to Submit for Decision ("Notice") on September 26, 1996. 
This Notice simply informed the Court and the Defendant that the only motion then "at issue 
and ready for decision of the court [sicY was the Motion for Ruling. 
Shortly thereafter, on October 4, 1996, Defendant Bert Charles Thomas ("Defendant") 
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Mrs. Thomas' [sic] Motion for Ruling and 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings, referring to Plaintiffs Motion for Ruling. This 
motion, which asked that Defendant be given until October 9, 1996 to reply, was granted 
On October 10, 1996, Defendant filed his Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Ruling and 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings. The following day, October 11, 1996, Defendant 
filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause. This Motion was accompanied by the Affidavit of 
Defendant, Bert Thomas[,] in Support o[f] Order to Show Cause to Implement Visitation. 
This Court granted Defendant's motion and issued an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") on 
October 17, 1996. 
On November 4, 1996, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of "Motion for 
Ruling" [sic] was filed. Four days later, on November 8, 1996, a hearing on the OSC and 
other motions was held. Present at the hearing were both of the parties as well as their 
respective counsel: Frederick N. Green for Plaintiff and Brent D. Young for Defendant. 
This Court, having carefully reviewed the file, with particular attention to the recent 
memoranda of counsel and transcript of the hearing, now enters the following: 
L 
VISITATION 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
At the November 8 hearing on the OSC, this Court ruled from the bench as to the 
matter of visitation. For purposes of clarification, the visitation order is set for* as follows. 
This Court adopts the "minimum schedule for visitation" found at Utah Code 
Annotated ("U.C.A.") § 30-3-35(2), modified as follows. Plaintiff, as noncustodial parent, 
shall have visitation rights on alternating weeks* beginning on Thursday evening at 5:30 p.m. 
and concluding on Stnrday evening at JJtiQjp.m. This shall constitute her regular weekday 
and weekend visitation. 
This modification is made according to the "advisory guidelines" of U.C.A. § 30-3-33, 
particularly paragraph (2) ("the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life"). Pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-34(l),] the Court finds that this 
modification serves three important interests of the children. 
"If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may establish a visitation schedule 
consistent with the best interests of the child." U.C.A. § 30-3-34(1). 
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First, it economizes on the amount of required travel. This should promote the safety 
of the children, increase the amount of time available for meaningful activities with each 
parent, and reduce the amount of money diverted to transportation costs. 
Second, it avoids late-evening exchanges on week nights, which could have ill effects 
upon the health of the children as well as their performance in school. Third, it reduces the 
number of times the children are forced to make a change of dwelling, with all of the 
inconvenience that may entail (in terms of packing and cleaning, for example). 
For these reasons, the Court finds that this visitation schedule will tend to "maximize 
the continuity and stability of the child[ren]'s [lives]," U.C.A. § 30-3-33(2), and therefore is 
"consistent with the best interests of the children]" U.C.A. 30-3-34(1). Moreover, this 
arrangement is compatible with this Court's prior order of "generous, liberal and frequent 
visitation by [Plaintiff]," Ruling at 18, subject to the restriction to be discussed presently. 
Moreover, in its ruling from the bench, this Court placed an important restriction upoi? 
Plaintiff with regard to her periods of visitation. This Court stated that during the visitation 
periods set forth, "there should be no romantic interaction between the Plaintiff and Pedro 
Sauer." Minute Entry - Order to Show Cause Hearing ("Minute Entry") at n.p. Plaintiff must 
use caution and sound judgment in her relations with Mr. Sauer in the presence of the 
children. 
Furthermore, there shall be no romantic interaction whatsoever between Plaintiff and 
Mr. Pedro Sauer during the children's martial arts instruction. 
However, despite the concerns expressed by the Defendant, this Court declines to 
restrict the children's participation in martial arts while on visitation. As the Court has 
previously stated on the record: 
The participation of the children in martial arts is a separate issue and should 
be addressed through mediation. If the children are being injured, bruised or 
engaging in activities which are foreign to the personal philosoph[y] of [either] 
parent, then the issue can be revisited. 
Minute Entry at n.p. 
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In addition, as to any extra-curricular activities, including jujitsu/martial arts, the 
parties shall consult with one another with the intent to reach a resolution. If they are unable 
to do so, they shall mediate their differences. The parties shall cooperate with each other in 
providing medical, school and other records relating to their children. 
Each party is to assume its own costs and attorneys' fees associated with bringing and 
responding to the Order to Show Cause. 
Any additional issues concerning visitation are reserved until further notice. 
EL 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Plaintiff requests that the Court place a monetary value on Defendant's tools and then 
factor that value into the equitable division of the personal property. This Court carefully 
considered the agreement/stipulation of the parties, rejected it in part, and fashioned an 
equitable division of the personalty under the circumstances. Weighing all factors, the Court 
believes it to be equitable and fair. 
In this regard, the Court makes a few observations. First, this Court finds that 
Plaintiff has minimized the value of some of her items and exaggerated the value of some of 
Defendant's items. Some tools were purchased prior to the marriage and some after. Those 
acquired during the marriage are generally worn out or in disrepair. This Court awarded Mr. 
Thomas those tools, calculating the values of the assets of both parties to be nearly equal, fair 
and equitable. 
Absolute mathematical precision is impossible. For example, some items given to the 
Plaintiff, such as the Oriental rug, maintain value over time much better than tools which 
become worn out by day-to-day use in the construction industry. 
Ruling 
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These are the statutory statements which guide the analysis which follows. 
C 
Defendant in this case seeks a retroactive award of overpayment of temporary support 
He was ordered to make payments of $700 per month at a preliminary order at the earliest 
stages of these proceedings. Defendant argues that that amount was established based upon a 
faulty and inflated determination of his income. He argues further that an initial faulty 
determination has been perpetrated throughout this entire case to the harsh detriment of 
Defendant. 
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs personal expenses have been highly 
exaggerated, that she has sufficient income to meet her needs and that she will receive a 
significant amount of the proceeds (approximately $78,000). Further, he argues that during 
the pendency of this action, she has had access to large amounts of money derived from the 
sale of stocks and bonds and from personal savings (something in excess of $120,000). Next, 
he argues that yearly gifts of stocks and bonds, in light of the divorce, have now simply been 
conveyed to their minor children as a subterfuge until after the divorce. 
Next, he argues that the accounts of the children can be utilized to purchase a home, 
etc. and reduce any need for alimony. The Court finds this argument to be interesting, but 
unconvincing. Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs affidavit of personal expenses is 
exaggerated, and that she has sufficient income to meet her personal needs. 
Counsel for Plaintiff argues that Defendant should pay alimony pursuant to the 
temporary order and that Plaintiff should not pay child support simply because she cannot 
afford it even accounting for the alimony she will receive. Plaintiff argues that her present 
personal expenses exceed her income. 
The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1372 (Utah 1988). 
Ruling 
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The 1995 amendment to § 30-3-5(7)(a) codified Jones which had established a 
three factor approach in setting alimony. In setting an award of alimony, a trial 
court must consider the following three factors: (1) the financial condition and 
needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
sufficient income for him or herself, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support However, "alimony may not be automatically awarded 
whenever there is disparity between the parties' incomes."??? 
Additionally, the Court has weighed the following three factors. 
1. Earnings and Expenses 
This Court has previously determined the income of each party. The Court finds that 
Plaintiffs expenses are exaggerated and that the expenses of Defendant will necessarily 
increase somewhat because of this Court's award of custody to Defendant In addition, it is 
apparent that during this litigation that Plaintiff has had access to sums of money derived 
principally from the sale of gifted stocks and bonds. 
2. Education, Health, Etc. 
Both parties are employed and are healthy. Plaintiff is a college graduate and has 
pursued an advanced degree. She is employed as a teacher and has steady, stable 
employment Defendant is a high school graduate with no college degree and no substantive 
advanced training.. He runs a one-man-managed construction company, employing others as 
the seasons allow. He has expressed some desire to change careers and seek a more stable, 
long-term employment with benefits and retirement. 
3. Ability to Pay 
Defendant argues that he cannot afford alimony because he is now saddled with a 
refinance of the home in order to pay out the equity to Defendant Further, he again argues 
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that the Court's determination of income is in error and that Plaintiffs take-home income 
exceeds his. 
This Court previously held that the character of Defendant's source of income requires 
that he remain in the Sundance home. His construction business relies exclusively upon 
word-of-mouth referrals in the Sundance area. 
Clearly there are limited funds to meet the demands of two households. It is 
impossible to absolutely equalize standards of living. This Court must order alimony in an 
attempt to provide the minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries essential to maintain 
customary or proper status or circumstance. 
This Court concludes that even with the refinance, Defendant has some ability to pay 
alimony. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff four years (36 months) of alimony at the 
rate of $700 per month. Defendant may have credit for amounts paid pursuant to the 
temporary order of the Court. This award shall automatically terminate upon Plaintiffs 
remarriage or cohabitation with another person. 
IV. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
To arrive at the amount of child support required of parents collectively, this Court 
must first determine the "adjusted gross income" of each parent U.C.A. § 78-45-7.4. 
"Adjusted gross income" in this case simply means gross income. See U.C.A. § 78-45-7.6. 
This Court previously found Defendant's annual income to be $69,567 and Plaintiffs to be 
$25,824. These figures are hereby found to represent the "gross income" and hence the 
"adjusted gross income" of each party for purposes of determining their respective child 
support obligations. 
According to U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(2)(a), the next step is for this Court to "[c]ombine 
the adjusted gross incomes of the parents." This yields a sum of $95,391 annually. Next, the 
Court must "recalculatefl . . . to determine the average [adjusted] gross monthly income" of 
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each of the parties separately and of both together. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.5(5)(a), emphasis 
added The result is a finding that the Defendant receives $5,797.25 per month, while 
Plaintiff receives $2,152.00 per month. Together, their monthly income amounts to 
$7,949.25. 
With this last figure in hand, the Court is in a position to "determine the base 
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation table" 
found at U.C.A. § 78-45-7.14. U.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(2)(a). According to that table, where the 
monthly combined adjusted gross income ("monthly combined income") is between $7,901 
and $8,000, and there are two children of the marriage, the base combined child support 
obligation is $1,236 per month. 
This amount ($1,236) must be apportioned between the parents according to their 
respective contributions to the monthly combined income. As it happens, Defendant 
contributes 72.9% of the income while Plaintiff contributes 27.1% of i t Therefore, Defendant 
is liable for $901.39 ($1,236 x 72.9%) per month in child support, while Plaintiff is liable for 
$334.61 ($1,236 x 27.1%) per month. 
Because Defendant is the custodial parent, he is entitled to receive $334.61 per month 
from Plaintiff for the purpose of child support. 
V. 
DISSIPATION OF ASSETS 
Plaintiff claims that at the time of the separation, Defendant had approximately 
$40,000 on account in the Bert Thomas, Inc.'s Savings Account and that she is entitled to 
one-half as a marital asset Plaintiff further argues that the account was depleted to 
approximately $7,000 at the time of the trial and that the Defendant was the sole 
beneficiary—i.e., he used the funds to live on and meet his obligations under the temporary 
order. 
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Defendant argues that the subject account was an operating fund for the company and 
the amount in the account fluctuated significantly from month-to-month; the amount of money 
in an operating business account at any particular time has no particular significance. 
These parties set up a complex financial system to operate the Bert Thomas 
Construction Inc. business. The best this Court can glean, the flow of money in and out of 
the company is represented in the flow chart attached (Exhibit No. 37). 
Defendant is accurate that the amount in a corporate savings account on a given date 
is not controlling. To determine the value of the marital asset, one must determine the value 
of the company. There was insufficient presented evidence at trial to arrive at the value of 
Bert Thomas construction Inc. and therefore there was an insufficient basis to award Plaintiff 
assets or assess financial obligations. This Court did not make a finding of value of Bert 
Thomas Construction Inc. and cannot make such a determination by looking solely at a 
savings account as of a given date. 
VL 
MEDICAL COSTS AND COSTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 
A. Medical Costs 
It is clear that Plaintiff improperly cancelled health care benefits, and it was necessary 
for the Court to order reinstatement. Defendant argues that he is entitled to medical expenses 
he incurred because of the improper cancellation. Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not 
comply with insurance company policies. It appears that these problems arose because of 
Plaintiffs improper cancellation of coverage. She is chargeable, but is also entitled to the 
insurance reimbursement payments once the bill has been presented and her payment to 
Defendant has been verified 
B. Psychological Reports 
Ruling 
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These parties stipulated to the use of Dr. Jensen as a friend of the Court When 
Plaintiff found his recommendations to be unfavorable, adverse or objectionable, she moved 
to have another evaluator appointed. Regardless of the language of this Court's decision, it 
was the intent of the Court that the parties should share the costs of Dr. Jensen equally. 
Plaintiff should bear all costs associated with the report and appearance of Dr. Stewart. 
vn. 
FINDINGS PREPARATION 
Two drafts of proposed findings were submitted to this Court after the initial decision. 
The draft proposed by Mr. Green more closely tracks this Court's decision. 
RULING 
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings is granted in part and denied in part 
consistent with the discussion above. Counsel for Plaintiff is instructed to supplement 
previously submitted pleadings to include the provisions of this decision and to submit the 
same to Mr. Young for approval as to form. 
Ruling 
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Defendant's Order to Show Cause is resolved pursuant to this ruling. Counsel for 
Defendant is instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this Court's^  decision and submit 
the same for approval as to form to Mr. Green. 
Dated this /3 day of January, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
LYNN W. DAVlOxJDGE * 
cc: Brent D. Young, Esq. 
Frederick N. Green, Esq. 
Ruling 
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CASE NO. 934402503 
DATE: AUGUST 19, 1996 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial commencing September 5, 
1995, and, following an adjournment, convening again February 26, 1996. The Honorable 
Judge Lynn Davis presided. The plaintiff and the defendant were present in person and 
represented by their attorneys, Frederick N. Green appearing for the plaintiff and Brent Young 
appearing for the defendant. Each party presented evidence and testimony, and the Court 
entertained the testimony of the parties and witnesses. Counsel argued the following 
contested issues: 1) division of personal property; 2) division of real property and value of 
real property and marital versus premarital property; 3) child custody and visitation; 4) child 
support; 5) alimony; 6) pension, retirement issues, business assets; and 7) miscellaneous 
issues. Final argument was heard by the Court on April 1, 1996. The Court, having 
reviewed the file, the exhibits, and the arguments of counsel based thereon and good cause 
otherwise appearing, the Court now makes and enteis its 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on July 17, 1982. 
2. Each of the parties resided in Utah County for more than three (3) months prior 
to the filing of the Complaint. 
1 
3. The parties have two (2) minor children of the marriage: Joseph, born July 12, 
1986, age ten (10); and Katherine, "Katie," bom July 8, 1989, age seven (7). 
4. The parties separated and began to live separate and apart on March 21, 1993. 
5. The plaintiff is thirty-eight (38) years old and has earned a Bachelor of Science 
degree, prior to her marriage to the defendant, from the University of Utah. 
6. The plaintiff presently teaches special education for the Alpine School District 
7. The parties' children also go to school in the Alpine School District at the same 
school in which the plaintiff teaches. 
8. The defendant is a self-employed contractor and builder licensed as such in the 
State of Utah. He is a high school graduate with some plans to continue his education. 




10. The general purpose of property division is to allocate property "in a manner 
which best serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives." The overriding consideration in property division is "that the ultimate division be 
equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties given their contributions during 
the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1171. 
11. For the purposes of asset consideration this Court accepts the following 
definition: 
Marital property is all property acquired during marriage except property acquired 
by gift or inheritance and it "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed 
by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318. 
2 
12. It is clear that statutory law confers broad discretion upon the trial court in the 
division of property, real and personal, regardless of its source or time of acquisition. 
13. During the course of the marriage, and prior thereto, the plaintiff received 
annual gifts, principally from her grandfather. 
14. These gifts were always in cash or in kind and, when in the form of stock, 
were conveyed to the plaintiff individually and not to the defendant as well. 
15. This practice continued through the marriage and existed among Mrs. Thomas' 
siblings, likewise. 
16. Since the separation of the parties, gifts have been made in trust for the benefit 
of the parties1 minor children. 
17. All of these gifts have always been maintained in separate accounts or in 
separate stock accounts or certificates, and have not been augmented, supplemented, added to, 
protected or enhanced by the defendant or from earnings from either party during the 
marriage. 
18. As such, they are classic cases of separate property which have maintained 
their separate identity and should be awarded to the plaintiff, except for those funds which 
have been designated in trust for the children which should be maintained by the plaintiff, in 
trust, for the children and made available to them consistent with the intent of the donor. 
19. Subsequent to separation, the defendant prepared a document entitled "Personal 
Property Settlement Between Ann Thomas and Bert Thomas" dated February 5, 1994. 
The Court finds the parties discussed the final resolution of the division of personal 
property and tools. Mr. Thomas drafted an agreement. Mrs. Thomas made changes to that 
agreement and signed it. Property was delivered and accepted pursuant to the agreement. No 
discussion was had about that agreement for a period of approximately one year. Based upon 
the authority of the agreement, Mrs. Thomas even sold a vehicle. 
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20. Upon review, and based upon the testimony of the parties, the Court finds that 
the "Settlement" is ambiguous because it does not state whether it is a settlement of all 
property rights or only temporary property rights. 
21. Furthermore, the agreement was executed without the benefit of counsel, and 
its enforcement would result in a potentially significant and substantial inequity between the 
parties. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the agreement and its consideration are 
heavily disputed. 
21. Rather, the Court relies upon Exhibit 25 of the plaintiff which lists, in detail, 
the personal property in each party's possession, what property would constitute gifts to either 
party, and the relative values of the property. 
22. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the parties to be awarded the personal 
property presently in their possession and, in addition and not withstanding that, that the 
plaintiff be awarded the following items of personal property: 
a) Large Indian rugs given to the plaintiff by the defendant. 
b) Kachina doll. 
c) Twig outdoor furniture (five (5) pieces) or the Adirondack outdoor 
furniture (four (4) pieces), at the election of the defendant. 
d) One (1) of the Bernease Mountain Dog puppies, or financial equivalent 
e) The oriental rug. 
f) The antique toy trucks given to the plaintiff by her father. 
g) The wooden bowl. 
h) One (1) copy of the home videos. 
4 
REAL PROPERTY 
a. Marital Versus Separate Property 
24. Utah's appellate courts have long held that once a trial court has determined 
marital property, the Court may distribute it equitably, regardless of which party's name 
appears on the title. Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986). "The trial court is 
empowered to make such distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel such 
conveyance as are necessary to that end." Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 
1980). 
25. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas, solely and exclusively, owned real estate in 
Sundance, Utah, before the parties were married. He owned the real estate free from any type 
of encumbrance. (The subject property is described in plaintiffs Exhibit 23.) The Court finds 
that Mr. Thomas commenced construction of a home on the property, and that it was framed 
up and many of the materials had been purchased before the parties were married. In 
addition, it is important to note that a lengthy access road had been constructed and power 
and sewer utilities have been placed on the premises. The Court finds Mr. Thomas continued 
to work on the home after the marriage, using materials previously obtained. This property 
ultimately became the parties' martial residence. Approximately one to one and one-half 
years after they were married, the parties obtained $27,000 from Mrs. Thomas's grandfather. 
This note was secured by a mortgage which had been reduced to approximately $17,000 at 
the time of trial (Exhibit 23). 
26. The note was signed by both parties, as was the mortgage. Title was 
transferred to facilitate the security of the note payable to Mrs. Thomas's grandfather. The 
evidence is clear that Mr. Thomas did not make a gift of the home to Mrs. Thomas. 
27. Mr. Thomas had a significant asset before the marriage and was able to use 
assets previously acquired to help complete the home for at least a year. Therefore, it would 
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be inequitable for the Court to divide the equity in the home equally, and permit Mrs. Thomas 
to have all of her stocks and bonds. It would not be equitable or consistent for the Court to 
award Mrs. Thomas all of her premarital property and her gifts and inheritance and award her 
one-half of Mr. Thomas's premarital property. That approach may force Mr. Thomas to sell 
his home, which would be much to the disadvantage of the children, and it would ignore the 
simple fact that he had a substantial asset for which he had worked for many years before the 
marriage and acquired before the marriage. It would also have a significant adverse effect 
upon his employment opportunities at Sundance for the following reasons: 
a. Mr. Thomas has lived in Sundance since five years before the marriage, 
although not continuously until the home was habitable. 
b. Since the Fall of 1983 he has lived there continuously and is very much 
involved in the social and political activities there. For example, he is the Fire 
Chief, member of the North Fork Special Services District, and Vice-Chairman 
for three years. He is a past president of the Homeowners Association, 
Chairman of the Architectural Committee, and he drafted the Architectural 
Covenants for the SCAPO subdivision. 
c. Mr. Thomas earns his livelihood and established his business at Sundance, 
and has earned his livelihood almost exclusively in that community since 1977. 
d. Given his income, it is not probable that he could acquire other 
accommodations in that community. 
e. It would prove far more difficult for him to maintain his maintenance 
contracts if he were to leave the area. 
28. Commencing sometime during the period of cohabitation and thereafter, the 
plaintiff made some modest contribution to the construction of the home including her own 
manual labor, the acquisition of building materials, the building of retaining walls, and 
6 
generally assisting the defendant who acted as the general contractor for the building of the 
home. 
29. As stated above, generally, parties should retain their separate property that 
they brought into the marriage or that they might inherit during the marriage. 
30. The ownership of the premises and the stage of improvement of the lot prior to 
marriage is not significantly disputed. The value of the asset prior to marriage can be 
established. It would be inequitable to grant plaintiff an interest for which she never worked 
for, nor contributed to. 
31. The building lot had been conveyed to Mr. Thomas and significant 
improvements had been made prior to any contribution by Mrs. Thomas. This Court may 
always adjust property distribution to achieve an equitable result. 
32. The Court values Mr. Thomas* premarital asset at $150,000. The Court 
specifically rejects Mr. Free's claim that the 1982 value could not be ascertained because of 
the credibility problems listed below. That consists of the building lot and its improvements 
including the foundation for the home, the partially framed home, the lengthy access road 
which was constructed and other improvements such as sewer, power, partial retaining walls, 
and the stockpiled supplies. 
33. Beyond that interest, Mrs. Thomas is then entitled to an equitable share 
because of her maintenance and contributions. This appears to be a fair, just and equitable 
result because Mr. Thomas retains his clearly premarital interest, and Mrs. Thomas retains an 
equitable interest based upon her efforts. This equitable determination rejects both the 
position of plaintiff (commingling) and the position of defendant (exclusive ownership 
together with all appreciation). 
b. Valuation of the Real Property 
34. Trial courts are provided considerable discretion in establishing the value of 
real property. Such valuations are presumed valid and will not be overturned absent a clear 
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abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As stated 
in Morgan at 691, the trial court "is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever weight it 
deems appropriate." There are conflicting opinions in this case. The Court establishes the 
value of the Sundance property as of the date of trial. 
35. The plaintiff introduced evidence based upon the real property appraisal 
conducted by Gary Free and Associates which is based upon the "comparable sales approach" 
and concludes that the home has a current fair market value of $500,000. 
36. The defendant introduced evidence based upon an appraisal conducted by Jud 
Harward who concluded that the home had a current fair market value of $355,000. 
37. The Court is disinclined to accept the appraisal of the home at Sundance by 
Mr. Free, plaintiffs expert, for the following reasons: 
a. Plaintiffs expert was uncertain of the comparables and some of the 
pictures of the "comparables" did not even correspond to the comparables 
which were relied upon. While this does not constitute a dispositive defect, it 
does reflect upon the accuracy of the appraisal and the credibility and integrity 
of the report. 
On this issue, the Court agrees with Mr. Thomas. The Court is not 
impressed with the idea that the photos of the comparables are not required and 
therefore of little importance. In the Court's view, an appraisal is a comparison 
of properties. The photograph is a "snapshot" of the real property. If it is 
wrong, the appraisal could be misleading. 
b. The comparables were not visited. 
c. The quality of the materials and quality of workmanship in the 
comparables were considerably different than those used by Mr. Thomas. It is 
undisputed, specifically, that the materials to construct the Thomas cabin had 
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been previously used. The materials in the comparables were new. For 
example, the kitchen cabinets in the Thomas cabin are made of plywood. 
d. Comparison of the garages were not accurate, as well as other items such 
as number of fire places, concern for avalanche danger, and degree of exposure 
to sun. 
e. The Thomas home is not complete. It requires maintenance and repairs to 
make it marketable. The "Free" appraisal did not give sufficient weight to the 
true condition of the Thomas cabin. 
f. Mr. Free and his associates had considerable difficulty in even locating the 
correct properties. 
g. Of significant concerns to this Court was Mr. Free's failure to address the 
extant property line and easement problems associated with the property. Such 
problems can significantly delay the sale of a property and the Court is aware 
that title problems not only affect the marketability of a property, but also 
affect its value. 
h. The "Free" appraisal also failed to address the difficulty of accessibility to 
the subject property and the significance of view. 
38. Mr. Thomas testified of his personal knowledge of plaintiffs comparables 
because he was acquainted with each, and had performed work in many of the comparables 
and other cabins in the area. He testified concerning the significant differences in the quality 
of those properties compared to the Thomas cabin. 
39. Next, the Court turns to the appraisal of Mr. Jud Harward. It is clear that Mr. 
Harward has considerable experience of appraising in Utah County area and in appraising 
property in Sundance. 
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40. The Court accepts Mr. Harward!s appraisal based upon his experience and 
observations in appraising real estate in Sundance. Accordingly, the Court accepts the value 
of the cabin at $355,000. 
41. The Court must consider costs associated with sale. It is undisputed that there 
are problems with the cabin before it could be marketable, including boundary line problems. 
There also are costs of repair. A real estate commission would be approximately 6%, plus 
closing costs (.06 x $355,000 = $21,300). Mr. Thomas testified that the sales costs would be 
approximately $31,900. The mortgage of approximately $17,000 would have to be paid. 
$355,000 Sale Price 
$ 17,000 Mortgage 
$ 31,900 Commission and Realtor Fees 
$306,100 Total Equity 
42. The value of Mr. Thomas's interest at the time of marriage was $150,000. The 
Court has already addressed the issue of natural growth/appreciation. A fair division of the 
equity forces the Court to reject the appreciation factor given the contributions of the parties 
during their marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce. Newmever v. 
Newmever. 745 P.2d 1276, 12178 (Utah, 1987). Accordingly, Mrs. Thomas's equity is 
calculated as follows ($306,100 - $150,000 12). 
43. Therefore, the Court awards Mrs. Thomas an interest in the home at the value 
of $78,050. 
44. The Court grants the defendant the option to either purchase the plaintiffs 
interest in the cabin or sell the cabin and divide the proceeds consistent with the above 
findings of fact. 
45. The election to purchase the cabin should be exercised within 120 days from 
date hereon. Upon expiration, the cabin should be placed on the market for sale, with the 
parties cooperating in its listing, showing and selling and closing. 
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m. 
CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
46. As indicated above, the parties have two minor children: Joseph and Katie. 
This Court is charged with the duty respecting the future care and custody of Joseph and 
Katie as it deems appropriate. 
This trial court is given broad discretion in making child custody awards. Sukin v. 
Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This Court has had the opportunity to 
witness the parties, to hear all of the evidence, to visit with the minor children and to judge 
the personal and individual circumstances of this case. 
As provided by statute, "in awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other 
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
(children), including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial 
parent as the court finds appropriate." 30-3-10(2) U.C.A., 1953 as amended. In determining 
custody, the Court is to consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. 30-3-10 U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
47. This Court shall consider the "best interests of the child" as an important 
factor, but will also consider past conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent 
will act in the child's best interest and other relevant factors such as keeping the siblings 
together, and each child's bond with each parent. 
48. It is apparent that Joseph and Katie get along well, participate in activities 
together, and are a mutual support of each other. As noted in Dr. Stewart's report, there is a 
firm sibling bond. Accordingly, it is in their best interests not to be separated. This Court 
did not inquire as to the preference of Joseph or Katie because neither child is sufficiently 
mature of age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference regarding legal 
custody. 
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49. Both parents truely have a sincere desire for custody. This Court has carefully 
examined a custody evaluation report of Dr. Jay P. Jensen, a clinical psychologist, dated 
March 21, 1995. He, by stipulation, was appointed friend of the Court. In addition, the 
Court carefully examined the custody evaluation report of Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart, also a 
clinical psychologist, dated December 1, 1995. Both of these fine professionals testified at 
trial. Dr. Stewart had the benefit of Dr. Jensen's report when making her report and 
adopted/supported some of his findings and conclusions and criticized others. This Court 
would have favored an analysis which did not rely upon or disparage that of the party-
stipulated friend of the Court. The Court has relied, in part, on both evaluations for guidance, 
but the Court does not accept either in total. 
The two custody evaluations performed in this case appear to agree on a number of 
important points and disagree on some critical issues. Dr. Jensen recommended that custody 
be given to the father or, in the alternative, a modified joint custody arrangement be worked 
out. Dr. Stewart recommends that custody be awarded to Mrs. Thomas. 
50. This is a complicated case with no easy/ clear-cut answers. Both of these 
parents seek custody, are competent and definitely love their children. Both have personal, 
professional lives which somewhat complicate custodial arrangements. The children have 
been isolated in their Orem neighborhood because they attend a non-neighborhood school, 
Orchard Elementary, where their mother teaches. In addition, they have been somewhat 
isolated in their Sundance neighborhood because of the paucity of playmates and distance 
between cabins, etc. 
51. Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' 
separation. 
52. Prior to the parties1 separation, and since, Ann Thomas has performed well as 
the mother of the children. 
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53. The defendant has also acknowledged that Ann Thomas is a competent, caring 
mother who has indeed been the primary care giver for the children throughout their lives. 
54. As the primary care giver of the children, Mrs. Thomas has seen to their day-
to-day needs, typically been the parent who has been home when they return from school, 
assisted the children with their school work, made sure the children received appropriate 
medical and dental care, typically transported the children when such was necessary, 
entertained the children, disciplined the children, and so forth. Mr. Thomas has also 
contributed and been involved in these activities. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has been 
involved with the children's schooling, health care, religious training, and day-to-day 
activities. He has attended parent/teacher conferences, he has taken the children to doctors, 
dentists, and other activities. 
55. The children interact with Ann Thomas as their primary care provider and have 
established confidence in her as their primary care provider. 
56. The parties have, since their separation in March of 1993, entered into an 
arrangement of shared custody. The Court finds the arrangement which was been heretofore 
set forth in prior court orders has provided that the time the children spent with each parent 
has been approximately equal. The Court finds that for approximately half of the life of the 
youngest and one-third of the life of the oldest child, that they both have enjoyed a 
relationship with both of their parents wherein they have shared approximately equal time. 
The arrangement has worked somewhat well as these arrangements go. But the children have 
suffered from some instability and moving back and forth. 
57. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas has been involved with the children on a 
daily basis until the separation. Mr. Thomas conducts business out of his home which has 
permitted him to be involved in the children's daily activities since they were bora. Since the 
parties' separation, the children have also had an opportunity to rely upon their father for 
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meeting their needs to a greater extent than existed prior to separation. The children have 
flourished in the relationship they have with Mr. Thomas. 
58. The children's social needs are being principally met through their associations 
at school. 
59. The defendant's residence in Sundance, Utah County, does not afford a 
substantial amount of peer interaction for the children, but they have close friends there. In 
addition, the children have not established close friendships in their mother's neighborhood. 
This Court would prefer some type of modified shared joint custody arrangement. 
But Dr. Stewart has made a compelling argument that a shared custody arrangement is not in 
the best interests of the children and is not workable in the long term. Thus, this Court will 
focus on custody by the mother, or by the father. 
60. The appearance of Senor Pedro Sauer in an emotional and sexual relationship 
with Ann Thomas during this marriage is a very complicating factor. 
61. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas separated in March of 1993. Mrs. Thomas, unbeknownst 
to Mr. Thomas, had commenced a relationship with Pedro in October or November of 1992. 
Mr. Pedro Sauer was then, and was at the time of trial, a married man. 
62. From all the trial testimony and reports of the evaluators, what facts do we 
glean about Pedro? 
a. He is not a citizen of the United State of America. 
b. He is Brazilian and has entered the United States by virtue of a work 
permit. 
c. He is a martial arts instructor in Jiu Jitsu at a health club. 
d. He is married, and his wife and small children live in Orem, Utah. He has 
several small children. 
e. It is somewhat unclear when Pedro entered into a sexually intimate 
relationship with Mrs. Thomas, but the romantic relationship commenced in 
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1992. Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that she met Pedro in October and 
had a relationship by November of 1992. Mr. Thomas believed the relationship 
had started as early as June of 1992. 
f. During the pendency of this action, Pedro fathered a child during a time of 
reconciliation with his wife, while still maintaining an intimate relationship 
with Mrs. Thomas. 
g. After commencing a relationship with Mrs. Thomas, Pedro was charged 
with domestic violence with his wife. 
h. Pedro, a non-citizen of the United States, was charged with possession of a 
firearm/revolver at Lake Powell in the company of Mrs. Thomas. This may 
have also violated his work permit status in the United States. 
i. Pedro, in his young marriage and with several young children, has 
participated in other adulterous affairs. 
j . He now has a divorce pending in the Fourth District Court which is set for 
September of 1996. 
k. His wife enjoys entry into the United States because of the work status of 
Pedro. A divorce will result in her deportation from the United States and her 
re-entry is in question. The future custodial status of their children is 
unknown. This could significantly affect the Pedro/Mrs. Thomas dynamics if 
some or all of the children remain here, particularly any child bom in the 
United States and who would automatically enjoy citizenship. 
1. Mrs. Thomas reported to Dr. Jensen that her relationship with Pedro "had a 
dramatic effect" on the ultimate breakup of the Thomas family. 
m. Mrs. Thomas perceives Pedro as "a very positive male role model. . ." 
(Report of Dr. Jensen, p. 10). 
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63. The Pedro/Ann Thomas relationship has continued for several years and while 
no one can predict the future, it appears to this Court that it is their intention to many when 
they are legally able. As mentioned above, his divorce trial is scheduled for September of 
1996. 
64. This Court had hoped Mr. Sauer's divorce would have been completed earlier 
in order to evaluate his true motives, and then to have evaluators thoroughly and fully 
consider his relationship to these minor children, his commitment to Mrs. Thomas, his 
relationships with any other women and his obligations to his children and his ex wife. 
65. The Court has entertained the testimony of Pedro Sauer and his wife. He 
represented himself as a responsible individual, but is not. He has undertaken activity which 
would be considered detrimental to the Thomas children. 
66. Based upon the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Sauer and others, the Court does find 
a "link" or connection that would suggest that the relationship between the plaintiff and Mr. 
Sauer has negatively impacted the children, or will negatively impact the children in the 
future. 
67. The evaluators can make no "objective" link between the "affair" and its impact 
upon the children. The fact of the matter is that they are young and may not appreciate the 
consequences of a fairly discreet sexual affair. But the relationship has affected the family. 
a. The affair has impacted the family financially. The testimony is that Mr. 
Sauer has not contributed financially to the family despite the frequency of his 
overnight stays. In addition, scarce resources have been expended on Pedro for 
gifts and travel; 
b. The affair eventually resulted in a confrontation at the children's home 
with Mrs. Sauer. That exposure, albeit brief, is not positive for the children; 
c. Mrs. Thomas's affair with a convicted criminal is of concern to this Court. 
His spousal abuse charge during this time is of concern to this Court as is his 
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illegal possession of a weapon. The weapon was possessed in the company of 
Mrs. Thomas on a trip to Lake Powell and was attempted to be retrieved at a 
time of confrontation. Such activity always places the children's mother at risk 
and such illegal choices can potentially, negatively affect the family, 
d. Mr. Sauer "had a dramatic effect" on the ultimate breakup of the Thomas 
family. That breakup has affected these children significantly, dramatically and 
in a myriad of ways. 
68. The reason this case is so troubling is because of Pedro Sauer and his negative 
influence on the family. Absent his entry, and his influence, it is clearly in the best interests 
of the children to be awarded to Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the picture, which he is and 
intends to be, it is not in the best interests of the children to be in the home and subjected to 
the negative influences and example of Pedro. 
69. This Court is profoundly concerned with Mrs. Thomas's observation that Pedro 
is "a very positive role model." She has been duped by his suave, debonair and romantic 
influences and has overlooked his less than desirable characteristics; immorality, social 
irresponsibility, his womanizing and infidelity, his criminal activity and his spousal abuse. 
This Court cannot conceive how Pedro is a positive role model for little Joseph. To that 
extent Ann Thomas does not have the best interests of her children at heart. 
70. Mr. Thomas offers a more stable environment to the children. On the issue of 
stability, the Court concurs with Dr. Jensen that: 
a. Mr. Thomas is a greater source of stability in the children's lives (Exhibit 
1 page 15, Conclusions and Recommendations). 
b. Mr. Thomas will not threaten the children's integration into their present 
environment by a change in residence. Mr. Thomas has indicated that he plans 
to remain in this area where his business is established. It is the area where 
the children were born. He plans to continue to rear the children in these 
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familiar surroundings. At earlier stages of the separation, Mrs. Thomas wished 
to move from the area regardless of the separation of the children from their 
father. 
c. Mr. Thomas has no plans to diminish Mrs. Thomas's role in the children's 
lives. 
d. Mr. Thomas was not unfaithful in the marriage and has set a better 
example in this regard. 
e. There is no indication that Mr. Thomas would subject the children to the 
deleterious effects of a relationship such as Mrs. Thomas has done. 
f. Mr. Thomas has maintained the proper orientation to his family and is 
more interested in the children having a meaningful relationship with both 
parents. 
71. Based upon the above, the Court believes it is in the long term best interests of 
the children to award their custody to Mr. Thomas subject to generous, liberal and frequent 
visitation by Mrs. Thomas. This award will allow the children the stability of the home, 
which they have known from birth, will allow them to continue in the same school and will 
allow them to have daily contact with their mother there. This arrangement will provide Mrs. 
Thomas with sufficient recreational time, as well as work time/discipline time with the 
children. 
IV. CHILD SUPPORT 
72. Mr. Thomas is entitled to child support for the care and custody of Katie and 
Joseph. Practically speaking it is difficult to assess the income of Mr. Thomas because of his 
self-employment status and the legal measures set up for financing his business. In addition 
income generated from a construction business is volatile from year to year and is sensitive to 
the economy. Likewise it is also difficult to assess Mrs. Thomas's income because she 
historically enjoyed the benefit of an inheritance of stocks and bonds exclusive to her. There 
18 
is testimony that that source has been exhausted, but nonetheless she had substantial income 
from the sale of stocks and bonds during the tax year prior to trial. 
73. The Court finds Bert Thomas was self-employed, and had numerous tools and 
two trucks at the time he married Mrs. Thomas. He earns a living using his tools. 
74. The Court finds that Mr. Thomas owns a business known as Bert Thomas 
Construction, Inc. (BTCI). Mr. Thomas performs the following tasks with respect to the 
business: he performs all of the bidding, purchases all of the materials, answers the telephone 
or otherwise handles all inquiries, pays all bills, deals with all employees, and has so been 
involved for approximately twenty years at Sundance. He has periodically worked with 
Dwight Hooker as an employee. 
75. Mr. Thomas has set up, pursuant to the advice of his accountant, an investment 
company called Thomas Investments. This accounting arrangement allows him to earn 
passive income through the investment company without Social Security contribution. 
76. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has confined virtually all of his work to the 
Sundance area. He remodels and maintains homes in this area. He has also built a few 
homes in the Sundance area. 
77. The Court finds Mr. Thomas's income is derived from two sources: (1) Bert 
Thomas Construction Company, a corporation, and (2) Thomas Investment. There is not 
anything irregular or inappropriate with respect to his income from either the construction 
company and investment companies as verified by both Ann and Bert's accountants. 
78. The Court finds Mr. Thomas has income which comes from the investment 
company. The Court finds the arrangement has been set up so that Mr. and Mrs. Thomas 
could receive passive income, thus reducing their withholding to Social Security. According 
to Mrs. Thomas's expert there does not appear to be any inappropriate expenditures, or any 
unaccounted for funds, or inappropriate accounting conducted by Thomas. Moreover, there 
does not appear to be any significant benefits to Mr. Thomas, from either the construction 
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company or the investment company. While employees of the construction company did 
minor work on the home, part of the home is listed as an asset of the investment company 
and is used as an office, shop, bathroom and storage area. 
79. Mr. Thomas has been a reasonably successful contractor earning, typically 
during the years just prior to separation, approximately $70,000 per year. 
80. The Court relies upon the exhibits introduced in connection with the testimony 
of Derk Rasmussen, CPA, consisting of Exhibits 7 through 19. 
81. Mr. Rasmussen conducted an in depth review of the parties' savings account 
and checking account activity in order to determine the availability of cash to the family, the 
expenditures of cash, the income of the defendant and the projected income of the defendant. 
82. The defendant has testified that his income and business activity has been 
about normal during the pendency of the case. 
83. The trend in Utah County residential construction has been an increasing trend, 
and the Bert Thomas Construction revenue trend has approximately kept pace with that 
increase, see Exhibit 12. 
84. Inexplicably and contrary to the defendant's own testimony, the actual Bert 
Thomas Construction revenue has declined sharply since separation regardless of the trend of 
residential construction in Utah County and the previous Bert Thomas Construction trend, see 
Exhibit 13. 
85. It would be appropriate to average the income of Mr. Thomas to determine 
what his actual income earning capacity is. However, it would be inappropriate to give the 
same weigm :o post-separation years as to pre-separation years. 
86. Therefore, the Court adopts the average set forth in Exhibit 16 for Mr. 
Thomas's income at $69,567 per year, gross and before taxes, which is an average of the 
income from the years 1988 to 1992. 
87. The plaintiffs income from her sole employment is $25,824 gross per year. 
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88. Child support should be based upon the Child Support Guidelines for the State 
of Utah attributing $5,797 per month as gross income to the defendant and $2,152 per month 
to the plaintiff. 
89. Based upon the foregoing, child support should enter consistent with the 
Guidelines. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare the necessary Child Support 
Obligation Worksheet Total child care paid by Mr. Thomas from February, 1994 through 
March, 1996 was $2,080. His actual responsibility for payment of child care was $438. He 
is therefore entitled to a credit of $1,642. 
V. 
ALIMONY 
90. The issue of alimony is reserved It is necessary to resubmit financial 
statements which now reflect the award of custody. An alimony award is highly fact specific 
and the previous financial statement of plaintiff mixed the financial needs of the children with 
her own. The custody award will affect the financial condition and needs of the receiving 
spouse and may also affect the payor's ability to provide support. In addition, defendant's 
claim respecting overpayment is reserved. 
VL 
PENSION, RETIREMENT BENEFITS, MISCELLANEOUS, ETC 
91. Health care insurance and health care costs. The children should be maintained 
on Mrs. Thomas's health care plan. Each party should pay one-half of any unreimbursed 
routine health care costs. Any non-routine medical, dental, or orthodontic care costs must be 
agreed upon by the parties before any such cost is incurred. The Court finds Mrs. Thomas 
terminated Mr. Thomas from her health insurance. Although the insurance coverage was 
reinstated, as a result, Mr. Thomas incurred and paid health care costs in the amount of 
$1,944, which should have been paid by her insurance. Mr. Thomas is entitled to a credit in 
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that amount against her interest in the home (See Exhibit 53). If Mrs. Thomas is able to 
obtain a refund from the insurance company, she may have it. 
92. Costs of custody evaluation. Mr. Thomas should be reimbursed for the costs of 
the friend of the court's custody evaluation performed by Dr. Jay Jensen. 
93. Tax deductions. Each party is entitled to claim one of the children as a 
dependent for tax purposes. 
94. Debts. Mr. Thomas shall be responsible for his debts and obligations including 
those of the corporation. Mrs. Thomas shall be responsible for her own debts and obligations. 
95. Costs of litigation. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own costs of 
litigation, which includes attorney fees, costs, cost of appraisals and expert witnesses. 
96. Retirement. Mr. Thomas is entitled to a qualified domestic relations order. 
The date of the marriage is July 17, 1982. The date of the divorce is August 13, 1996. Mr. 
Thomas is entitled to be paid his interest in the retirement pursuant to the terms and 
conditions of the plan. The ratio which he is entitled to receive is as follows: 
.5 x total # of years married during which Mrs. Thomas was teaching 
total # of years Mrs. Thomas will have taught at retirement 
Mr. Thomas is entitled to be designated as a fifty percent (50%) survivor. 
97. The Court finds Mr. Thomas is also entitled to one-half of a school bus credit to 
which he was entitled by virtue of paying taxes on the home in Sundance. Mrs. Thomas 
collected this credit in the amount of $400. 
vn. 
98. The parties are ordered to cooperate in the effectuation of these terms and 
conditions. Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and a decree consistent with this decision. 
Dated this / / day of August, 1996. 
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cc: Frederick Green, Esq. 
Brent Young, Esq. 
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Bert Thomas Construction. Inc. 
Income Statements 
For Years Ending December 31st 
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on his own motion, recused himself due to 
the colorable claim of prejudice. 
Pursuant to our holding regarding sec-
tion 77-29-1, the convictions are reversed 
and the charges are dismissed with preju-
dice. 
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
Mary M. THRONSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Charles H. THRONSON, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 890547-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 25, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1991. 
In a divorce action, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young, 
J., entered a divorce decree and awarded 
joint legal custody of the parties' child, 
child support, alimony and property divi-
sion. Wife appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) amend-
ments to child custody statute deleting re-
buttable presumption favoring joint legal 
custody was a substantial and substantive 
amendment and thus could not be applied 
retroactively; (2) court abused discretion in 
imposing joint legal custody on parents 
without statutorily required parental 
agreement; (3) findings were inadequate to 
support child custody award; (4) child sup-
port award had to be reconsidered includ-
ing income from nonearned sources and 
husband's current earnings in making cal-
culations; and (5) wife was entitled to ali-
mony of $800 per month on a permanent 
basis, rather than for only one year. 
Remanded in part, modified in part and 
otherwise affirmed. 
1. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(l) 
Amendments to child custody statute 
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring 
joint legal custody was a substantial and 
substantive amendment and thus could not 
be applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-10.2. 
2. Divorce <s=>299 
Trial court abused its discretion in im-
posing order of joint legal custody on par-
ents and child without statutorily required 
parental agreement and in the face of pa-
rental opposition. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.1 to 
30-3-10.4. 
3. Divorce <3=>301 
Findings were inadequate to support 
child custody award where court utilized 
best interest factors related to joint legal 
custody, not those related to child custody, 
findings were in conflict as to whether 
court or parents should determine visita-
tion rights, findings did not support award 
of any physical custody, and custody was 
awarded on the basis of court imposed visi-
tation time allocation. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
10, 30-3-10.2(3). 
4. Divorce <s=>306 
In determining appropriate child sup-
port award, parental income had to include 
consideration of income from nonearned 
sources, as well as current earnings of 
husband, rather than average of husband's 
earned income over several years. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.5, 78-45-7.5(l)(a), 
(5)(b), 78-45-7.5 to 78-45-7.7. 
5. Divorce <3=>240(2) 
Award of $800 alimony to wife on a 
permanent basis, rather than for only one 
year, was warranted based on considera-
tion of wife's earning capacity as a full-
time pharmacist and her necessary monthly 
living expenses, and husband's current 
gross capacity and his actual and necessary 
monthly living expenses. 
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Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a 
divorce decree and separate order award-
ing joint legal custody of a child, child 
support, alimony, and property. We re-
mand for further proceedings regarding 
child custody and support. We modify the 
alimony award and affirm the remainder of 
the decree. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on September 
30, 1978. Their marriage was the first for 
both. She was a full-time pharmacist and 
he a full-time attorney. A son was born to 
them on September 11, 1981. She became 
the child's primary caretaker and a part-
time pharmacist. He became a shareholder 
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for 
divorce. He filed a counterclaim for di-
vorce. They were divorced by a decree 
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of 
joint legal custody was also entered. Fur-
1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges 
and writers have been loose with their "joint" 
custody language. Early articles identified this 
vexing problem as follows: 
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split, 
joint] following divorce and the terms which 
describe them are vague and overlapping. 
The lack of standard definitions and the 
courts' tendency to use certain terms inter-
changeably have created confusion. 
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children 
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525 
(1979). 
Often, when referring to one of these custody 
arrangements, courts use vague language or 
inadequately defined terms. 
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky.LJ. 271, 283 (1978-
79). 
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ther relevant facts will be set forth below 
in our treatment of the respective issues. 
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD 
Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal 
custody decree and order on two grounds: 
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint 
legal custody and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.2 (1989) required the agreement 
of both parents at the time of this decree 
and order. (2) The provision for an auto-
matic award of sole custody to one parent 
when the other moves from the state was 
error. 
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH 
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute 
expressly authorizing an award of "joint 
legal custody" l of a child. Our divorce 
statutes have contained various child custo-
dy provisions since 1903. For many years 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989) has autho-
rized district courts to include in divorce 
decrees "equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties." Further, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained 
various specific provisions regarding 
factors to be considered in awarding sole 
custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox, 
639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev. 
363 (1989) (historical development of child 
custody factors and preferences in Utah). 
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically 
added to the sole custody statute in 1988, 
and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4. 
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" 
custody statute and not a joint "physical" 
One author points out that considerable se-
mantic confusion has resulted possibly because 
the "term" joint custody predates the "concept" 
or joini cubtody as it is known today. He states: 
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used 
to refer to various alternatives to sole custody: 
joint legal custody, joint physical custody, divid-
ed custody, separate custody, alternating custo-
dy, split custody, managing conservatorship, 
possessory conservatorship, equal custody, 
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given 
to neither party to the exclusion of the other,' 
temporary custody, shifting custody, and con-
current custody." Miller, Joint Custody, 13(3) 
Fam.L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979). 
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custody statute. In the 1988 Utah legisla-
tive session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This 
is not joint physical custody. The child 
obviously can't live in two homes. But it's 
joint legal custody which would give the 
non-custodial parent more involvement in 
the decisions of child raising." Floor De-
bate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording No. 42, 
side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature pro-
vided its definition of joint legal custody: 
In this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, 
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent 
by both parents, where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive 
authority by the court to one parent to 
make specific decisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custo-
dy of the child except as specified in the 
order of joint legal custody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or 
nearly equal periods of physical custody 
of and access to the child to each of the 
parents, as the best interest of the child 
often requires that a primary physical 
residence for the child be designated; 
and 
(5) does not prohibit the court from 
specifying one parent as the primary 
caretaker and one home as the primary 
residence of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Sub-
sections (1) and (2) define joint legal custo-
dy: both parents share the authority and 
responsibility to make basic decisions re-
garding their child's welfare. Subsections 
(3), (4) and (5) tell us what joint legal custo-
dy is not—it is not joint physical custody. 
We note that this statute does not contain a 
definition of nor a provision for "joint phys-
ics! custody." 
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable 
presumption" that joint legal custody is in 
the best interest of a child. But, that pre-
sumption was made subject to subsection 
(2) which provided: 
The court may order joint legal custody 
if it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best inter-
est of the child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of imple-
menting joint legal custody. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989). 
The order remains discretionary with the 
court, not mandatory, even when all three 
conditions are satisfied, i.e., (1) parental 
agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) par-
ents capable of implementation. Further 
sections of the statute emphasize its "pa-
rental agreement" posture. We note that 
section 10.3—terms of joint legal custody 
order—contains two further subsections 
dealing with parental agreement: 
(2) The court shall, where possible, in-
clude in the order the terms agreed to 
between the parties; . . . 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute 
resolution procedure the parties agree to 
use 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). More-
over, the termination provisions, section 
10.4, confer upon one parent the right to 
unilaterally terminate the order of joint 
legal custody. The order can be terminat-
ed simply by filing and serving a motion. 
Once the motion is filed, the court is re-
quired to replace the order "with an order 
of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-
10." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989). 
This provision emphasizes the parental 
agreement stance of the statute as initially 
adopted and in force at the time of this 
divorce. 
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out 
that the legislature created a list of factors 
the court shall consider in determining the 
best interest of a child in the context of 
joint legal custody (not joint physical custo-
dy). Those factors are: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, 
and emotional needs and development of 
the child will benefit from joint legal 
custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first 
priority to the welfare of the child and 
reach shared decisions in the child's best 
interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of en-
couraging and accepting a positive rela-
tionship between the child and the other 
parent; 
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(d) whether both parents participated in 
raising the child before the filing of the 
suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the 
homes of the parents; 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, 
any preference of the child for or against 
joint legal custody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds rele-
vant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On 
the other hand, the legislature did not offer 
any guidance to trial courts to assist in 
determining the "capability" of the par-
ents. The term is not defined. Section 
10.4 contains provisions for (1) modification 
of a joint legal custody order, (2) termi-
nation of the order discussed above, and (3) 
attorney's fees based on frivolous plead-
ings and harassment. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provi-
sions appear to be a codification of the 
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) 
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody 
modifications. Prior to adoption of this 
statute in 1988, the only reported Utah 
case dealing directly with an initial award 
of "joint custody" was Lembach v. Cox, 
supra. There, the court stated "a custody 
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within 
the broad equitable powers of the court." 
Further, the court said "[t]he fact that the 
father and the mother could not negotiate a 
joint custody arrangement demonstrates 
2. Other Utah reported cases involving joint cus-
tody are: Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 
1985) (modification hearing of an initial award 
of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was 
noted that trial court considered joint custody 
but did not order it in initial decree). 
3. The child custody reform of the eighties 
gained impetus from ongoing no-fault divorce 
legislative reform. Utah added "irreconcilable 
differences" to its list of nine fault-based 
grounds in 1987. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-l(3)(a) (1987). "Both reforms took 
place with no public commitment or private 
initiative for the systematic assessment of the 
legal changes on patterns of custody or on child 
welfare. As fashions change and new interest 
groups emerge, family law is at risk of becom-
ing a series of experiments that never report 
results in ways that can help inform the legisla-
tive nmrMs." Zimrine. Foreword to Sugarman 
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the inappropriateness of ordering joint cus-
tody/' 639 P.2d at 200.2 
Prior to 1980, a handful of states includ-
ing California had adopted various forms of 
"joint custody" statutes. During the 
1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a 
second wave of states adopted "joint custo-
dy" statutes. Utah became the thirty-sec-
ond state (and apparently the last) caught 
up in this wave. 2 Family Law and Prac-
tice, § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & Supp.) 
(hereinafter "Fam. Law").3 
California, the acknowledged pioneer of 
no-fault divorce and joint custody, re-
trenched in 1988 regarding joint custody. 
California's 1979 statute contained a "pre-
sumption . . . that joint custody is in the 
best interests of a minor child where the 
parents have agreed to an award of joint 
custody." Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(a) (West 
1979). In 1983, California amended its 
joint custody statute to include a specific 
definition of both "physical" custody and 
"legal" custody. The California Legisla-
ture recognized the need to be more specif-
ic when in 1983 it defined joint legal custo-
dy to mean "both parents shall share the 
right and responsibility to make decisions 
relating to the health, education and wel-
fare of the child," Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(d), 
and defined joint physical custody as 
"each of the parents . . . [have] significant 
periods of physical custody." Cal.Civ.Code 
§ 4600.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team of 
Stanford professionals proposed the need 
& Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, at viii 
(1990). As no-fault made divorce virtually auto-
matic, fathers' groups began to protest a pro-
mother bias in child custody decisions. At the 
same time, feminist groups began attacking le-
gal standards which were gender-specific as in-
herently discriminatory. Then, fathers' groups 
turned the idea of gender-neutrality to their 
advantage in the child custody arena. These 
opposing forces set the stage for "joint custody" 
statutes based on the rationale of "equality" 
rather than "equity" and children end up taking 
a back seat to the drivers, i.e., their divorcing 
parents. One writer succinctly summed up the 
result: 'This modern trend illustrates a move 
backward toward the more explicit treatment of 
children as property—only this time the proper-
ty is to be divided equally." Fineman, Domi-
nant Discourse, Professional Language, and Le-
gal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking, 
101 Harv.L.Rev. 727, 739-40 (1988). 
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to consider "joint custody" as having a 
third form—the actual residential arrange-
ment for the child.4 Later, a California 
Task Force recommended that existing 
joint custody provisions be clarified to indi-
cate that no statutory presumption exists 
in favor of joint custody. In response, 
subsection (d) was added: 
This section establishes neither a prefer-
ence nor a presumption for or against 
joint legal custody, joint physical custo-
dy, or sole custody, but allows the courts 
and the family the widest discretion to 
choose a parenting plan which is in the 
best interests of the child or children. 
Cal.Civ.Code § 4600(d) (West Supp.1989). 
[1] Coincidentally, while this appeal 
was pending, the 1990 Utah Legislature 
substantially amended its two year-old joint 
legal custody statute deletmg the "rebut-
table presumption" favoring joint legal cus-
tody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 
(1989 & Supp.1990). However, the legisla-
ture retained its initial definition of *'joint 
legal custody/' section 30-3-10.1, and the 
list of seven factors courts are required to 
consider in determining the best interests 
of the child in the context of joint legal 
custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also 
retained in the statute is some language 
regarding parental agreement: "The court 
shall, where possible, include in the order 
[joint legal custody order] the terms agreed 
to between the parties [parents]/' 
§ 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, "The 
agreement may contain a dispute resolu-
tion procedure the parties agree to 
use..,:1 § 30-3-10,3(5) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Our 
legislature's change of position on the "re-
buttable presumption" in favor of joint le-
gal custody and the necessity of parental 
agreement creates confusion concerning 
the public policy basis for the joint legal 
custody statute. Utah and California ap-
pear to be the first and only states to 
retrench from a presumption in favor of 
joint (legal) custody after having adopted 
4. 'There are actually three aspects of joint cus-
tody: the legal custody agreement, the physical 
custody agreement and the actual residential 
arrangement for the child. It is important to 
investigate the three forms of joint custody sepa-
thtf presumption. Due to the paucity of 
pre-statute and absence of post-statute 
joint custody reported decisions in Utah, 
plus the fact that Utah's statute is not like 
that of any other state, we are left to 
decide an issue of first impression with 
little useful precedent. Mr. Thronson ar-
gues that we should apply the 1990 version 
of the joint legal custody statute, i.e., apply 
the amendments retroactively. We decline 
to do so. The 1990 amendments did not 
make a mere procedural change or simply 
clarify how the 1988 statute should have 
been understood originally, The amend-
ments were substantial and substantive, 
thus retroactive application is not appropri-
ate. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n. 
4 (Utah 1982). 
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL 
CUSTODY AWARD UNDER § 
30-3-10.1 to -10.4 
As noted above, the majority of states 
have adopted statutes expressly authoriz-
ing some form of "joint custody,, award. 
Those statutes come in four basic forms: 
1. joint custody as an option only where 
the parties petition or agree; 
2. joint custody as an option; 
3. joint custody as a presumption or 
preference; 
4. joint custody split into joint legal cus-
tody and joint physical custody. 
Fam.Law, § 32.06[2]. Initially, Utah com-
bined forms 1 and 3. Now, Utah is form 2, 
but only as to joint "legal" custody. Here, 
the trial court faced Utah's initial statute 
with a favorable presumption on one hand 
and the requirement of parencs' agreement 
on the other. Ms. Thronson opposed a joint 
custody order. The trial court failed to 
meet the parental agreement requirement 
head-on. Instead, the court found "there 
exists substantial difficulty between the 
parties" and "it is in the best interests of 
the child for the parties to be awarded 
joint legal custody." The court failed to 
rately to understand the implications of each 
for the functioning of the post-divorce family." 
Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint Legal 
Custody Matter?, StanX. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168 
(1990). 
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find whether the parents agreed or disa-
greed as to an order of joint legal custody. 
At the time the court ruled, the statute 
stated: 
The court may order joint legal custody 
if it determines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of 
joint legal custody . . . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989). 
The form of the statute required a 
threshold finding of parental "agreement." 
The trial court implicitly found "disagree-
ment" but proceeded with the order. 
Moreover, the record reveals opposition to 
the order, i.e., no agreement. Several 
states have adopted the "parental agree-
ment" form of joint custody statute, includ-
ing Colorado, Texas and Kansas.5 The Col-
orado statute, for example, requires that 
any motion for joint custody be filed by 
both parties, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124(5) 
(1973), and that any plan for joint custody 
must be jointly agreed to by the parties, 
Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In 
Colorado, a trial court ordered joint custo-
dy over the objection of the mother. The 
appellate court ruled that the award in the 
absence of agreement of the parties was an 
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo.Ct.App. 
1984). See also Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 
S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Ct.App.1984) (court has no 
authority to award joint custody without 
agreement); Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. 
App.2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 (1980) (without 
agreement, joint custody award unautho-
rized). 
[2] We hold that the trial court abused 
its discretion by Imposing the order of joint 
legal custody on the parents and child, 
the statute required parental agreement. 
Here, there was parental opposition. See 
lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah 
1981) (inappropriate to order joint custody 
Where parents not in agreement). Thus, 
We vacate the order of joint legal custody. 
t>ue to our ruling and remand, we need not 
^each Ms. Thronson's challenge to the pro-
s' Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin 
have also adopted similar statutes. Fam.Law 
vision for automatic change of custody 
when one parent moves from the state. 
ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY 
UNDER § 30-3-10 
Our vacating of the order of joint legal 
custody is not necessarily dispositive of the 
issues of child custody, including legal cus-
tody, i.e., decision-making, and physical 
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation 
rights. The trial court's findings might 
support a "best interests" custody award 
under § 30-3-10, although an award of 
joint legal custody was improper. How-
ever, both the court's memorandum deci-
sion and formal findings specify the court's 
reliance on the legislature's list of best 
interest factors in the joint legal custody 
statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above. 
On the other hand, § 30-3-10 provides: 
In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated 
moral standards of each of the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis 
add^d). 
Our Supreme court has developed the 
best interest factors to be considered under 
this provision. 
We believe that the choice in compet-
ing child custody claims should instead 
be based on function-related factors. 
Prominent among these, though not ex-
clusive, is the identity of the primary 
caretaker during the marriage. Other 
factors should include the identity of the 
parent with greater flexibility to provide 
personal care for the child and the identi-
ty of the parent with whom the child has 
spent most of his or her time pending 
custody determination if that period has 
been lengthy. Another important factor 
should be the stability of the environ-
ment provided by each parent. 
Pussy v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986) (emphasis added). See also Hutchi-
son v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud.Ad-
§ 32.06[2] at n. 45. 
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min. (1989) (requiring custody evaluators to 
consider and respond to a list of factors). 
[3] Our comparison of the two lists of 
factors reveals that they are not identical, 
although some similarities appear. More-
over, the context of the respective factors 
point the thrust of the trial court's inquiry 
in two different directions. As a result, 
the findings herein will not support an ulti-
mate finding under § 30-3-10 that child 
custody should be placed with one parent 
or the other. Further, the findings contain 
internal disagreement. The memorandum 
decision states "the court desires the par-
ties to arrange between themselves for rea-
sonable and liberal visitation which they 
determine." To the same effect is formal 
finding number 61: "[i]t is in the best 
interests of the parties and their minor 
child to attempt to arrange between them-
selves reasonable and liberal visitation 
If the parties are unable to do so, the court 
will set a specific schedule." But, the 
court in formal finding number 65 took 
that promised privilege away from the par-
ties stating—"[i]n light of an appropriate 
reasonable and liberal visitation schedule, it 
is reasonable that the parties' minor child 
will spend 57% of his time with plaintiff, 
who has primary physical custody, and 43% 
of his time with the defendant." The 
"57%" visitation award to the mother pro-
vides the basis for the "primary physical 
custody" statement. This was the only 
time the trial court mentioned physical cus-
tody. This specification of visitation time 
surreptitiously imposed an award of joint 
physical custody upon the parties without 
proper consideration of the best interest 
factors under § 30-3-10. We hold the find-
ings to be inadequate to support any award 
of child custody because: 
(1) The trial court utilized best interest 
factors related to joint legal custody 
§ 30-3-10.2(3) and not the factors related 
to child custody § 30-3-10; 
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the 
determination of visitation rights, i.e., by 
the court or the parents; 
(3) The findings do not support any 
award of physical custody; and 
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of 
a court irrmnQpH vici+o+i/vn +ir«« oii~~«4.:— 
Our task is to act in the best interests of 
the child. We must vacate and remand the 
custody and visitation award. We do not 
remand simply for revision of the findings 
or with directions to modify the decree 
regarding these matters. During the inter-
im, the facts regarding the parents and 
their child and their relationships might 
have been dramatically changed. Further, 
the joint legal custody statute has been 
substantially amended. The current factu-
al and legal circumstances should be exam-
ined before this matter is finalized. Thus, 
we remand for further fact finding and a 
new legal determination, utilizing whatever 
procedures and hearings the trial court 
deems necessary—consistent with this 
opinion. 
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
[4] Child support will have to be recon-
sidered in connection with the above re-
mand. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 
1990) reveals that the support obligation is 
intended to be a shared obligation of both 
parents. This obligation must be allocated 
in proportion to the parties' adjusted gross 
income pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.5 to -7.7. Subsection 7.5 lists 
the items of income to be included in gross 
income. It also lists two items to be sub-
tracted from gross income to calculate ad-
justed gross income: alimony previously 
ordered and paid and child support previ-
ously ordered. Neither of those items is 
applicable here. Thus, gross income is the 
same as adjusted gross income in this case. 
But, the trial court failed to include income 
from nonearned sources as required by 
§ 78-45-7.5(l)(a). Moreover, the trial court 
averaged Mr. Thronson's earned income for 
several years rather than using "current 
earnings." Section 78-45-7.5(5)(b) indi-
cates that current earnings are to be used. 
On remand, child support calculations 
should properly account for these items 
pursuant to the statutory requirements. 
ALIMONY AWARD 
The trial court awarded Ms. Thronson 
THRONSON v. THRONSON 
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Three factors must be considered by the 
trial court in making an alimony award: 
1. the financial condition and needs of 
the party seeking alimony; 
2. that party's ability to produce suffi-
cient income for him or herself; and 
3. the ability of the other party to pro-
vide support. 
Saranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah Ct.App.1988) (citing English v. Eng-
lish, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)). 
"Failure to analyze the parties' circum-
stances in light of these three factors con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 
1986)). As long as the trial court exercises 
its discretion within the bounds and under 
the standards we have set and has sup-
ported its decision with adequate findings 
and conclusions, we wjJJ not disturb its 
rulings. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988). 
[5] Here, the trial court considered each 
of the alimony factors and entered find-
ings. Ms. Thronson's actual and necessary 
monthly living expenses were found to be 
$3,700. She presented a higher figure, but 
the court heard evidence challenging cer-
tain items and found them to be overstated. 
Ms. Thronson's current earning capacity, 
as a full-time pharmacist, was found to be 
$35,000 a year gross. This finding was 
based on competent evidence and repre-
sents the midpoint of an annual gross sala-
ry range of $31,000 to $39,000. The final 
factor, Mr. Thronson's ability to provide 
support, i.e., his earning capacity, was con-
sidered by the trial court. He submitted a 
thirteen-year summary of his income. The 
trial court used an average of the last eight 
years, after excluding some contingent fee 
income in three of those years. Thus, the 
court found Mr. Thronson's average gross 
income to be $71,376 annually. This calcu-
lation and finding was in error. Mr. Thron-
son's schedule showed his current gross 
earning capacity to be $94,476 annually. 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that an award 
of $800 per month in alimony is an abuse of 
discretion given the above factors and oth-
er financial circumstances of the parties. 
But, we do hold that the trial court abused 
its discretion in making the alimony non-
permanent, i.e., for one year. 
The trial court found that "an annual 
income of $35,000 should be imputed" to 
Ms. Thronson, i.e., she could earn that 
amount, assuming she was employed on a 
full-time basis. But, the court found her 
needs to be $3,700 per month, i.e., $44,400 
annually. Accordingly, she is not capable 
of meeting her needs, she requires $9,400 
annually to meet her needs, even when 
employed on a full-time basis. Thus, she 
will require the $800 per month ($9,600 
annually) alimony for the forseeable fu-
ture. Otherwise, she will face a substan-
tial income shortfall compared to her 
needs. Further, the trial court found Mr. 
Thronson's actual and necessary monthly 
living expenses to be $4,300 per month, i.e., 
$51,600 annually. This leaves him with 
some discretionary income. These findings 
warrant an award of permanent alimony. 
The trial court abused its discretion in lim-
iting the alimony award to one year. Ras-
band v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). We remand for modi-
fication of the alimony award to be perma-
nent alimony of $800 per month. 
OTHER FINANCIAL AND 
PROPERTY AWARDS 
There is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of property in a di-
vorce action. The trial court has considera-
ble latitude in adjusting financial and prop-
erty interests, and its actions are entitled 
to a presumption of validity. See Naranjo, 
751 P.2d at 1146. Ms. Thronson claims the 
trial court erred by failing to restore to her 
inheritance monies expended by her while 
the parties were separated prior to divorce; 
by failing to replace certain furniture re-
moved by Mr. Thronson; and by failing to 
restore certain funds spent by Mr. Thron-
son after they separated. We have exam-
ined these items and find no abuse of trial 
court discretion. This court will not dis-
turb a determination of financial and prop-
erty interests unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. Rasband, 752 
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P.2d at 1335. Thus, we affirm the rulings 
on these matters. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF 
Aundrae HIGLEY, a minor. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES, Appellee, 
v. 
Dennis J. HIGLEY, 
conservator, Appellant. 
No. 900236-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 10, 1991. 
After recipient of state medical assist-
ance payments settled his claim against the 
insurer of the owner of the automobile 
which caused his accident, State brought 
action against recipient under the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act to recover medical 
assistance payments provided for recipient. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David S. Young, J., entered summary judg-
ment for State, and recipient appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that: (1) 1989 amendments to the Act ap-
plied retroactively, and (2) because recipi-
ent settled the claim without state's con-
sent, state was entitled to recover the medi-
cal assistance payments. 
Affirmed. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
e=*241 
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act, which previously prohibited 
filing of claim without State consent and, 
as amended, included settlement, compro-
mise, release, or waiver of claim as well, 
was not substantive, and thus, could be 
applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-
7(D(a). 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>241 
State was entitled to recover from re-
cipients medical assistance payments ad-
vanced in his behalf, as recipient settled his 
claim with insurer without state's consent. 
U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>241 
Because recipient of state medical as-
sistance payments settled claim with insur-
er without state's consent, state was enti-
tled to recover those medical assistance 
payments, even though insurer's written 
offer to settle for policy limits predated 
both recipient's application for State assist-
ance and state's acceptance; recipient's 
claim was not fully and legally settled until 
several months after state became obligat-
ed. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a). 
4. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>241 
Where recipient of state medical assist-
ance payments had claim for recovery 
against insurer of owners and driver of 
automobile which caused recipient's inju-
ries, and recipient pursued that claim with-
out state's consent, state's claim against 
recipient under Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act included "any proceeds" payable by 
third party to extent of State medical as-
sistance provided to him. U.C.A.1953, 26-
19-5, 26-19-7(l)(a). 
Victor Lawrence (argued), Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and 
Douglas W. Springmeyer, Asst. Atty. Gen. 
(argued), Salt Lake City, for appellee. 




Appellant ("the conservator") appeals 
from a summary judgment based on the 
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we have recognized the practical fact that 
in deciding whether to return a particular 
verdict, a jury may take into account the 
real or imagined consequences of that ver-
dict and should be given all verdict choices 
reasonably supported by the evidence. 
See, e.g., Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424; Baker, 
671 P.2d at 156-57. Implicit in that line of 
cases is an assumption that the jury will 
have some understanding of the relative 
consequences of the verdicts available to it. 
When faced with a choice between verdicts 
of guilty and mentally ill or not guilty by 
reason of insanity, however, the jury can 
only guess at the consequences of one ver-
sus the other. Therefore, they should be 
given some guidance. 
Hermona Jane MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kay Sherman MORTENSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 19328. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 1988. 
Husband appealed from order of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. 
Robert Bullock, J., dividing parties' proper-
ty in divorce action. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, Associate CJ., held that: (1) trial 
court making "equitable" property division 
pursuant to divorce statute should general-
ly award property acquired by one spouse 
by gift and inheritance during marriage to 
that spouse, and (2) awarding husband all 
of stock that he acquired from his parents 
during marriage, then dividing remaining 
property by giving two-thirds to wife and 
one-third to husband was not inequitable. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., filed concurring opin-
ion in which Durham, J., concurred. 
1. Divorce ®=>252.3(3) 
In Utah, trial court making "equitable" 
property division pursuant to divorce stat-
ute should generally award property ac-
quired by one spouse by gift and inheri-
tance during marriage, or property ac-
quired in exchange thereof, to that spouse, 
together with any appreciation or enhance-
ment of its value, unless other spouse has 
by his or her efforts or expense contributed 
to enhancement, maintenance, or protection 
of that property, thereby acquiring eq-
uitable interest in it, or property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through com-
mingling or exchanges or when acquiring 
spouse has made gift of interest therein to 
other spouse. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
2. Divorce <s=»252.3(l,3) 
Exception to rule awarding property 
acquired by one spouse by gift and inheri-
tance during marriage to that spouse is 
where part of or all of gift and inheritance 
is awarded to nondonee or nonheir spouse 
in lieu of alimony; remaining property 
should be divided equitably between parties 
as in other divorce cases, but not necessar-
ily with strict mathematical equality. U.C. 
A.1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Divorce e=>252.3(3) 
In making equitable property division 
when one spouse has acquired property by 
gift and inheritance during marriage, donee 
or heir spouse should not lose benefits of 
his or her gift or inheritance by trial 
court's automatically or arbitrarily award-
ing other spouse equal amount of remain-
ing property which was acquired by their 
joint efforts to offset gifts or inheritance; 
any significant disparity in division of re-
maining property should be based on eq-
uitable rational other than on sole fact that 
one spouse is awarded his or her gifts or 
inheritance. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
4. Divorce <3=>240(2) 
Fact that one spouse has inherited or 
donated property, particularly if it is in-
come-producing, may properly be con-
sidered as eliminating or rpHnninor naoH fm-
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alimony by that spouse or his source of 
income for payment of child support or 
alimony, where awarded, by that spouse; 
such property might also be utilized to 
provide housing for minor children or uti-
lized in other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5. 
5. Divorce <s=»252.3(l, 3) 
Awarding husband all of stock that he 
acquired from his parents during marriage, 
then dividing remaining property by giving 
two-thirds to wife and one-third to hus-
band, was not inequitable, even if value of 
stock awarded to husband was not con-
sidered; parties did not have equal earning 
power, and wife had waived all right to 
alimony,, U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
Richard B. Johnson, Provo, for defendant 
and appellant 
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
This case presents for determination the 
question of what disposition should be 
made in a divorce decree of property given 
to one of the parties to the marriage by his 
or her family during the course of the 
marriage. 
Plaintiff Hermona Jane Mortensen and 
defendant Kay Sherman Mortensen were 
married on June 18, 1959, when they were 
eighteen and nineteen years of age, respec-
tively. Neither brought any substantial as-
sets into the marriage. In 1969, defend-
ant's parents, who owned a farm, orga-
nized a corporation to which they conveyed 
the farm. They issued 50 percent of the 
stock to themselves and the remaining 50 
percent to their five children in equal 
shares. A certificate of stock bearing de-
fendant's name alone was issued to him for 
his 10 percent of the outstanding shares. 
Plaintiff has had no involvement with the 
corporation except that she served as its 
secretary for six months, during which 
time she performed some nominal secretar-
ial work. 
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce. 
At the end of the trial, the court granted 
her a divorce, but suggested to counsel for 
both parties that they attempt to agree on 
a division of the property and on the 
amount of child support and alimony, if 
any. Counsel agreed to do so, but request-
ed that the court first guide them by decid-
ing whether the shares of stock given to 
defendant by his parents should be con-
sidered by them in their negotiation. The 
court took the question under advisement 
and, after reading trial memoranda provid-
ed by counsel, ruled that the stock "is 
property of the marriage and should be 
taken into consideration by the court in 
dividing all marital property on a fair and 
equitable basis/' Thereafter, the parties 
stipulated to a division of their property 
which gave all of the shares of stock to 
defendant, but gave about two-thirds in 
value of the remaining property to plain-
tiff, including their major asset, their house 
and lot which had been fully paid for. 
They also stipulated to amounts of child 
support for the three minor children and 
that plaintiff should be awarded no alimo-
ny. The stipulation was made subject to 
the right of defendant to appeal to this 
Court the trial court's ruling quoted above 
concerning the shares of stock. The court 
accepted and approved the stipulation, 
which was incorporated into a decree of 
divorce. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984, Supp. 
1988) tersely provides: "When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, and parties." "Property" 
is nowhere defined in our divorce code. In 
Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 
P.2d 928 (1968), we rejected the contention 
of the defendant husband that shares of 
stock which had been given to him by his 
father and sister should not have been 
treated by the trial court as part of the 
marital estate and divided between him and 
his plaintiff wife. We did so without any 
analysis of the issue and based our decision 
on the oft-repeated rule that under section 
30-3-5, there is no fixed rule or formula 
for the division of property, the trial court 
has wide discretion in property division, 
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and its judgment will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be 
demonstrated. In that case, however, the 
wife was awarded no alimony and was di-
rected to pay her own attorney fees and 
costs, even though she was totally disabled. 
More recently in Bushell v. Bushell, 649 
P.2d 85 (Utah 1982), the defendant hus-
band's father had given him fourteen acres 
of land during the marriage. In a divorce 
action brought by the plaintiff wife, we 
affirmed the trial court's division of proper-
ty which awarded her one acre of that land 
upon which the parties placed a mobile 
home in which they lived. She was also 
given the right to use the remaining thir-
teen acres for farming and for her live-
stock for seven and one-half years to assist 
in providing support for the minor children 
and herself. Similarly, in Dubois v. Du-
bois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973), 
we were unable to find any abuse of discre-
tion in the division of a marital estate total-
ling $588,581 which awarded to the plain-
tiff wife 60 percent thereof, even though 
"the greater part of the nucleus of this 
estate was the result of investment and 
reinvestment of gifts from the plaintiffs 
relatives." The defendant husband had ap-
pealed the division because the trial court 
had not taken into consideration that the 
wife was a beneficiary of the estate of her 
uncle who died after the divorce action was 
filed but before trial. This Court made no 
specific comment on that issue and af-
firmed the property division but reversed 
the award of alimony made by the trial 
court, since the wife could maintain herself 
on the income from the property awarded 
her. 
In contrast to the above cases, we have 
on a number of occasions affirmed a divi-
sion of property made by the trial court 
which awarded to one spouse property 
which he or she inherited during the mar-
riage. For example in Preston v. Preston, 
646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), we affirmed 
a divorce decree awarding to each party, in 
general, the real and personal property he 
or she brought to the marriage or inherited 
during the marriage. We there said: 
Following the principle we have approved 
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes, 
Utah, 627 P.2d 44 (1981); Jesperson v. 
Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980); 
and Humphreys v. Humphreys, Utah, 
520 P.2d 193 (1974), the district court 
concluded that each party should, in gen-
eral, receive the real and personal prop-
erty he or she brought to the marriage or 
inherited during the marriage. 
Again, in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 
(Utah 1987), the plaintiff wife, ten years 
into the marriage, inherited from her moth-
er's estate three and one-half acres of un-
improved land then worth less than $5,000. 
Although no improvements were made to 
the property nor any effort was expended 
by either party, the property had appreciat-
ed at the time of divorce to $35,000 per 
acre. The trial court awarded the property 
solely to the plaintiff wife, giving the de-
fendant husband no part of the land's origi-
nal value or appreciation during the mar-
riage. This Court refused to disturb that 
award. A few months later, we decided 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1987), where the plaintiff invested in 
houses money she had inherited early in 
the marriage. During their twenty-year 
marriage, the parties owned three houses 
in succession. During the holding periods, 
each house appreciated in value. Upon di-
vorce, the plaintiff wife was credited with 
the amount of her inheritances that went 
into the houses, but the parties equally 
shared the appreciation of the value of the 
houses. We found no abuse of discretion 
in that arrangement. See also Argyle v. 
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984), where 
the defendant husband was credited with 
the amount of a gift of land received from 
his mother during the marriage. 
Some of the above cases in whicn gifts or 
inheritances received by one of the parties 
to the marriage were treated differently 
can be reconciled because of the effort 
made by the nondonee or nonheir spouse to 
preserve or augment the asset, Dubois v. 
Dubois, supra, or because of the lack of 
such effort, Burke v. Burke, supra. Also, 
in Weaver v. Weaver, supra, the award to 
the wife of part of the assets given to the 
husband during the marriage by his family 
was in lieu of alimony and attorney fees. 
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Significantly, no case has been found 
where this Court has reversed a trial 
court's disposition of gifts or inherited 
property received by one party during the 
marriage. In almost every case, we have 
emphasized the wide discretion trial courts 
have in property division and have re-
frained from laying down any general rules 
for the disposition of gifts and inherited 
property. 
A review of the law in other jurisdictions 
discloses that generally property acquired 
by one spouse by gift or inheritance during 
the marriage is awarded wholly to that 
spouse upon divorce unless the other 
spouse has contributed to the augmenta-
tion, improvement, or operation of the 
property or has significantly cared for, pro-
tected, or preserved it, thereby acquiring 
an equitable interest in the property. In 
some states, this rule is aided by or based 
on statute. Bailey v. Bailey, 250 Ga. 15, 
295 S.E.2d 304 (1982); Klingberg v. Kling-
berg, 68 Dl.App.3d 513, 25 IlLDec. 246, 386 
N.E.2d 517 (1979); In re Marriage of Pit-
luck, 616 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.Ct.App.1981); In 
re Marriage ofHerron, 186 Mont. 396, 608 
P.2d 97 (1980); In the Matter of the Mar-
riage of Pierson, 294 Or. 117, 653 P.2d 
1258 (1982); Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 
418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (CtApp.1984); Wier-
man v. Wierman, 130 Wis.2d 425, 387 
N.W.2d 744 (1986). In other states, the 
rule is founded on case law holding that 
although trial courts have wide discretion 
in the division of property, which discretion 
will be disturbed on appeal only if it has 
been abused, as a general rule an equitable 
and fair distribution of property requires 
that gifts and inheritances be retained 6y 
the donee or heir spouse. Raupp v. 
Eaupp, 3 Ea^.App. 602, 653 P,2d 329 
(1983); Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 212 
Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832 (1982). In Hus-
sey v. Hussey, supra, the court noted that 
a substantial majority of states exclude 
inherited property from the marital estate 
of the parties, citing Baxter, Marital Prop-
erty § 41:8 (Supp.1983); see now Supp. 
1987. It justified that policy on the ground 
that "property which comes to either party 
by avenues other than as a consequence of 
their mutual efforts owes nothing to the 
marriage and is not intended to be shared." 
Hussey, 312 S.E.2d at 270. The same court 
further observed: 
Finally, we are mindful that the inclusion 
of inherited property in the marital es-
tate subjects it to being removed from 
the natural line of succession, thus 
thwarting the desire of the persons who 
acquired it and passed it on to the spouse 
in possession. At the same time, the 
spouse who made no contribution toward 
acquisition of the property benefits from 
the windfall award. 
Hussey, 312 S.E.2d at 270. 
The rule that property acquired by gift 
or inheritance by one spouse should be 
awarded to that spouse on divorce unless 
the other spouse has, by his or her efforts 
with regard to the property, acquired an 
equity in it does not apply when the proper-
ty thus acquired is consumed, such as when 
a gift or an inheritance of money is used 
for family purposes, In re Marriage of 
Metcalf, 183 Mont 266, 598 P.2d 1140 
(1979); when the property completely loses 
its identity and is not traceable because it 
is commingled with other property (some-
times called transmuted), Wierman v. Wi-
erman, supra; Klingberg v. Klingberg, 
supra; Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 (Okla. 
Ct.App.1979); or when the acquiring 
spouse places title in their joint names in 
such a manner as to evidence an intent to 
make it marital property. Hussey v. Hus-
sey, supra. See also Van Newkirk v. Van 
Newkirk, supra, where the court deter-
mined that shares in a mutual fund were 
actually given to both husband and wife by 
the wife's parents. 
Some jurisdictions which award property 
acquired by one spouse by gift or inheri-
tance also award to him or her any appreci-
ation of that property during marriage due 
to inflation. Van Newkirk v. Van New-
kirk, supra; In re Marriage of Komnick, 
84 I11.2d 89, 49 IlLDec. 291, 417 N.E.2d 
1305 (1981). Other jurisdictions do not al-
ways do so. See Mochida v. Mochida, 5 
Haw.App. 348, 691 P.2d 771 (1984). 
Once property acquired by gift or inheri-
tance has been set over to the donee or heir 
spouse in accordance with the rules just 
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stated, the jurisdictions are in conflict as to 
how the nondonated and noninherited prop-
erty (hereinafter called remaining property) 
should be divided. In Van Newkirk v. 
Van Newkirk, supra, the court held that 
the remaining property should be divided 
equitably between the parties apparently 
without regard to the fact that one party 
had been awarded his or her property ac-
quired by gift or inheritance. (The court 
observed that generally the disparity in the 
division of the remaining property should 
not exceed two-thirds to one-third.) This 
view that the award to one spouse of his or 
her inheritances and gifts should not be a 
factor in the division of the remaining prop-
erty was taken by two dissenting justices 
on the Oregon Supreme Court in In the 
Matter of the Marriage ofPierson, supra. 
Other courts, however, have taken the posi-
tion that even though donated or inherited 
property is not subject to equitable divi-
sion, it may properly be considered as a 
factor in determining what constitutes an 
equitable division of the remaining proper-
ty. Hussey v. Hussey, supra; In the Mat-
ter of the Marriage ofPierson, supra. In 
the latter case, the remaining property was 
not evenly divided. The wife, who was 
awarded a farm she inherited during the 
marriage valued at over $100,000, received 
less than 50 percent of the remaining prop-
erty in order to make the husband economi-
cally self-sufficient. The court observed: 
Where a decree cannot achieve all the 
objectives of a dissolution and at the 
same time divide property exactly evenly, 
the court should order a division of as-
sets which is out of balance to the extent 
required for the accomplishment of the 
other purposes of the decree . . . , as here, 
to enable both parties to be i^n post-mari-
tal life with a degree of economic self-
sufficiency 
Pierson, 653 P.2d at 1262. 
[1-4] We conclude that in Utah, trial 
courts making "equitable" property divi-
sion pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in 
accordance with the rule prevailing in most 
other jurisdictions and with the division 
made in many of our own cases, generally 
award property acquired by one spouse by 
gift and inheritance during the marriage 
(or property acquired in exchange thereof) 
to that spouse, together with any apprecia-
tion or enhancement of its value, unless (1) 
the other spouse has by his or her efforts 
or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that proper-
ty, thereby acquiring an equitable interest 
in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the 
property has been consumed or its identity 
lost through commingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift 
of an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Cf Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980). An exception to this rule 
would be where part or all of the gift or 
inheritance is awarded to the nondonee or 
nonheir spouse in lieu of alimony as was 
done in Weaver v. Weaver, supra. The 
remaining property should be divided equi-
tably between the parties as in other di-
vorce cases, but not necessarily with strict 
mathematical equality. Teece v. Teece, 715 
P.2d 106 (Utah 1986). However, in making 
that division, the donee or heir spouse 
should not lose the benefit of his or her gift 
or inheritance by the trial court's automati-
cally or arbitrarily awarding the other 
spouse an equal amount of the remaining 
property which was acquired by their joint 
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance. 
Any significant disparity in the division of 
the remaining property should be based on 
an equitable rationale other than on the 
sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or 
her gifts or inheritance. The fact that one 
spouse has inherited or donated property, 
particularly if it is income-producing, may 
properly be considered as eliminating or 
reducing the need for alimony by that 
spouse or as a source of income for the 
payment of child support or alimony (where 
awarded) by that spouse. Such property 
might also be utilized to provide housing 
for minor children or utilized in other ex-
traordinary situations where equity so de-
mands. These rules will preserve and give 
effect to the right that married persons 
have always had in this state to separately 
own and enjoy property. It also accords 
with the normal intent of donors or de-
ceased persons that their gifts and inheri-
tances should be kept within their family 
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and succession should not be diverted be- the court made the division, it would have 
cause of divorce. fallen into error. 
[5] Turning now to the instant case, 
based on the stipulation of the parties, de-
fendant was awarded all of the stock. This 
was entirely proper since plaintiff does not 
claim that through any effort of hers, the 
value of the stock was in any way en-
hanced. Indeed, there was no evidence 
that the stock had appreciated in value. 
Defendant complains, however, that even 
though he was awarded the stock, because 
of the trial court's ruling that the stock "is 
property of the marriage and should be 
taken into consideration by the court in 
dividing all marital property on a fair and 
equitable basis," he was compelled to stipu-
late to a division of the remaining property 
which gave him less than he would have 
otherwise been entitled to. Defendant ap-
parently assumes that had the trial court 
made the division of property, it would 
have, in view of its ruling stated above, 
given plaintiff an award of remaining prop-
erty equal in amount to the value of the 
stock before giving defendant any of the 
remaining property. 
We cannot agree with defendant's con-
tention. We are not satisfied that by its 
ruling the trial court intended the meaning 
which defendant gives to it. In the first 
place, even though the stock should have 
been and was awarded to defendant, the 
trial court was technically correct in ruling 
that the stock was not without the purview 
of the court since it was "property" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Weaver v. 
Weaver, supra. Secondly, the balance of 
the court's ruling is couched in general 
terms, leaving us without any way of 
knowing the extent of consideration the 
trial court in dividing the remaining proper-
ty would have given to the fact that de-
fendant was entitled to be awarded his 
stock. We cannot assume that the trial 
judge would have given improper consider-
ation of, or too much weight to, that fact 
Since the trial court did not actually make 
the division of property here but only ac-
cepted the division made by the parties 
themselves, we cannot presume that had 
We do point out that the division agreed 
upon by the parties would have been an 
equitable division had it been made by the 
trial court, even though it gave plaintiff 
approximately two-thirds of the property 
and defendant one-third, exclusive of the 
shares of stock. Thus, the trial court's 
vague ruling did not mislead defendant into 
stipulating to an inequitable division. 
Here, the parties married at a young age. 
The husband continued his education and 
finally obtained a Ph.D. degree in metallur-
gy. He teaches at a private university and 
earns a gross salary of approximately 
$2,560 per month. The parties have four 
children, one of whom had obtained his 
majority at the time of trial but was still 
living at home. After the birth of the last 
child, plaintiff went back to school and 
obtained a bachelor's degree with a teach-
ing certificate. For five years prior to the 
trial, she had been employed as a public 
school teacher, earning approximately 
$1,300 gross per month. Despite the dis-
parity in their educational achievement and 
their earnings, plaintiff waived all right to 
alimony and agreed to the payment of 
$150-per-month child support for each of 
the three minor children in her custody. 
Although there is scant evidence in the 
record concerning the extent of retirement 
benefits which the parties may later be-
come entitled to, it would appear that de-
fendant's retirement will be greater be-
cause of his higher salary and longer num-
ber of years in employment Plaintiff was 
not awarded any part of defendant's retire-
ment. In view of these factors, it would 
not have been inequitable for the trial court 
to award plaintiff two-thirds of the remain-
ing property and defendant one-third, giv-
ing no weight at all to the fact that he 
received his shares of stock. 
Defendant raises one further issue, that 
the decree signed by the trial court deviat-
ed from the oral stipulation the parties 
entered into the record. We find that the 
decree accurately reflected the intent of 
the parties, and the deviation from the ex-
act language of the stipulation was of no 
consequence. In any event, the language 
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of the stipulation is not necessarily binding 
on the court. Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1980); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 
472 (Utah 1975); Johnson v. Johnson, 21 
Utah 2d 23, 439 P.2d 843 (1968). 
The decree of the trial court is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, J., 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring). 
I concur in the majority opinion, at least 
as I understand its scope. I write sepa-
rately to explain that understanding. As I 
read the majority opinion, the rules articu-
lated today require only that in the usual 
case not fitting within one of the excep-
tions spelled out by Justice Howe, property 
acquired by one spouse during the mar-
riage through gift or inheritance should be 
awarded to that spouse upon divorce. I 
take this to be nothing more than a varia-
tion on the analogous rule applicable to 
property brought into the marriage by one 
party: in the usual case, that property is 
returned to that party at divorce, absent 
exigent circumstances. Preston v. Pres-
ton, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982). I cer-
tainly do not read the majority opinion as 
creating an exalted status for inherited or 
donated property that would effectively en-
tail it or its value beyond the reach of a 
trial court fashioning a divorce decree. 
The overarching general rule remains the 
same in any divorce case: to provide ade-
quate support for the children of the mar-
riage, Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 
(Utah 1987), and to divide the economic 
assets and income stream of the parties so 
as to permit both to maintain themselves 
after the marriage as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 761 
P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah 1988). That standard 
ultimately determines how property and in-
come should be allocated by the trial court 
in making property division, alimony, and 
child support orders. Where possible, inter-
ests of parties in their separate property, 
such as those described by Justice Howe, 
should be honored. For this reason, the 
rules articulated today, like those generally 
applicable to separate pre-marital property, 
may limit somewhat the trial court's initial 
flexibility to allocate property of a marriage 
in a fashion so as to provide an entirely 
equitable portion to each party. But if, af-
ter an attempt is made to pay due deference 
to each party's claim to particular pieces of 
property by reason of their source, the 
court finds that it is unable to fashion a divi-
sion of assets and awards of alimony and 
child support that will be just and equitable 
for both parties and the children, then it is 
free to ignore those claims in the greater in-
terest in a just and equitable decree. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
STATE of Utah, By and Through the DI-
VISION OF CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, Jean A. Williams, Director, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
GAF CORPORATION, a Delaware cor-
poration, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 19836. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 18, 1988. 
State Division of Consumer Protection 
brought action against asphalt shingle 
manufacturer. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., 
granted summary judgment for manufac-
turer, and appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) Division 
could sue for damages to consumer based 
on complaint filed by consumer with Divi-
sion, and (2) promotional materials provided 
by manufacturer to retailer, which were 
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Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
App.1992). 
[16] As a prerequisite to an attack on 
findings of fact, the petitioner must marshal 
all evidence in support of the findings and 
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings." Gray-
son Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989); see West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App.1991) (discussing in detail what "oner-
ous" marshaling burden entails for appel-
lants). This marshaling requirement pro-
vides the appellate court the basis from 
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient 
review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 
512 n. 2 (Utah App.1990). 
[17] In the present case, petitioner does 
not meet his marshaling burden; rather, he 
merely reargues the evidence most favorable 
to him, leaving it to this court to sort out 
what evidence actually supports the habeas 
court's competency determination. Because 
he has failed to meet this burden, we decline 
to consider the merits of his argument on 
appeal. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).6 
CONCLUSION 
The information known to the trial court at 
the time of the plea hearing does not indicate 
that the trial judge should have had a bona 
fide doubt with respect to petitioner's compe-
tency to plead guilty. Furthermore, we re-
fuse to consider petitioner's claim that the 
tnal court erred in finding him competent at 
the time he entered his guilty plea because 
6. However, our review of the record suggests the 
likelihood that sufficient evidence supports the 
habeas court's finding that petitioner was compe-
tent at the time he entered his guilty plea. Dr 
Carlisle testified that although petitioner proba-
bly suffered from MPD at the time ot the shoot-
ings, he was nevertheless competent to have pied 
guilty He further testified that petitioner would 
have been able to think rationally, form a mental 
state of intent to kill, understand the nature of 
the proceedings and the nature of the crime, 
comprehend the reasons for punishment, and 
assist his attorney Dr Carlisle explained that 
petitioner "would have the rational thought of 
determining whether or not [pleading guilty] was 
he has failed to meet his burden to marshal 
the evidence. Nevertheless, there is an ade-
quate evidentiary foundation for the habeas 
court's determination that petitioner was 
competent at the time he entered his guilty 
pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus 
petition. 
DAVIS, J., and ORME, Associate P.J., 
concur. 
Christa C. SCHAUMBERG, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas J. SCHAUMBERG, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920865-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 26, 1994. 
Divorce action was brought. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. 
Hanson, J., entered a final decree of divorce. 
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Davis, J., held that: (1) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding wife $800 
per month alimony; (2) finding that husband 
spent loan, a marital debt, to maintain and 
improve business building was not clearly 
the choice he wanted to make at the time " Dr 
Carlisle also testified that if the host personalis 
had really been unaware of what the alternate 
personality had done, he would have expected 
more confusion and inability to remember in 
petitioner's statements at the police station, and 
that it was possible petitioner was blocking his 
memory Furthermore, the tnal court s finding* 
and conclusions clearly indicate the court ap-
plied the appropnate legal standard in finding 
petitioner competent to plead guiltv, as required 
by Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S 402, 80 S Ci 
788, 4 L.Ed 2d 824 (1960) (per curiam) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1993). 
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erroneous; (3) wife was entitled to one half 
of appreciation of building; and (4) remand 
was required for determination of whether 
wife was entitled to attorney fees on appeal 
and, if so, amount of fees. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Divorce e=>239, 240(1) 
Trial court made adequate finding re-
garding wife's need and, thus, did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding wife $800 per 
month alimony; wife presented uncontro-
verted testimony regarding her projected 
needs and past standard of living and hus-
band's ability to pay. 
2. Divorce <3=>231 
General purpose of alimony is to prevent 
receiving spouse from becoming a public 
charge and to maintain to the extent possible 
the standard of living enjoyed during mar-
riage. 
3. Divorce e=>237 
In determining whether to award alimo-
ny and in setting amount, trial court must 
consider financial conditions and needs of 
receiving spouse; ability of receiving spouse 
to provide for him or herself; and ability of 
payor spouse to provide support. 
4. Divorce e=>240(2) 
When payor spouse's resources are ade-
quate, alimony need not be limited to provide 
for only basic needs, but should also consider 
recipient spouse's station in life. 
5. Divorce c=>286(3.1), 287 
When trial court has failed to make find-
ings on financial conditions and needs of 
receiving spouse, ability of receiving spouse 
to provide for him or herself, and ability of 
payor spouse to provide support, Court of 
Appeals reverses award of alimony unless 
pertinent facts in record are clear, uncontro-
verted, and capable of supporting only a find-
ing in favor of judgment; so long as record is 
clear that trial court has considered these 
factors, Court of Appeals will not disturb 
trial court's determination regarding alimony 
unless trial court clearly abused its discre-
tion. 
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6. Divorce <3=>286(2, 5) 
Trial court has considerable discretion 
concerning property distribution in divorce 
proceedings; thus, its actions enjoy a pre-
sumption of validity. 
7. Divorce <s=>252.3(3) 
A trial court has discretion to award 
inherited property in divorce action. 
8. Divorce <£=>286(8) 
Court of Appeals disturbs distribution of 
property in divorce proceeding only when 
there is misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law* resulting in substantial and preju-
dicial error, evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequi-
ty has resulted as to manifest clear abuse of 
discretion. 
9. Divorce <s>252.3(3) 
While trial court has discretion to award 
inherited property in divorce proceeding, the 
property, as well as its appreciated value, is 
generally regarded as separate from marital 
estate, and, hence, is left with receiving 
spouse in property division incident to di-
vorce. 
10. Divorce <3>286(8) 
In reviewing husband's claim that trial 
court clearly erred in finding that he spent a 
loan, admittedly a marital debt, to maintain 
and improve a business building, Court of 
Appeals had to give due regard to opportuni-
ty of trial court to judge credibility of wit-
nesses, and Court would not set aside chal-
lenged finding except if it determined it to be 
clearly erroneous. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
11. Divorce <3>278.1 
To challenge finding on property divi-
sion, party must marshal all evidence sup-
porting challenged finding and demonstrate 
how marshaled evidence is insufficient to 
support finding. 
12. Divorce 0=>253(2) 
Trial court's finding that husband spent 
proceeds from a loan, a marital debt, to 
maintain and improve a business building 
was not clearly erroneous, for purposes of 
determining property division; husband did 
600 Utah 875 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
not marshal evidence but merely reargued 
evidence supporting his position and husband 
caused inconsistencies in the record. 
13. Divorce <3=>252.3(3) 
There was no error in trial court's deter-
mination that wife was entitled to one-half of 
appreciation of business building pursuant to 
property division upon divorce; even though 
husband used inherited funds to pay down 
payment on building, he used substantial 
marital funds to maintain and augment that 
asset. 
14. Divorce ®=>223, 226 
Trial courts have discretion to award 
attorney fees in domestic cases so long as 
award is based on findings regarding need of 
receiving spouse, ability of payor spouse to 
pay, and reasonableness of fees. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-3. 
15. Divorce <3=»287 
When trial court has awarded attorney 
fees in divorce proceeding based upon find-
ings regarding need of receiving spouse, abil-
ity of payor spouse to pay, and reasonable-
ness of fees, and when receiving spouse has 
prevailed on appeal, Court of Appeals will 
award attorney fees on appeal and remand 
solely for trial court to make foregoing find-
ings. U.CA1953, 30-3-3. 
16. Divorce <3=>287 
When Court of Appeals reverses partial 
award of attorney fees in divorce proceeding 
and remands for findings on attorney fees at 
trial, Court of Appeals likewise remands to 
determine attorney fees on appeal when par-
ty claiming fees on appeal substantially pre-
vails. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
17. Divorce <3=>287 
When party who prevails on appeal in 
divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at 
trial, claims attorney fees on appeal solely on 
basis of new allegations of change in financial 
condition and those allegations are not a 
matter of record and have not been adjudi-
cated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals 
cannot evaluate claim; prevailing party's 
claim for attorney fees on appeal based on 
allegation of need must be addressed by trial 
court to determine need of claiming spouse, 
ability of other spouse to pay, reasonableness 
of fees and amount, if any, to be paid. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3. 
Frederick N. Green and Susan C. Brad-
ford, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Kent T. Yano, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 




Appellant, Thomas J. Schaumberg (Hus-
band), appeals from a final decree of divorce 
from appellee, Christa C. Schaumberg 
(Wife). We affirm and remand for determi-
nation of whether Wife is entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal. 
FACTS 
At the time of their divorce, the parties 
had been married for over twenty-five years, 
and their two children had reached their 
majority. 
For sixteen years of the marriage, Hus-
band was employed by the military. There-
after, he became self-employed as a financial 
consultant through a solely-owned corporate 
entity. 
During the marriage, Husband inherited 
real property from his father's estate, the 
sale of which resulted in net proceeds of 
$33,933.87. Husband used $20,000 of these 
funds as a down payment on a business 
building. The court found that Husband 
spent an additional $8000 of the inherited 
funds to improve the building. Husband's 
corporation, the sole tenant of the building, 
paid Husband $1250 a month in rent. Hus-
band used these funds to pay the $957 
monthly mortgage payment on the property 
and used the remainder for upkeep. 
Over the years, Husband maintained and 
improved the business property using corpo-
rate and other funds. Prior to trial, Hus-
band responded to an interrogatory to the 
effect that he used the proceeds of a $25,000 
loan (the Armstrong loan) to improve the 
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building. However at trial, Husband sug-
gested that he spent the proceeds of the 
Armstrong loan on family expenses. The 
trial court found in its memorandum decision 
that the Armstrong loan was used in part to 
maintain and upgrade the building. At the 
time of trial, the outstanding mortgage on 
the building amounted to approximately $45,-
000, and the fair market value was $100,000, 
leaving an equity of $55,000. 
The court awarded Wife $800 per month 
alimony. While the court made no findings 
regarding need, Wife submitted the following 
to establish her need and standard of living: 
(1) at the time of filing, in September 1991, 
she declared $3178 as her monthly living 
expenses; (2) at pretrial, she declared $2849 
as her monthly living expenses; and (3) at 
trial, she submitted an exhibit projecting her 
monthly living expenses as $2272.58. Wife 
testified that the three amounts differed be-
cause of her changing understanding of her 
finances and her changing circumstances as 
she moved from a family household to a 
single household. She also testified that the 
last amount most nearly reflected her under-
standing of her projected needs and standard 
of living in a single household. 
Taking into account her skills and past 
experience, the court imputed to Wife an 
earning ability of $1000, and awarded her a 
portion of Husband's military retainer 
amounting to $589 per month. These 
amounts, combined with Wife's alimony 
award, amounted to a gross monthly income 
of $2389. 
At trial, Wife made no claim against Hus-
band's original $28,000 investment in the 
business property. However, she claimed 
one-half of the equity in excess of Husband's 
investment in the building. The court 
agreed with this claim, determining Wife was 
"entitled to share in the appreciation in the 
value of the building in an amount equal to 
S2T,000, which takes into account [Hus-
band's] initial separate property contribu-
tion." The court based this determination on 
the fact that "the rent paid by Husband's 
corporation exceeded the mortgage payment, 
[and that] Husband sought to categorize the 
$25,000 Armstrong debt as a marital debt 
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and he used the funds from the loan to 
improve the property." 
On the last day of trial, the parties closed 
on the sale of their marital house, the pro-
ceeds of which the court had not yet distrib-
uted. At trial, counsel for Wife claimed that 
she feared Husband would keep all the mon-
ey if the title company issued only one check 
in both parties' names. Wife's counsel sug-
gested that the title company issue checks to 
each party for one-half of the sale proceeds, 
pending the trial court's final distribution of 
marital assets. Husband's counsel informal-
ly stipulated to that procedure. 
Later, in its memorandum decision and in 
its conclusions of law, the court awarded 
Wife the entire net proceeds of the sale of 
the house, which amount the court deter-
mined to be $61,730. Both parties agree that 
Husband received one-half of the proceeds 
but did not deliver those proceeds to Wife. 
In making its property distribution, to-
gether with allocation of the Armstrong debt, 
the court determined that each of tlfe parties' 
distributions were equal within a few hun-
dred dollars. 
The court also found that each party 
should pay their respective attorney fees. 
The court based this determination in part 
upon its findings that Wife received a greater 
share of the liquid assets, that the parties 
received a relatively equal distribution of the 
marital assets, that the court had partially 
resolved inequities in the parties' income via 
alimony, and that Husband voluntarily 
agreed to finance their daughter's education. 
Husband appeals and Wife seeks attorney 
fees on appeal. 
ALIMONY 
[1] Husband claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding Wife $800 per 
month alimony because it failed to make a 
finding regarding Wife's need. 
[2] The general purpose of alimony is to 
prevent the receiving spouse from becoming 
a public charge and to maintain to the extent 
possible the standard of living enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage. Howell v. Howell 806 
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P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
[3,4] In determining whether to award 
alimony and in setting the amount, the trial 
court must consider (1) the financial condi-
tions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to provide 
for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
payor spouse to provide support. Chambers 
v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 
1992). When "the payor spouse's resources 
are adequate, alimony need not be limited to 
provide for only basic needs, but should also 
consider the recipient spouse's 'station in 
life/" Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212; accord 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 
(Utah 1991). 
[5] When the trial court has failed to 
make findings on the three factors listed 
above, we reverse, unless pertinent facts in 
the record are clear, ^incontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1025 (Utah App.1993); Howell 806 
P.2d at 1213. So long as the record is clear 
that the trial court has considered these 
three factors, we will not disturb its determi-
nation regarding alimony unless it has clearly 
abused its discretion. Chambers, 840 P.2d at 
843. 
We find no merit in Husband's claim that 
the evidence of need is controverted. Wife 
submitted documents reflecting her changing 
circumstances as she moved from a family 
household to a single household. In addition, 
she testified at trial that her stated needs 
amounted to $2272.58 per month. While 
Husband's counsel vigorously cross-examined 
her on this issue, Husband offered no evi-
dence controverting her evidence of this 
amount. 
Here, the court awarded Wife $800 per 
month alimony, imputed an earning ability of 
$1000.per month and awarded her a portion 
of Husband's military retainer amounting to 
$589 per month. Thus, the court's award 
contemplated that Wife would receive a 
monthly income of $2389. That figure is 
close to Wife's stated monthly need of 
$2272.58. In view of the trial court's equita-
ble distribution of the marital assets and 
debts, Wife's uncontroverted testimony re-
garding her projected needs and past stan-
dard of living, and Husband's ability to pay, 
we conclude that the court considered the 
necessary factors. Accordingly, the court 
did not abuse its discretion in awarding her 
$800 per month alimony. 
APPRECIATION 
Husband claims the court erred in award-
ing Wife one-half of the appreciated value of 
his business property. 
[6-8] A trial court has considerable dis-
cretion concerning property distribution in a 
divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity. Watson v. Watson, 
837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1992). In fact, a 
trial court has discretion to award inherited 
property. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1988). We disturb such a distri-
bution of property only when there is "a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequi-
ty has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion." Id. 
[9] While a trial court has discretion to 
award inherited property, such property, "as 
well as its appreciated value, is generally 
regarded as separate from the marital estate 
and hence is left with the receiving spouse in 
a property division incident to divorce." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah 
App.1990); accord Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 
1018, 1022 (Utah App.1993). Courts have 
considered inherited property as part of the 
marital estate when "the other spouse has by 
his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or 
protected the inherited or donated property, 
when the parties have inextricably commin-
gled the property with marital property so 
that it has lost its separate character, or 
when the recipient spouse has contributed all 
or part of the property to the marital estate." 
Id, However, even in cases when the inher-
ited property has not lost its identity as such, 
the court may nevertheless award it to the 
non-heir spouse in lieu of alimony and in 
other extraordinary situations when equity 
so demands. Id. 
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[10] Husband claims the court clearly 
erred in finding that he spent the $25,000 
Armstrong loan, admittedly a marital debt, 
to maintain and improve the business build-
ing. He essentially argues that the business 
building is not marital property because he 
never used marital funds to augment or 
maintain it. Husband's argument challenges 
the court's findings of fact. In reviewing 
such a claim, we give due regard "to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses," and we do not 
set aside a challenged finding except when 
we determine it to be clearly erroneous. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
[11,12] Moreover, to challenge a finding, 
the party must marshal all evidence support-
ing the chaDenged finding and demonstrate 
how the marshaled evidence is insufficient to 
support the finding. Baker v. Baker, 866 
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah App.1993). Here Hus-
band has not marshaled the evidence, but has 
merely reargued the evidence supporting his 
position. 
Further, Husband caused the inconsisten-
cies in the record. Husband prepared an 
answer to Wife's interrogatory to the effect 
that he spent the loan funds to improve the 
business property. However at trial, he de-
nied this and said he spent the funds on 
family expenses. We therefore defer to the 
trial court, which was in a superior position 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses and 
to weigh the evidence. Thus, Husband has 
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's 
finding that he spent the proceeds from the 
Armstrong loan to maintain and improve the 
building is clearly erroneous. 
[13] Even though Husband used inherit-
ed funds to pay the down payment on the 
building, he used substantial marital funds to 
maintain and augment that asset.: We find 
no error in the court's determination that the 
appreciated portion of the asset changed its 
character from a personal asset to a marital 
asset, See Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169. Like-
1. No evidence in the record suggests that Hus-
band's corporation paid an excessive amount for 
rent (which funds in turn were used to pay the 
mortgage). Our affirmance of the court's distri-
bution of the building's appreciation does not 
turn on the fact that Husband's corporation was 
SCHAUMBERG Utah 603 
(UtahApp. 1994) 
wise, we find no error in the court's determi-
nation that Wife was entitled to one-half of 
the appreciation of the building. 
APPROVED STIPULATION 
Husband claims the trial court erred in 
awarding Wife the entire equity from the 
sale of the marital property. He claims the 
parties stipulated that each party would re-
ceive one-half of the net proceeds of the sale 
and that the court approved that stipulation. 
Both parties agree that Husband has failed 
to deliver to Wife the money he received 
from the title company representing one-half 
of the proceeds. 
At trial, Wife's counsel claimed Wife 
feared Husband would keep all the money if 
the title company issued only one check in 
both parties' names. Wife's counsel suggest-
ed that the title company issue checks to 
each party for one-half of the sale proceeds, 
pending the trial court's final distribution of 
marital assets. The parties never agreed 
that Husband could keep the funds notwith-
standing a later court order. 
Moreover, the court determined that Wife 
should receive all the net proceeds from the 
sale of the marital home. The court made 
this determination while aware that it had 
earlier approved the parties' agreement for 
temporary distribution of the sale proceeds. 
We therefore affirm the trial court's determi-
nation that Wife should receive all the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the marital home. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that 
Wife has substantially prevailed on appeal. 
Notwithstanding the fact that she was not 
awarded attorney fees at trial, Wife asks this 
court to award attorney fees on appeal on the 
basis of allegations in her brief that her 
financial circumstances have changed since 
the time of trial. 
the sole tenant of the building. Nor do we 
suggest that payment of a legitimate business 
expense related to the value or use of an inherit-
ed asset converts that asset or a portion of that 
asset into a marital asset. 
604 Utah 875 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
[14] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (Supp. 
1993) grants courts discretion to award attor-
ney fees in domestic cases. Trial courts have 
discretion to award fees, so long as the award 
is based on findings regarding the need of 
the receiving spouse, the ability of the payor 
spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the 
fees. See Wells v. Wells. 235 Utah Adv.Rep. 
43, 45 (Utah App.1994). 
[15] When a trial court has awarded fees 
at trial based on such findings, and when the 
receiving spouse has prevailed on appeal, we 
will award attorney fees on appeal and re-
mand solely for the trial court to make the 
foregoing findings. See, e.g., Hall v. Hall 
858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App.1993); Allred 
v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974. 979 (Utah App.1992); 
Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 
App.1992); Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah App.1991); Crcmse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 
836, 840 (Utah App.1991); Haumont v. Hau-
mant, 793 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah App.1990). 
[16] Similarly, when we reverse a partial 
award of attorney fees and remand for find-
ings on attorney fees at trial, we likewise 
remand to determine attorney fees on appeal 
when the party claiming fees on appeal sub-
stantially prevails. See, e.g.. Potter v. Potter, 
845 P.2d 272, 275 (Utah App.1993); Willey v. 
Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 556 (Utah App.1993); 
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 742 (Utah App. 
1992). 
[17] When a party who prevails on ap-
peal, yet was not awarded fees at trial, claims 
attorney fees on appeal solely on the basis of 
new allegations of a change in financial condi-
tion, and when those allegations are not a 
matter of record and have not been acjjudi-
cated by a finder of fact we cannot evaluate 
that claim. Heltman v. Heltman> 29 Utah 2d 
444, 511 P.2d 720, 721 (1973); see generally, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp.1993) (re-
garding appellate court jurisdiction). A pre-
vailing party's claim for attorney fees on 
appeal based on an allegation of need must 
be addressed by the trial court to determine 
the need of the claiming spouse, the ability of 
the other spouse to pay, the reasonableness 
of the fees and the amount, if any, to be paid. 
We therefore remand this claim for determi-
nation of whether Wife is entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal, and if so, the amount of fees 
to be awarded. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Wayne PILLING, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 930577-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 27, 1994. 
Defendant was convicted in the Seventh 
District Court, Carbon County, Bryce K. 
Bryner, J., of assault by prisoner, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
P.J., held that: (1) defendant did not pre-
serve for appeal contention that he was not a 
prisoner at the time of the assault; (2) defen-
dant did not marshal the evidence as re-
quired to challenge sufficiency of the evi-
dence; and (3) evidence demonstrated that 
defendant was a prisoner at the time of the 
assault and sustained the conviction. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <2>1030(3) 
Defendant who did not argue at trial 
that he was not a prisoner because he was 
not in custody at time of assault failed to 
preserve the issue therefore precluding the 
court's consideration of the issue on appeal. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-102.5. 
2. Criminal Law <s»1030(3) 
Any error in convicting defendant of as-
sault by prisoner could not have been obvi-
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other is a nullity." 86 Hl.Dec. at 746, 475 
N.E.2d at 1125 (citing Culver u TiUe Guar. 
& Trust Co., 269 AJD. 627, 58 N.Y.S.2d 116 
(1945)). 
In the instant case, the revocation lan-
guage of the trust agreement speaks only in 
the plural. The specific terms, "we reserve 
unto ourselves" are identical to the terms the 
Khan court construed. Additionally, the 
trust states "disposition by us . . . of the 
property . . . shall constitute . . . revocation." 
(Emphasis added.) A literal reading of these 
terms mandates a finding that the co-trustors 
must mutually exercise the power to revoke 
the trust. Therefore, Herschel West as the 
surviving trustor/trustee could not unilateral-
ly revoke the trust after the death of his co-
trustor/trustee, and his quitclaim deed to 
himself and appellee was a nullity. Accord-
ingly, we conclude the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, determining Herschel 
West had authority to unilaterally transfer 
the trust property, was incorrect. The joint 
trust, as the court originally held, has title to 
the home transferred out of trust by Her-
schel West. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that under the terms of the trust 
agreement, the power to revoke was re-
served in Herschel and Hazel West as co-
trustors. Additionally, the trust terms re-
quire joint action to revoke the trust. Ac-
cordingly, the surviving trustor could not 
unilaterally revoke the trust after the death 
of the other co-trustor. We therefore re-
verse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment and remand for the entry of an 
order restoring the property to the joint 
trust and for such further proceedings the 
trial court determines are necessary. 
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
Sahndra K. MARSHALL, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald R. MARSHALL, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 950172-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 11, 1996. 
Wife brought divorce proceeding. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Ray M. 
Harding, J., entered default judgment 
against husband striking his pleadings, and 
subsequently granted divorce decree. Hus-
band appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1) default 
judgment was proper on basis of husband's 
noncompliance with discovery orders; (2) tri-
al court made inadequate findings with re-
spect to alimony award; (3) husband did not 
properly marshal evidence to challenge find-
ings on value of marital estate; and (4) trial 
court's findings and conclusions regarding 
attorney fees were insufficient to allow mean-
ingful review of award of such fees to wife. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Motions <3=>56(2) 
"Nunc pro tunc order" is used to correct 
the court's omission or error; however, such 
an order may not be used to address an issue 
not previously before the court 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
2. Divorce <3=>181 
Court of Appeals did not address propri-
ety of bench warrant for husband's arrest 
ordered at conclusion of divorce proceeding, 
though husband stated in "Statement of the 
Case" section of brief that the issue was on 
appeal, where issue was not mentioned any-
where else in brief. 
3. Divorce <3=>85,160 
Trial court did not abuse discretion in 
entering default judgment against husband 
MARSHALL v. 
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and striking his pleadings in divorce proceed-
ing, even if default was partially based on 
improper ground of husband's failure to pay 
support arrearages; default was supported 
on basis of noncompliance with discovery or-
ders, where husband secreted approximately 
$180,000 in income while insisting to court 
that he had insufficient income to pay an 
additional $1,000 in support, where he never 
presented required statements proving tax 
payments which allegedly accounted for his 
lack of funds, and where he failed to provide 
documentation of several savings and invest-
ment accounts. Rules CiwProc, Rule 
37(b)(2)(C). 
4. Appeal and Error <s>961 
Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1 
Trial court has broad discretion to im-
pose discovery sanctions upon a noncomply-
ing party, and Court of Appeals will not 
reverse trial judge's decision to impose such 
sanctions absent an abuse of that discretion. 
5. Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1 
Discovery sanctions are intended to de-
ter misconduct and require a showing of 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault 
6. Pretrial Procedure @=>44.1, 46 
Striking of pleadings, entering of de-
fault, and rendering of judgment against a 
disobedient party are the most severe of the 
potential discovery sanctions that can be im-
posed upon a nonresponding party; because 
of severity of this type of sanction, trial 
court's range of discretion is more narrow 
than when the court is imposing less severe 
sanctions. 
7. Divorce <§=»85 
Judicial system is not to be manipulated 
in divorce proceedings by one who actively 
and aggressively misleads the court and the 
opposing party. 
8. Divorce <S=>287 
Remand of alimony award for findings 
°n each of the required factors was neces-
sary, where Court of Appeals could not de-
termine the basis of the award or whether 
^ 1 court abused its discretion in the 
amount of the award. 
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9. Divorce <S=>286(3.1) 
Court of Appeals will not disturb alimo-
ny award absent a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of the considerable discretion granted 
the trial court in determining award. 
10. Divorce ®=>235, 237,238 
With respect to alimony award in di-
vorce proceeding, trial court must consider 
the financial conditions and needs of the re-
ceiving spouse, the ability of receiving spouse 
to produce a sufficient income, and the ability 
of supporting spouse to provide support; fail-
ure to consider those factors is abuse of 
discretion. 
11. Divorce <s=>243, 286(9) 
In awarding alimony in divorce proceed-
ing, trial court must make sufficiently de-
tailed findings on each of the three pre-
scribed factors to enable reviewing court to 
ensure that trial court's discretionary deter-
mination was rationally based upon those 
factors; if sufficient findings are not made, 
reviewing court must reverse unless the rec-
ord is clear and uncontroverted so as to allow 
court to apply the factors as a matter of law. 
12. Divorce ®=>278.1 
Ex-husband did not properly marshal all 
evidence in support of trial court's findings 
regarding value of marital property and then 
demonstrate insufficiency of evidence to sup-
port findings, as required when challenging 
those findings on appeal, where he merely 
recited the findings on point and then high-
lighted the evidence which he deemed con-
trary to the findings. 
13. Appeal and Error <®=>757(3) 
In order to challenge trial court's find-
ings of facts on appeal, challenger must mar-
shal all the evidence in support of the find-
ings and then demonstrate that the evidence 
is insufficient to support those findings; 
Court of Appeals will uphold trial court's 
findings of fact if appellant fails to appropri-
ately marshal all of the evidence. 
14. Divorce <§>253(3) 
Where one party in divorce proceeding 
has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or 
otherwise acted obstructively, trial court 
may, under its broad discretion, value the 
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property at an earlier date, i.e., date of sepa-
ration. 
15. Divorce <3=>85, 253(3) 
Trial court acted well within its discre-
tion at divorce proceeding in valuing marital 
property at time of parties' separation, as 
opposed to valuing the property at the time 
of trial, where husband failed to give accu-
rate, verifiable accountings of his income and 
assets. 
16. Divorce ®=>221, 287 
Trial court's findings and conclusions 
with respect to award of attorney fees to wife 
in divorce proceeding were insufficient to 
allow a meaningful review of trial court's 
ruling, though trial court found wife's attor-
ney fees were "necessary," where it made no 
finding regarding wife's need for such fees, 
and where it also awarded substantial marital 
assets to wife. U.CJU953, 30-3-3. 
17. Divorce <s=>226, 286(9) 
Decision to award attorney fees in di-
vorce action must be based upon evidence of 
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of other spouse to pay, and the rea-
sonableness of the requested fees; failure to 
consider any of those factors is grounds for 
reversal on fee issue. U.CA1953, 30-3-3. 
18. Divorce <3>287 
Wife who prevailed on central issue ui 
husband's appeal of divorce judgment would 
be awarded attorney fees incurred as result 
of appeal if trial court determined on re-
mand, following consideration of the three 
required factors, that she was entitled to 
attorney fees for trial-level proceedings. 
19. Divorce @=»194 
Generally, when fees in divorce case are 
granted to prevailing party at trial court, and 
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then 
fees will also be awarded on appeal. 
20. Divorce <s>312.7 
District court was required on remand 
to incorporate into divorce decree the juve-
nile court's order regarding custody and visi-
tation, where district court had certified 
those issues to juvenile court, where parties 
subsequently entered into stipulation on 
those issues which was approved by juvenile 
court, and where juvenile court order provid-
ed that it would be incorporated into divorce 
decree and would be binding on the parties 
as though entered in district court. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-3a-17. 
21. Divorce <3=>287 
Court of Appeals declined to discuss 
husband's claim that child support awarded 
at divorce proceeding was incorrect, where 
trial court was found not to have deviated 
from child support guidelines. U.CA1953, 
78-45-7.12. 
22. Divorce @=»181 
Court of Appeals rejected husband's re-
quest that trial judge in divorce proceeding 
be recused from case where husband failed 
to brief issue on appeal 
Fourth District Utah County; The Honor-
able Ray M. Harding. 
Helen E. Christian, Gustin & Christian, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Samuel King and David J. Friel, King, 
Friel & Colton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before DAVIS, Associate P.J., and 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Donald R. Marshall appeals from a final 
decree of divorce and related matters. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In June of 1992, plaintiff filed for divorce. 
An order to show cause was obtained by 
plaintiff which, in pertinent part, addressed 
temporary alimony and child support. A 
hearing was held on the matter September 1, 
1992. Defendant did not attend the hearing 
and, although aware of the hearing date, 
defendant's counsel was not present because 
of a scheduling conflict In defendant's ab-
sence, the court entered an order which re-
quired that he pay $4122 per month in child 
support and $3500 per month in alimony. 
MARSHALL v. 
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Defendant objected to this order and re-
quested a rehearing on the issues. The trial 
court granted defendant's request, and an-
other hearing was held on October 7, 1992. 
This second hearing resulted in a reduction 
of the child support to $3000 per month,1 but 
the alimony remained at $3500. The support 
payments were retroactive to August 1992. 
Both parties were also ordered to refrain 
from disbursing, disposing of, or encumber-
ing any assets without the consent of the 
other. 
Shortly thereafter, on December 4, 1992, 
plaintiff obtained an order to show cause 
regarding defendant's contempt for his fail-
ure to pay the full amount of the court-
ordered support. Defendant paid plaintiff 
only $5500 per month, instead of the required 
$6500. In response, defendant filed a veri-
fied motion for relief requesting, among oth-
er things, that the alimony be reduced from 
$3500 to $1500, retroactive to August 1992. 
A hearing on those matters was held January 
26, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the trial 
court, by memorandum decision, found there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the tempo-
rary alimony award and also found defendant 
in contempt for his failure to pay the addi-
tional $1000 per month. Defendant subse-
quently filed a motion for reconsideration or, 
in the alternative, a motion to set aside the 
order, arguing the contempt order should be 
reversed and the amount of alimony reduced. 
On April 5, 1993, by memorandum decision,2 
the court partially granted defendant's mo-
tion and vacated the finding of contempt 
However, the court again upheld the alimony 
amount and awarded judgment to plaintiff in 
the amount of $6000, reflecting the amount of 
the support arrearages. 
Because there had been allegations of 
abuse, the issues of child custody and visita-
tion were certified by the district court to the 
juvenile court on May 19, 1993. The parties 
subsequently entered into a stipulation re-
1. Defendant had argued, however, that the child 
support be reduced to $2000. 
2. The record does not reflect that a hearing was 
held on defendant's motion for reconsideration 
or that an order was prepared and signed subse-
quent to the memorandum decision. 
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gdrdmg custody and visitation, which was 
approved by the juvenile court on November 
16, 1993. The custody and visitation order 
provided, among other things, that plaintiff 
and defendant were to have joint legal custo-
dy of the children. The order also provided 
that it shall be "incorporated into the terms 
of the decree of divorce, and shall be binding 
on the parties to the divorce action as though 
entered in the District Court, in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-17." The case 
was then sent back to the district court for 
resolution of the other pending issues. 
On March 10,1994, plaintiff filed a "Motion 
for Order to Show Cause," 3 which was based 
upon several grounds, including defendant's 
failure to comply with discovery, his failure 
to pay the additional $1000 per month in 
support, and his concealment of assets. 
Plaintiffs memorandum in support of her 
motion alleged numerous occasions on which 
defendant had failed to comply with discov-
ery. Plaintiff requested "that defendant be 
ordered, within 30 days, to completely com-
ply with all discovery requests," that defen-
dant be defaulted, and that he be found in 
contempt of court for his failure to pay the 
court-ordered support payments. Defendant 
responded by denying plaintiff's allegations 
and requesting immediate relief from the 
$3500 per month alimony award.4 After a 
hearing, the trial court entered an order on 
May 27,1994, which provided in part: 
6. Both parties are to provide statements 
of any and all assets sold, transferred, 
hypothecated or otherwise handled or dis-
posed of from the time the divorce was 
filed up to the present time. The accountr 
ing should be done strictly within the nor-
mal accounting procedures, and all founda-
tion and background documents must be 
3. Although plaintiff tides the "motion" an "order 
to show cause," an order to show cause was 
never signed by the trial court and it was treated 
as a motion. This was also the case in subse-
quent "motions for an order to show cause." 
4. Each time defendant requested a reduction in 
the alimony amount, he claimed he did not have 
the income to pay the court-ordered amount 
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provided to show the amounts of the sale, 
to whom, the distribution oi those funds 
upon receipt and where they are presently 
located. No further assets are to be sold 
or transferred from this point on. 
7. Defendant is to submit statements of 
all accounts in which defendant has an 
interest Plaintiff asserts she needs dis-
covery of more accounts than defendant 
has submitted 
9. All financial records from each party 
are to be submitted to the other by May 
20, 1994, which should include credit card 
records, bank statements, canceled checks, 
etc. 
The court also denied defendant's request to 
lower the alimony award and granted plain-
tiff a judgment against defendant in the 
amount of $21,9555 for defendant's support 
arrearages. 
In June of 1994, plaintiff began garnishing 
defendant's wages in an attempt to collect 
the judgment. Interrogatories were sent to 
defendant's employer, Prudential Securities. 
As a result of Prudential's answers to the 
interrogatories, plaintiff discovered that al-
though defendant had earlier disclosed that 
he had a certain "Command Account" with 
Prudential, he had failed to reveal that he 
also had three others. Furthermore, while 
defendant testified at his deposition that he 
did not have any stocks with Prudential, 
Prudential's interrogatory answers revealed 
that he held "five groups of stock having a 
face value of $58,000." 
When plaintiff began garnishing defen-
dant's wages, defendant made a partial pay-
ment \n July 1994, but then stopped making 
the monthly $5500 payment.6 Thus, on Au-
gust 19, 1994, plaintiff filed yet another mo-
tion for an order to show cause, seeking 
another judgment for the support arrearages 
and an order of contempt for defendant's 
failure to comply with the support order, his 
failure to comply with the May 27, 1994 
5. This amount included the prior $6000 in ar-
rearages which had been reduced to judgment on 
April 5, 1993 and $955 interest thereon. 
discovery order, and his intentional withhold-
ing of infoTmatfon regarding his accounts 
with Prudential 
On September 9, 1994, before the August 
19 motion for an order to show cause was 
heard, plaintiff filed a motion for "(1) Default 
on Defendant and/or (2) Obtaining Legal 
Fees to Continue Discovery and (3) Con-
tempt" Plaintiff requested that defendant 
be defaulted for his continued failure to com-
ply with discovery or, in the alternative, an 
order compelling defendant to pay plaintiff 
$25,000 so that she could complete discovery. 
Plaintiff also requested that defendant be 
found in contempt for defying the orders of 
the court. In plaintiffs supporting memo-
randa, thirteen instances of defendant's fail-
ure to provide discovery documents were 
specifically outlined. Plaintiff also illustrated 
how defendant had failed to comply with the 
court's discovery orders. 
Defendant responded to plaintiffs motions 
on September 23, 1994. Accompanying de-
fendant's response was "Defendant's Verified 
Statement in Re: Expenses Paid With De-
fendant's 1994 Year-To-Date Income." This 
document revealed that defendant had di-
verted $95,479.49 of his income in 1992 and 
$84,077.74 in 1993 without the knowledge of 
plaintiff or the court This information sug-
gested that he did have sufficient income to 
cover the additional $1000 per month he had 
failed to pay since August 1,1992. 
Plaintiff's August 19 and September 9 mo-
tions were heard on September 27, 1994. 
Plaintiff was present with her counsel and 
defendant's counsel was present. The court 
heard arguments of counsel; the record does 
not reflect the introduction of any evidence. 
As fc result <tf the September 2,7, 1994 
hearing, the trial court entered an order on 
November 1, 1994. This order provided that 
plaintiff be given a $20,000 judgment for the 
support delinquencies for April 1994 through 
September 1994. Paragraph three of the 
order provided that because plaintiff "needs 
her delinquencies paid in order to fund nec-
6. Defendant's justification for this was that the 
garnishment was in lieu of support payments. 
tSHALL v. 
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essary trial preparation, Defendant is or-
dered to pay his delinquencies in full, $41,-
349.71, by November 15, 1994, or he will be 
defaulted." Defendant objected to the order, 
arguing it was improper for the court to 
enter an order forcing defendant to pay sup-
port arrearages or his default would be en-
tered. The court overruled defendant's ob-
jection. 
As a result of defendant's failure to comply 
with the court's November 1, 1994 order, the 
court entered an Order of Default on Novem-
ber 30,1994. The Order of Default provided, 
in pertinent part: 
In this action the Defendant . . . having 
been served through his counsel . . . on 
September 27, 1994, with the Plaintiffs 
Proposed Order on Order to Show Cause 
and on Plaintiffs Motion to Default and 
Defendant's Counterclaim to Reduce Sup-
port, and said Order having been entered 
by the Court November 1, 1994, . . . and 
having not complied with paragraph 3 of 
said Order, now therefore pursuant to the 
terms of that Order, the Default of said 
Defendant in the premises is hereby duly 
entered according to law. 
Defendant filed a motion to set aside the 
default on December 6, 1994, arguing the 
trial court abused its discretion by entering 
defendant's default for his failure to pay the 
judgment for his support delinquencies. 
Without notice to defendant, an evidentia-
ry hearing was held on December 8, 1994, 
during which the trial court received evi-
dence in the form of testimony and exhibits 
on the merits of the divorce.7 At this time, 
the trial court signed the proposed findings 
7- Rule 55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides 
[a]fter entry of the default of any party, . . . it 
shall not be necessary to give such party in 
default any notice of action taken or to be 
taken or to serve any notice or paper otherwise 
required by these rules to be served on a party 
to the action or proceeding. 
*• A nunc pro tunc order is used to "correct the 
court's omission or error." In re Estate of Leone, 
860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App.1993). However, a 
nunc pro tunc: order may not be used to address 
411
 issue not previously before the court. Id. In 
this case, the court utilized the nunc pro tunc 
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of fact and conclusions of law, but did not 
enter them pending a hearing set for Janu-
ary 9, 1995, on defendant's contempt and his 
motion to set aside the entry of default 
[1] Apparently in response to defendant's 
motion to set aside default, the trial court 
filed an "Order Clarifying Default" nunc pro 
tunc8 on December 19, 1994.9 This clarify-
ing order stated that defendant's position 
that the default was entered based on defen-
dant's failure to pay his delinquent support 
was 'inaccurate," and went on to say 
3. At the hearing September 27,1994, the 
Court was persuaded, based on the Plead-
ings filed by the parties and their in-Court 
arguments, that Plaintiff was unable to 
determine the size of the marital estate. 
This was because it was all in Defendant's 
control and he vxis hiding the assets con-
trary to the Court's Order he disclose 
them. Plaintiff asked that Defendant be 
defaulted 
7. The Court finds that Defendant's pat-
tern in . . . (2) taking all known assets (a 
niinimum of $552,000.00 at the time of 
separation, these being solely in liquid as-
sets held at his employer Prudential Secu-
rities), and converting them to unknown 
accounts and refusing to reveal any of 
them to Plaintiff or the Court 
9. In her Motion for Default, Plaintiff 
submitted pertinent Rules and Utah case 
law justifying on the spot default in such 
situations.10 
(Emphasis added.) 
order to correct the court's earlier error in not 
sufficiently stating the grounds justifying the en-
try of defendant's default. 
9. At the December 8, 1994 hearing, plaintiff sug-
gested the court enter this nunc pro tunc order to 
clarify the grounds for defendant's default. The 
trial court agreed and directed plaintiff to pre-
pare the order. 
10. Plaintiff's motion for default relied in part on 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which in pertinent part provides: 
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery . . . the court in 
which the action is pending may make such 
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On the same day the court entered the 
clarifying order, the court entered another 
order captioned "order and notice of hearing" 
which, in pertinent part, provided: 
9. The Courts [six:] [November 1, 199U] 
Order to pay delinquencies or be defauti-
ed[] did not state the underlying reasons 
for the Default Order. 
10. To deal with this the Court directed 
Plaintiffs counsel to submit a Clarifying 
Order of Default setting forth the Court's 
reasons. The Order was to include by 
reference pleadings pending before the 
Court on September 27, 1994, together 
with the content of the Findings, Conclu-
sions, and Decree, these all together stat-
ing the reasons underlying Defendant's 
being in a position to be defaulted 
(Emphasis added.) The order also provided 
defendant notice of the hearing to be held on 
January 9, 1995, which would address defen-
dant's motion to set aside the default and the 
entry of the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and decree of divorce. Additionally, de-
fendant was ordered to personally appear at 
the January 9 hearing to address his con-
tempt and the appropriate sanctions. 
Although the January 9, 1995 hearing was 
held as scheduled, defendant failed to appear, 
citing threats on his life by plaintiff and their 
son and a new job as reasons justifying his 
absence. Following the January 9 hearing, 
the trial court entered the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and decree of divorce 
from the December 8, 1994 evidentiary pro-
ceeding and entered an order on March 6, 
1995, titled "Order From Hearing Dated Jan-
uary 9, 1995, Re: Contempt and Other Is-
sues." In the findings of fact supporting the 
March 6 order, the trial court found, in rele-
vant part, that: (1) defendant's consistent 
position that he did not have sufficient in-
come to pay the additional $1000 per month 
was a falsehood; (2) in defiance of the court's 
discovery order, defendant had steadfastly 
refused to reveal all of the accounts in which 
he had an interest; (3) defendant had failed 
to pay support since July 1, 1994: (4) defen-
dant willfully failed to appear at the January 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and 
among others the following: 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the 
9, 1994 hearing without good cause; (5) "it is 
appropriate that Defendant's pleading be 
stricken if for no other reason than on the 
basis of his non payment of child support;" 
and (6) u[t]he Court did expressly give the 
Defendant the opportunity to provide discov-
ery in an appropriate manner which he 
failed to do. And as a result of these things 
the court felt that his default should be en-
tered and pleadings stricken." (Emphasis 
added.) The court concluded, in relevant 
part, that (1) a bench warrant should be 
issued for defendant's arrest and (2) defen-
dant's motion to set aside the default should 
be denied. Accordingly, based on the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial 
court ordered, in pertinent part, that (1) 
"Defendant has not adequately provided dis-
covery pursuant to Court Order and as such 
it is appropriate that his pleadings be strick-
en;" and (2) that a bench warrant be issued 
for defendant's arrest. (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES 
[2] Defendant raises numerous issues on 
appeal. Defendant first argues the trial 
court did not have a legal basis to enter a 
default against him and, therefore, abused its 
discretion in doing so. Defendant next chal-
lenges the alimony award, asserting both 
that the evidence does not support the alimo-
ny awarded to plaintiff and that the trial 
court failed to make the necessary findings of 
fact. Defendant also challenges the child 
support award, claiming the amount awarded 
is contrary to the Child Support Guidelines. 
Defendant next alleges the trial court abused 
its discretion in valuing and dividing the mar-
ital estate. Defendant argues the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to plaintiff 
should be reversed because the trial court 
failed to make the required findings. Lastly, 
defendant claims the trial court erred by not 
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or pro-
ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient 
party. 
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including the provisions of the juvenile 
court's order regarding custody and visita-
tion into the divorce decree.11 
ANALYSIS 
A. Default 
[3] Defendant claims the trial court en-
tered his default because he failed to pay his 
past due temporary support obligations. Al-
though the court's November 1 and Novem-
ber 30 orders support defendant's argument, 
subsequent orders demonstrate the trial 
judge defaulted defendant based on his fail-
ure to comply with discovery. Furthermore, 
defendant was put on notice that plaintiff was 
seeking default as a sanction for defendant's 
wilful noncompliance with discovery requests. 
Two of plaintiffs motions, one filed on March 
10, 1994, and the other filed on September 9, 
1994, requested that defendant be defaulted 
for his failure to comply with discovery. At 
the September 27, 1994 hearing, the trial 
court heard plaintiffs September 9 motion 
for default from which the order of default 
arose. 
Additionally, at the January 9, 1995 hear-
ing the court stated to the parties that defen-
dant was given numerous opportunities to 
comply with discovery "which he failed to 
do." Consequently, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to set aside his default 
and reinstate his pleadings. In the March 6, 
1995 order, the trial court again specifically 
stated, "Defendant has not adequately pro-
vided discovery pursuant to Court Order and 
as such it is appropriate that his pleadings be 
stricken." Accordingly, it is clear the 
grounds for entering defendant's default 
were his failure to comply with discovery, as 
well as his failure to pay the courtr-ordered 
support. Thus, the issue becomes whether, 
under these circumstances, the trial court 
abused its discretion by entering the default 
and striking the pleadings. 
t4,5] The trial court has broad discretion 
to impose discovery sanctions upon a non-
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complying party. Utah Dept of Transp. v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). We 
will not reverse a trial judge's decision to 
impose discovery sanctions absent an abuse 
of that discretion. Arnica MvL Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah App.1989). 
Discovery sanctions are intended to deter 
misconduct and require a showing of willful-
ness, bad faith, or fault Osguthorpe, 892 
P.2d at 8. 
[6] "The striking of pleadings, entering 
of default, and rendering of judgment against 
a disobedient party are the most severe of 
the potential sanctions that can be imposed 
upon a nonresponding party." Id. at 7. Be-
cause of the severity of this type of sanction, 
<lthe trial court's range of discretion is more 
narrow than when the court is imposing less 
severe sanctions." Id. at 8. 
In the case at bar, defendant secreted 
approximately $180,000 of his income while 
insisting to the court that he had insufficient 
income to pay an additional $1000 per month 
in support When defendant finally disclosed 
what he had done, he explained the absence 
of these funds by presenting copies of the 
faces of cashier's checks purportedly sent to 
the Internal Revenue Service and the State 
of Arizona for tax liabilities. However, de-
fendant has never presented the statements 
evidencing payment of these obligations in 
compliance with the May 27, 1994 discovery 
order. Defendant also failed to reveal sever-
al savings and investment accounts he held 
with Prudential and failed to comply with the 
trial court's discovery order by providing 
documentation of these accounts. 
[7] "[T]he judicial system is not to be 
manipulated in divorce proceedings by one 
who actively and aggressively misleads the 
court and the opposing party " Boyce v. 
Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). Ac-
cordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering defendant's default12 
11. Although the Statement of the Case section of 12. Although the trial court may have erroneously 
defendant's brief states that the propriety of the 
bench warrant is also on appeal, it is not men-
tioned anvwhere else in the brief. Thus, because 
the issue was not briefed, we do not address it. 
Sec State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
1992). 
entered defendant's default partially based on his 
failure to pay support arrearages, we may affirm 
based on the fact that the default was also sup-
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B. Alimony Award 
[S-ll] Defendant also challenges the ali-
mony award, claiming the trial court failed to 
enter the required findings. We will not 
disturb a trial court's alimony award absent a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of the considera-
ble discretion granted the trial court in de-
termining the award. BreinhoU v. BreinhoU, 
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App.1995). It is well 
grounded in Utah law that the trial court 
must consider: " *(D the financial conditions 
and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
supporting spouse to provide support.'" 
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah 
App.1993) (citation omitted). A trial court 
abuses its discretion when it fails to consider 
the enumerated factors. Willey v. Willey, 
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App.1993). "Thus, 
4the trial court must make sufficiently de-
tailed findings on each factor to enable a 
reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court's discretionary determination was ra-
tionally based upon'" the required factors. 
Id, (citation omitted). Accordingly, " *[i]f suf-
ficient findings are not made, we must re-
verse unless the record is clear and uncon-
troverted such as to allow us to apply the . . . 
factors as a matter of law on appeal.'" Id 
(citation omitted). 
After reviewing the trial court's findings 
on alimony, we find them to be "so inade-
quate that we cannot determine the legal 
basis of the award or whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in the amount of the 
award." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App.1991). Thus, <4we reverse and remand 
ported on the basis of defendant's noncompliance 
with the discovery orders. See generally, DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (may affirm 
on any proper basis even though trial court's ruling 
was based on other ground); State ex rei H.R.V. & 
B.P.V., 906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App.1995) (same). 
13. This notwithstanding defendant's evidentiary 
contribution to the fact finding process. 
14. We note defendant's argument that the trial 
court erred in valuing the marital property at the 
time of the parties' separation. "However, 
the alimony award for additional findings on 
each of the . . . [required] factors . . . , and a 
reassessment of the alimony award based 
upon those findings[ J" if necessary. Id 
C. Property Division 
[12-15] Defendant argues the trial court 
abused its discretion in valuing and dividing 
the marital estate. The trial court entered 
findings regarding the value of the marital 
property, which defendant now claims are in 
error.13 However, in order to challenge a 
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the 
challenger "must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings in question." Phillips v. Hat-
field, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n. 1 (Utah App. 
1995) (emphasis added). We will uphold the 
trial court's findings of fact if a party fails to 
appropriately marshal all of the evidence. 
AUred v. Brvum, 893 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 
App.1995). Defendant has not properly mar-
shaled the evidence but has merely recited 
the findings on point and then highlighted 
the evidence which he deems contrary to the 
findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb the 
trial court's findings and affirm the awards 
on appeal.14 
D. Plaintiffs Attorney Fees 
[16,17] Defendant claims the trial court 
erred in ordering him to pay plaintiffs attor-
ney fees because the court failed to consider 
defendant's ability to pay and plaintiffs need 
for the award. The trial court has the au-
thority to award attorney fees in a divorce 
action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 
(1995). However, the decision to make such 
where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden 
its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the 
trial court may, under its broad discretion, value 
the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation." 
Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 
1987). Defendant has acted obstructively in the 
case at bar by failing to give accurate, verifiable 
accountings of his income and assets. Thus, it 
was well within the trial court's discretion to 
value the property at the time of the parties' 
separation, as opposed to valuing the property at 
the time of trial. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 
P.2d 429, 432-33 (Utah App.1994). 
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an award " 'must be based on evidence of the 
finance] need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees.'" Wil-
ley v. WiUey, 866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 
(Utah App.1991)). The failure to consider 
any of the enumerated factors is ground for 
reversal on the fee issue. See id at 556; 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah 
App.1991). 
The trial court entered the following find-
ing of fact regarding attorney fees: 
Plaintiffs fees and costs were submitted 
by ledger . . . to the court in the total sum 
of $25,844.88. Plaintiff's attorney . . . was 
sworn and testified concerning the fees. 
He testified that his hourly charge was 
$120.00, his associate . . . $100.00, that 
those were reasonable and customary, and 
most were incurred in efforts to have De-
fendant reveal his finances. The Court 
finds under all circumstances including the 
partiesO ability to pay and Defendant's 
demonstrated pattern of conduct, that 
Plaintiffs fees and costs are reasonable 
and necessary in full, and awards Plaintiff 
judgment for fees and costs against the 
Defendant in the sum of $25,844.88. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although the trial court concludes that 
plaintiff's attorney fees were "necessary," 
there is no finding regarding plaintiff's need 
for an award of attorney fees. As a result, 
the findings and conclusions are insufficient 
to allow a meaningful review of the trial 
court's ruling, especially in the face of the 
award of substantial marital assets. See WU-
ley, 866 P.2d at 555 (" We have consistently 
encouraged trial courts to make findings to 
explain the factors which they considered 
retevant in srrivmg at an attorney fee 
award.'") (citation omitted). We therefore 
reverse the attorney fees award to plaintiff 
and remand for the entry of further findings 
consistent with this opinion. 
[18,19] Plaintiff requests attorney fees 
on appeal. GeneraDy, when fees in a divorce 
case are granted to the prevailing party at 
the trial court, and that party in turn prevails 
on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on 
appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah 
App.1991). In this case, if the trial court 
determines that plaintiff is still entitled to 
attorney fees after considering the above 
enumerated factors, because she prevailed on 
the central issue on appeal, the entry of 
defendant's default, she shall be awarded her 
attorney fees incurred as a result of this 
appeal See id This amount shall be deter-
mined on remand. 
E% Failure to Incorporate Juvenile 
Court's Order 
[20] Lastly, defendant takes issue with 
the failure of the district court to incorporate 
into the divorce decree the juvenile court's 
order regarding custody and visitation. 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's position to 
the effect that crucial language regarding 
joint Custody and ongoing counseling was 
omitted. Accordingly, we remand the issue 
to the district court so that the order of the 
juvenile court can be incorporated into the 
divorce decree. 
CONCLUSION 
[21,22] We conclude the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in entering defen-
dant's default. As a result, the evidentiary 
hearing conducted on December 8, 1994, and 
the entry of the findings of fact, conclusions 
of laWj and decree of divorce were proper. 
Furthermore, because defendant did not 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings regarding the valuation 
and division of the marital property, this 
court will not disturb the trial court's find-
ings on appeal. We remand the issue of 
alimony for the entry of further findings. 
We also remand to the trial court for findings 
on the issue of plaintiffs need for attorney 
fees and, if appropriate, the determination of 
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plaintiffs attorney fees on appeal Lastly, 
we remand so the juvenile court's order may 
be incorporated in the divorce decree.15 
15. Defendant also claimed that the child support 
amount was incorrect. However, after review-
ing defendant's argument, we find the trial court 
did not deviate from the child support guidelines, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp.1995), 
and accordingly, find defendant's claim to be 
without merit Thus, we decline to discuss it on 
appeal. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 
(Utah 1992). 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
We also reject defendant's argument that 
plaintiffs brief should be stricken for failure to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Finally, we reject defendant's request that 
Judge Harding be recused from the case because 
defendant failed to brief the issue on appeal. See 
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
1992). 
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1] Q. Is it a Sub S corporation? 
2] A. No, it's a regular. 
3] Q. It's a C corp. So the corporation paid 
4] taxes? 
5] A. In that year they did pay taxes, that's true. 
6] Q. And they kept money in the corporation? 
7] A. Yes, they did, in that year. 
8] Q. And there are good reasons for a construction 
9] company to keep money in the corporation? 
10] A. There are good reasons for a construction 
11 ] company to maintain a good cash balance. As to whether 
12] or not it's good for them to keep net income in there, I 
13] question that as a tax planning vehicle. 
14] Q. Some of the reasons the corporation may need 
15] money, obviously, is to pay bills; that would be true? 
16] A. That's correct. 
17] Q. And an important reason they might need 
18] capital is for bonding; that would be true, wouldn't it? 
19] A That's correct. 
20] 0. How do these figures, how do your figures 
21] with respect to the income that you claim that 
22] Mr. Thomas should have or should be impugned to him, how 
23] do those compare with his actual tax returns over the 
24] last two to three years? 
25] A. His personal tax returns? 
